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Abstract  
 
This is a study of the theory of critical Sophistic logic that underwrote Hu Shi’s 
involvement in China’s 20th century reform period known as the Chinese Renaissance. Hu Shi 
was a radical liberal reformer who played a leading role in the New Culture Movement. He 
pursued a two-pronged project for cultural reform. One side of the reform was focused on 
developing a critical pragmatic logical theory. This side was aimed at the intellectual class and 
appealed to the heritage of the Confucian literati. The other side of the reform was focused on 
lifting the people’s vernacular language from vulgarity to serve as the foundation for an 
aesthetically developed and nationally shared knowledge. The national language and body of 
knowledge would equip the common people with tools for communicating with one another to 
share experiences and coordinate judgments about situations of public contingency. This side of 
the reform appealed to the heritage of the oral tradition. Hu Shi conceived of the two sides of the 
reform in coordination. They would bridge the traditional divide between the intellectual and 
common class and unify the nation in critical rhetorical language. Hu developed the Literary 
Revolution to pursue goals on both sides of the reform. It would make the vernacular language 
the national language by elevating its status and expanding the accessibility of written materials. 
He wanted to make cultural exposure and education common for all. With education and literacy, 
the people could gain a sense of the future, a body of shared experiences, and the ability to 
address the most pressing problems of the day. 
      
 
 1 
 
Introduction  Hu Shi (胡适), “Optimist in the Sea of Pessimism”  
 
“When the first volleys of sentimental fire are over…”  
Students swarmed the streets of Peking on May 4, 1919 to air their frustration over 
Japan’s successful claim to territory at the Paris Peace Conference and the Chinese Nationalist 
government’s submissive acceptance of the Treaty of Versailles.1 They had organized on the 
pages of student run periodicals, the likes of which played a fundamental role in the spread of 
radical ideas during the Chinese Renaissance. In 1919 alone, approximately four hundred new 
student publications appeared across the nation. They were written in pai hua, the spoken 
vernacular language that was popularized by Hu Shi, leader of the Literary Revolution.
2
 One of 
the earlier radical student publications, The New Youth, is particularly to thank for spreading Hu 
Shi’s ideas and advancing him as a major figure in China’s New Culture Movement.3 The New 
Youth ran an article that Hu wrote while he was in America, where he studied at Cornell 
University for his B.A. and one year of graduate study (1910-1914), and then earned his Ph.D. 
under the advisement of John Dewey at Columbia University (1914-1917). Hu’s article was 
called “Tentative Proposals for the Improvement of Literature.” Hu’s tentative proposals were 
given a much more radical bent by the support of the journal’s editor, who interpreted the 
proposals as the makings of a “literary revolution,” thus christening Hu’s role as father of the 
Literary Revolution.
4
 After this fervent show of support, The New Youth adopted much of Hu’s 
platform for its operative policies.   
Primary among the adopted guidelines was Hu’s contention that Chinese intellectuals 
leave politics alone to instead concentrate on nonpolitical cultural and intellectual transformation. 
From 1917 to 1919 the journal upheld this sentiment.
5
 In 1919, however, the journal was caught 
in the crosshairs of competing concerns between reform and revolution. Jerome Grieder explains 
in his study of Hu Shi and Liberalism during the Chinese Renaissance, “1919 marked a turning 
point that made such a preoccupation with literary and cultural concerns appear to many only 
peripheral to the vital issues of the movement.”6 The liberal reformers agreed that China had so 
far failed in achieving a republican government and that any attempt at responsible government 
was continuously marred by warlords, preservationist monarchists, and militaristic factions. 
They also agreed that China needed cultural and intellectual rejuvenation and the means of 
standing unaided in the modern world. The contention was essentially about sequence; which 
should come first, political or social reform? Hu was “convinced that intellectual and cultural 
regeneration must take precedence over political reform.”7 His view of political versus 
nonpolitical activity is a bit different from how readers might first think of it. The “political,” for 
Hu, referred to interactions with established political people, which, at that time, included the 
“rascals” of “warlord governments” and “corrupt regimes.”8 The “nonpolitical” realm included 
nonpolitical people, such as students and merchants.  
The activities of nonpolitical people, like students and merchants, included those 
contemporary readers will likely associate with democracy, “demonstrations and street orations 
and the boycott.”9 For Hu, these activities are “non-political forces.” This is an especially 
important distinction to bear in mind throughout this study. Up until this point, China had no 
experience with democracy as a political system. However, Hu pointed out that China did have 
experience with some fundamental characteristics of democratic thought. He sought to see China 
through the natural development of democracy from these ancient intellectual origins.  
Hu regarded democracy… less as a concrete system of political institutions than as a state 
of mind conducive to the maintenance of a particular social condition. It followed 
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logically that the creation of a democratic society would be essentially an intellectual 
rather than a political accomplishment.
10
   
Hu had mixed feelings about the nonpolitical forces acting in 1919. Initially after the student 
movements, when hundreds of student periodicals that adhered to the principles of liberal reform 
sprung up around the nation, he applauded the students’ efforts. He said that the events of 1919 
had imparted a “new lesson,” that activities like these could be “democratizing forces,” “new 
channels of activity… to rebuild a new foundation for Chinese democracy.”11 Later in his life, 
however, “Hu described the May Fourth movement as ‘a most unwelcome interruption’ of the 
work initiated in 1917 and 1918, a blow from which the New Culture movement never fully 
recovered.”12 This is largely due to the fact that nonpolitical forces, even when they seem to arise 
from new intellectual awareness, can be employed for antagonistic political ends, thus making 
for a predicament Hu faced time and time again throughout his career.  
A good amount of Hu’s involvement in the New Culture Movement was spent trying to 
talk fellow radicals off of the revolutionary path in favor of a tempered, gradual reform. This was 
a difficult task for Hu because as Grieder writes, he lived in “an era when revolutionary agitation 
engulfed the streets of China’s cities and filtered even into the narrow alleys of hinterland 
villages.”13 Anger had been brewing in China for a long time. It was rooted in subjugation at the 
hands of foreigners like the Manchu dynasty, the British Opium trade, and Japanese exploitation 
of China’s political corruption and national resources. Further stoked by the Paris Peace 
Conference and Treaty of Versailles, “the students of Peking took to the streets on May 4  to vent 
their anger.”14 United in this way, they “realized for the first time their power as a political 
force.”15 After this experience, many liberal intellectuals did not want to give up this feeling of 
power, or political might, in favor of Hu’s gradual approach to intellectual and cultural reform. 
However, Hu maintained that without adequate intellectual grounding, political might could be 
easily co-opted and directed toward unintended or unbeneficial ends. He believed “that new 
social values must supersede the old before a satisfactory political settlement could be 
effected.”16 China’s traditional society was grounded in an intellectual and cultural system that 
was too strong to simply give way following the addition of something new. A new political 
system had to follow from the firm establishment of an entire system of thought, culture, and 
values.  
This dissertation is a study of the theory of critical Sophistic logic that underwrote Hu 
Shi’s involvement in the 20th century reform movement known as the Chinese Renaissance. It 
traces the path by which Hu Shi attempted to forge this new political system through reforms in 
logic, aesthetics, and public intellectual culture in China. Chapter one is a preliminary treatment 
of the early social and political conditions that shaped Chinese rhetoric leading up to the 
twentieth century. Chapter two surveys China’s ancient intellectual traditions of humanism and 
rationalism beginning with the “Socratic Tradition of Confucius,” which he describes as “the 
tradition of free discussion, criticism, and intellectual honesty,” the original “spirit of courageous 
doubt” in the Taoist’s early naturalistic conceptions of the universe, and the practical advance of 
theories of logic in neo-Mohism. Hu holds the reclamation of these traditions as most necessary 
for China’s transition into the modern world. Each major tradition is addressed with regard to the 
resources it provided for confronting the contemporary predicament, the limitations of the 
tradition in light of Hu’s ambitions for cultural reform, and the choices he made to practically 
appropriate the tradition or to leave it behind. Chapter three looks at the aims of Hu’s literary 
revolution, such as the expanded availability of all literature written in vernacular and the 
creation of new progressive works to introduce and accustom people to progressive cultural and 
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scientific ideas, and thus develop a shared logical consciousness among the people. Here I 
discuss Hu’s vision for the formulation of a communicative literary moral figure that would 
speak to the people in their own language and consolidate rapid, and sometimes drastic, social 
changes into a stable cultural whole.  
 
Trained Incapacities  
Perhaps the most daunting challenge Hu faced was overcoming the centuries-old 
Confucian paternalism that had been indoctrinated into the elite. During the Republican Period it 
was carried forward and translated into terms of nationalism and civic duty. Jan Kiely explains 
how Nie Qijie, a Shanghai industrialist and philanthropist, who promoted the spread of 
traditional morality books in the early twentieth century, made this cognitive transition.  
Like many public moralists of the day, Nie considered his moralism to be consistent with 
the Confucian gentleman's duty… Like his father, he also saw this enterprise as serving 
the modern nation. But he now added the notion that the moral education of the masses 
would foster commitment to civic duties as an expression of popular sovereignty.
17
  
If taken in reverse, the twentieth century translation of traditional morality into national 
sovereignty is reminiscent of the Han period amplification of hierarchal boundaries. The 
hierarchy was used to strictly separate people by their level authority in the family home or in the 
state. The primary focus of this hierarchy was maintaining the reverence people of the lower 
ranks held for people of the higher ranks. Amplification of hierarchal boundaries came at the 
expense of the classic Confucian principle of mutuality, which focused on reciprocal lines of 
responsibility. The lower ranks had duties to fulfill for the higher ranks and the higher ranks had 
duties to fulfill for the lower ranks. The twentieth century translation of morality books into 
printed popular literature revived the spirit of mutuality as a nationalistic impulse toward moral 
self-cultivation. Kiely’s description of moralist Nie Qijie helps illustrate the similarity.   
Of course, he was quite clear that these moral citizens would have to subordinate their 
private interest to the interest of state, society and the dominant moral culture and that the 
way to achieve this was through practices of moral self-cultivation.
18
  
This translation is consistent with a well-known legacy of the Chinese philosophical tradition, 
that is, to subsume new thoughts into the traditional culture.  
Hu’s reform was hampered by the traditional culture’s capacity to maintain cultural 
consistency. The ability was developed in response to the need for socio-political unification 
across a vast land. It was a process of translating new and different influences into the old 
philosophical structure, thus negating the disruptive potential of the new thoughts. Hu Shi offers 
an example of this process explaining that Taoism was essentially a reassertion of the old Sinitic 
religion disguised along the lines of the foreign Buddhist influences it sought to subsume.
19
 
However, this capacity to maintain cultural consistency became a “trained incapacity” during the 
twentieth century, when new needs faced off against an old culture.   
By subsuming or altering new thought, Hu explained, traditional philosophy does not 
allow the people to confront and adequately deal with new problems; the people are suffering 
because of the resistance to change inlaid in their culture. A “trained incapacity” is explained by 
Kenneth Burke as a tendency in thought or action that developed as a capability, or “capacity,” 
but is no longer beneficial in light of new and different conditions. Rather, as a “trained 
incapacity,” the thought or action can actually be harmful to the thinker or actor.20 The 
Republican Period was wrought with tension between the Traditionalists, who saw the nation’s 
future in revival of traditional morality, and the Leftists, who imagined a modern China as very 
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similar to the modern west. Hu maintained that both groups were reactionaries; neither side was 
willing to consider any alternative to what they proposed, and as Hu understood things, both 
sides had selected a faulty set of means.  
Hu’s rhetorical predicament revolved around the need for appropriate means-selection. A 
“trained incapacity,” As Burke says, is a matter of the measures you will take or the tools you 
will put in your toolkit. In other words, it is a “matter of means-selecting.”21 There are a variety 
of things that prevent people from selecting adequate means, including means selected and 
carried forward from the past, intellectual ability, and cultural attitudes.
22
 Hu wanted to create an 
intellectual space in the spirit of scientific inquiry. An idea should neither be accepted nor 
rejected on the basis of its origin or professed moral aptitude. Rather, domestic and foreign ideas 
should be judged on equal footing according to their practical merit within a particular situation 
of need. 
Every step of Hu’s project was directed toward overcoming some trained incapacity that 
came attached to a faulty selection of means. Hu’s literary revolution was intended to confront 
the impenetrability of the classical language for the benefit of the common people. In accord 
with the central focus of ancient and imperial Chinese intellectualism, the language that could 
open the passageway between man and the heavens was fortified and ornamented in procedure 
and style no less than one would expect the citadel of a great city to be physically buttressed and 
adorned. According to Walter Ong, it was also constructed in much the same way, artificially as 
an official language.
23
 Its inaccessibility is widely understood. David Ze, who employs Ong’s 
paradigm to study Chinese literacy, notes that “learning the classical style was not very different 
from learning a foreign language…  [it was] drastically different from oral language.”24 Jack 
Goody explains the inaccessibility of the classical language with his 1987 argument on 
“restricted literacy,” which explains how the oral characteristics of partially literate societies can 
“be ideologically employed by imperial rulers for the consolidation of central control.”25 
Restricted literacy, Goody writes, is “literacy restricted by factors other than the technique of 
writing itself.”26  
Hu also worked to free the intellectual-elite from the bounds of their own cultural 
superiority. The firm divide between the two strata of society kept the intellectual-elite, who 
might have otherwise given the people the tools they needed to effectively confront modern 
challenges, too separate from the experiences of the common people to fully understand the trials 
faced by the common people or the living philosophy that guided them. Likewise, the future was 
uncertain for the elite class following the abolition of the civil service examination system. As 
Wang Ke-wen writes, “with the collapse of its institutional basis in 1905, the gentry ceased to be 
an active class. Its various social and political roles were gradually assumed by landlords, 
bureaucrats, merchants, or local bullies, in the twentieth century.”27 Without the examination 
system, a hole was left in Chinese society and which created panic for young people who now 
saw no clear means of social or political advancement. Hu Shi sought to preserve this divide; he 
asked intellectuals to abstain from dealing with the established political system and political 
people, to instead help develop the cultural groundwork capable of giving rise to an alternative, 
responsible system of government.  
 
A Legacy for Modern Times   
Hu Shi steps into the foreground of China’s reform in the first half of China’s 20th 
century, when three of the most foundational movements in the making of modern Chinese 
thought and political communication rose to prominence. Wing-Tsit Chan records these 
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foundational movements as follows: Western philosophy was introduced, the Confucian tradition 
lost its dominance, and alternative forms of traditional Chinese philosophy were resurrected.
28
 
For all three of these changes, Hu Shi played a primary role. The ambassador of American 
pragmatism to China, Hu’s reform ambitions were one of four distinct nationalistic impulses 
shaping China’s rhetorical climate during the early 1900s. The others included: the Nationalist 
movement as it was led and implemented by Sun Yat-sen, anti-Manchu nationalism, and 
nationalistic sentiment in its more standard anti-Western-imperialist variation.  
Hu’s struggle in the reform movement was complicated by clashing reform factions and 
an increasingly hostile external environment of international war and imperialistic aggression by 
Japan and the West. Changes in Chinese leadership did little to quell the stress. By the time the 
Republic of China was officially established, General Yuan Shikai had already gained control of 
China’s strongest military force, the Beiyang Army. Shortly thereafter, he gained legal control in 
Beijing. Acting as president, Yuan’s rule became increasingly more autocratic, and by the time 
World War II broke out, he had sabotaged the parliament and had allowed political divisions to 
subsume whatever cohesiveness had been remaining in political leadership until that point. Even 
Huang Hsing, the first commander-in-chief of the Republican Party, who had worked to achieve 
the initial revolution with Sun Yat-sen, began questioning the future of Chinese Republicanism. 
Furthermore, the competition between reformers was compounded by the power aspirations of 
former elites, as well as Russian Cominterns, spreading the ideas of Communism. Sun Yat-sen 
would take office again, but only with the help of the Cominterns, and for which he had to accept 
Chinese Communist Party members into the Guomindang. In 1916 China fell into a new Warlord 
Era, thus creating the prime conditions for communist aspirations to take root. Yet, even after 
Mao’s revolution, Hu struggled on, continuing his work in whatever capacity he could.  
The political climate of the reform years was a disorderly array of competing elite, 
intellectual, and military powers in which the voice of the peasant class was virtually non-
existent. The nation’s political future rested on altering the form and medium of political 
communication. Advancing forward under the guidance of American pragmatism, Hu held 
public participation as fundamental to any reform capable of withstanding the political tumult of 
the day. He considered public participation to include: who had access to language and exchange, 
how they expressed themselves, what resources they had to draw upon for judgment, and in what 
forum they could put their ideas before one another. In this sense, Hu’s battle was both 
theoretical and practical. Theoretically he would need to engage the philosophical changes 
already at play to advance the movement away from the Confucian political model. As Hu notes 
of the Chinese Renaissance movement at large, “Its leaders [including Hu] know what they want, 
and they know what they must destroy in order to achieve what they want.”29 Once the 
Confucian base was dismantled, people need to be given direction and the tools to fill the newly 
acquired intellectual and cultural space. Hu explains they would need “a new outlook on life 
which shall free them from the shackles of tradition and make them feel at home in the new 
world and its new civilization.”30  
On the practical end, he would need to direct this shift toward democratic forms of 
judgment, communication, and behavior. Such direction would entail a pedagogical 
methodology to train the public in the practice of democratic participation. Hu found his method 
in the Sophistic spirit and rhetorical arts. They would be the vehicles and resources for public 
communication. Hu describes the goals of movement leaders in this way:   
They want a new language, a new literature, a new outlook on life and society, and a new 
scholarship. They want a new language, not only as an effective instrumentality for 
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popular education, but also as the effective medium for the development of the literature 
of a new China. They want a literature that shall be written in the living tongue of a living 
people and shall be capable of expressing the real feelings, thoughts, inspirations, and 
aspirations of a growing nation.
31
 
Hu wanted to change the ordinary practices of Chinese people. To do this, he formulated the 
Literary Revolution within the larger movement. It was intended to be a renaissance of Chinese 
language, literature, and philosophy; freeing Chinese thought from its classic bonds and giving it 
new voice in the Chinese people’s everyday life experiences with ethics, writing, style, and 
exposure to alternative forms of literature. Yet, all these changes would be predicated on the 
consistent use of a living vernacular.  
Hu remains a pinnacle figure in contemporary studies of rhetoric because his 
contributions are important to the studies of both the western rhetorical tradition and the 
development of Chinese rhetoric. Hu lived between the Chinese and Western cultures, old and 
new. In many ways, Hu was constantly teetering on the crux of something new: Old and new 
forms of language, old and new forms of social dynamics, old and new developments in thought, 
etc… Hu’s ability to help the culture make these transitions is what qualifies him as a 
practitioner of the rhetorical arts. Artists of all kinds, such as rhetors, literary artists, and visual 
artists, are the most significant players in the Literary Revolution. It is the artist who merges 
modern forms of thought with the daily life experiences of the common people.
32
 It is also the 
artist who helps the audience move between particular points of perception and the larger shared 
social experience to invent strategies of cultural change that are effective for both the individual 
and the society.
33
   
Hu’s Renaissance stands out for its foundation in Chinese tradition. Rather than looking 
to import Western methods, as many intellectual reformers did at that time, Hu searched for the 
source material of these methods within China’s own ancient development of logic and scientific 
thought so they might develop organically from within China, rather than stand at odds with 
Chinese understanding as a foreign importation. Hu based his exploration of ancient Chinese 
logic on the metaphor of the ancient Greek Sophistic character as the modern Chinese public 
intellectual capable of seeing China through that period of uncertainty to China’s modern age.  
The conscious element in this movement is the result of long contact with the people and 
civilization of the West. It is only through contact and comparison that the relative value 
or worthlessness of the various cultural elements can be clearly and critically seen and 
understood… Contact with strange civilizations brings new standards of value with 
which the native culture is re-examined and re-evaluated, and conscious reformation and 
regeneration are the natural outcome of such transvaluation of values. Without the benefit 
of an intimate contact with the civilization of the West, there could not be the Chinese 
Renaissance.
34
 
Guided by the Sophist metaphor, Hu sought to recover a certain love of language, education, 
experimental thought and practice that was advantageous for democratic practice and organic to 
China. Hu recognized that waiting in China’s past were the key elements needed for long lasting 
political and cultural change; they needed only to be recovered. By highlighting an appropriate 
base, new forms of political thought, public judgment, public communication, and thus, political 
organization could follow.  
Consistent with John Dewey’s democratic philosophy, Hu viewed education as the first 
step in changing the standard of public participation. As he said in a lecture:  
 7 
 
Let me first state the problem for which the literary revolution offers the solution. The 
problem was first seen by all early reformers as the problem of finding a suitable 
language which could serve as an effective means of educating the vast millions of 
children and of illiterate adults. They admitted that the classical language which was 
difficult to write and to learn, and for thousands of years incapable of being spoken or 
verbally understood-was not suited for the education of children and the masses. But they 
never thought of giving up the classical language, in which was written and preserved all 
the cultural tradition of the race.
35
 
Hu wanted a new model of intellectual leaders, people capable of forming and transforming the 
public through the action of ideas in practice.  
In this project, that new model of an individual leader is referred to as China’s new 
Sophist, marked by the following characteristics: an understanding of opportunity (kairos), 
courage, wisdom, a critical approach, creativity, tolerance, self-sufficiency, and eloquence. The 
new Sophist would engage rhetoric to unite the people in confrontation of the era’s most pressing 
problems. Hu’s promotion of the new Sophist via the Literary Revolution can be viewed as 
analogous to the social function the new Sophist was intended to play. In many ways, Hu was the 
embodiment of China’s modern public intellectual who is propelled by the Sophistic spirit to 
rhetorically engage the situation confronting him.  
Apart from Hu’s many published academic and artistic works, he has also held multiple 
positions of great academic and social influence. After he finished his studies in America, Hu 
returned to China and became a professor at the prestigious Peking University. In 1945 he 
became the chancellor of Peking University. He served as the Nationalist government’s 
ambassador to Washington from 1938 to 1942. Once the Communists came to power, he 
returned to America once again. In 1957 he was Nationalist China’s representative to the United 
Nations. He spent the remainder of his life in Taiwan, where he presided over the Academia 
Sinica until his death in 1962 at age seventy-one.  
The legacy of Hu and his project says a lot about the power of perspective and 
imagination. Daily, these things translate into the choices individuals make. One can better 
appreciate the difference cultural foundations like the perspective of literacy and the kind of 
imagination that is encouraged by causal logic can when considering how just a small difference 
in attitude can set two people of the same culture down drastically different paths.  
With regard to Chinese rhetoric, I mostly see my role with this dissertation and future 
projects, as helping to restore the legacy of Hu Shi. His legacy remains relevant because China of 
today and China of Hu’s time share much in common. However, work must be done to reclaim 
Hu’s legacy from the Communist and Marxist campaigns to purge Hu’s influence from Chinese 
intellectual life in the lead up to the Chinese Revolution. Just a few years before his death, Hu 
returned to Columbia University to record his oral history. He says that his personal endeavor 
can be summarized according to the nine points that the Marxists and Communists worked 
hardest to purge.  
1.  His philosophical ideas. 
2.  His political ideas. 
3.  His historical point of view. 
4.  His ideas on literature. 
5.  His idea of history or the history of philosophy. 
6.  His idea of the history of Chinese literature. 
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7.  His idea on the place and function of evidential research in the study of history and 
classical literature. Classical literature, he said, includes anything written before the 
revolution including great novels written in the vulgar tongue.  
8-9. The last two points are specific to the Chinese novel Dream of the Red Chamber. Hu  
says the purge of his ideas began with this novel, because “I was supposed to be a great 
authority on that novel.”36 
He concludes the list saying: “This list gives me the idea that even today the Communists think 
that I have done some work and have left ‘poison’ in each of the first seven theories.”37 This 
study is part of the work to restore Hu’s thought to its original form, interpretation, and intention.  
For Western rhetoric, Hu’s contributions are relevant to many contemporary discussions. 
In particular, relevance can be seen with educational initiatives to promote study of classical 
theorists and theories from a modern point of perspective and to better integrate disciplines and 
emphases of study, to better explore and utilize the practices in comparison. In the oral history, 
Hu recounts the ambitions he shared with other liberal reformers for a new education. He says:  
We propose to remedy the old fundamental defect of the dearth of comparative material 
from the outside. Since this is outside the narrow scope of classical studies, we asked 
those in the University to resort to all kinds of reference material, all forms of 
comparative studies.
38
 
Hu also advanced a genetic study of history that shares much in common with comprehensive 
contemporary approaches to history. He explains:  
After the so-called May Fourth Movement… It was time for the University professors… 
To settle down on one aspect in which they, as scholars, could play their role, namely, the 
movement for systematic investigation of the whole cultural history of China.
39
 
Hu attributed democratic abilities of thought, communication, and judgment to the knowledge 
begot by these characteristics of a new education: expansive referential materials for comparative 
studies and systematic historical investigations.  
This is a study of Hu Shi’s attempt to direct criticism by rooting it in democratic forms of 
intelligence and experimentalism. Twentieth century China was a conflagration of diversity. 
Nationalism pulsed with intense variation, sustainable political action was stalemated by 
autocratic ambitions and public disfranchisement, and the asynchrony of intellectual restlessness 
exasperated political discontent. Criticism abounded, but it was mostly criticism of the 
undirected and unrestrained variety. This project offers rhetorical studies a genealogy of 
criticism in modern China, as it was introduced, expanded, and then altered. Seen as a function 
of historical continuity, this project offers Chinese communication studies an investigation of the 
Western tradition of criticism as it functioned according to Hu’s aspirations, as well as the 
competitive space it occupied in China’s complex rhetorical environment circa 1920. My 
research includes primary data such as Hu Shi’s dissertation under John Dewey, The 
Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China, The Haskell Lectures delivered by Hu Shi 
in 1933, The Chinese Renaissance, A Collection of Hu Shih’s English Writings, and a variety of 
other essays Hu Shi has published in English, or that were later translated into English by other 
people.  
For Hu, the Western tradition was intended to operate only as a guide, directing a return 
to ancient China’s own logic of “criticism,” so as to restore its logical origin as the basis for a 
distinctly Chinese reform. As intellectual competition, the Western tradition operated much 
differently, at times being used as the very sustenance of Hu’s rivals. Beyond variety, much of 
the time’s turmoil can be attributed to the instability that naturally accompanies transition. Views 
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regarding the benefit or threat of external ideas and materials were changing, as was the selection 
of who would be named heretical in the face of nationalistic sentiment and which branch of 
competition had the primacy of naming them; changes which, at some point in time, led to the 
coalescence of nationalism, thus resulting in the nation’s preparation for self-seclusion and what 
Dewey would call a fiction of national interests, of which logical criticism was a casualty.
40
 Hu 
was not willing to make this compromise; he wanted a nation that could not only fight for itself, 
but could also think for itself while creating an art and culture that could inspire the young 
generation of a new age. 
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Chapter One  History and Problems  
 
Greek Analogy  
The ancient Greek rhetorical tradition provided Hu Shi with an outline of how logical and 
investigative attitudes developed in the West. Hu saw the western tradition as reference material 
that could inform judgments about China’s own intellectual course. He did not see it as a 
blueprint for developing these attitudes in China, nor did he see the western outline as entirely fit 
to the Chinese circumstance. Rather, Hu adopted the outline in much the same way that 
architects provisionally adopt the generic principles of structurally sound buildings. They are 
guidelines based on previous experiences that always come attached to caveats: no two buildings 
are constructed atop exactly similar ground, there is a great deal of variation between the 
integrity of natural materials, each construction team is comprised by the skills and setbacks of 
its members, and even atmospheric variations like humidity can substantially affect the course of 
events. The Greek outline was a resource for Hu and it can be a resource for contemporary 
western rhetorical scholars who are trying to gain access to the burgeoning field of Chinese 
rhetoric.   
One way for Western scholars to apprehend Chinese traditions in rhetoric is by 
identifying places of parallel between the origins of rhetoric in ancient Greece and the origins of 
rhetoric in ancient China and how these origins account for respective developments in rhetorical 
culture. Differences in communication are rooted in differences of culture, and differences of 
culture extend all the way back to the curvatures of the earth we settle on.  Therefore, to address 
the concerns of communication we must begin by understanding their historical foundations. We 
can start by looking at the basic political economy of China, i.e. where did people create 
communities, what did they eat, how did they travel, what brought excitement, and what were 
the causes of concern? 
The rise of Crete and Greece from early Mesopotamia brings the contrasting rise of China, 
or the Middle Kingdom, 中国 (Zhōngguó), into sharp focus. Both the Greek and Chinese 
civilizations developed when dispersed communities congealed under a single, central authority. 
There can be no denying Sarah Pomeroy’s assertion that the movement, “from a loose 
community of towns and villages into a centralized state changed the course of human history.”1 
However, the process of centralization happened differently in China than it did in Greece. The 
first upsurges of western civilization followed from the formation of states. Agricultural 
advancements drew people into large groups around fertile ground. Towns became cities and 
cities continued to grow larger and larger. “In the fertile irrigated areas, the largest and most 
powerful city dominated the towns and villages and drew them into a single political unit, 
administered from the capital.”2 People literally came together.  
The social conditions in Greece led to the development of the rhetorical arts. The city-
states were individual political units. Each had its own agricultural resources and social 
stratification. As separate entities, the Greek city-states fought for dominance over one another. 
As Pomeroy notes, that is “the natural reflex of states that border on one another.”3 The social 
hierarchy took shape, in part, according to these shows of domination. “A powerful city-state 
would intimidate and conquer its weaker neighbors, becoming the capital city. Its ruler would 
then become the great king over a number of vassal states.”4 The formation of cities translated 
into great advancements in such things as artistry and craftsmanship, writing, and architecture.
5
 
In western city-states, the products of intellectual and technological advancements were put to 
work in support of the social hierarchy. The conquerors capitalized on the labor of the conquered 
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to magnify their wealth. The toil of the conquered kept them subject to their state and new 
technologies, like metallurgy, reinforced the connection between the physically dominant and 
wealthy class, due to the effectiveness of bronze weaponry and the cost of bronze respectively. 
 
Taking the Greek for Granted  
The problem of using this analogy as an in-road to Chinese culture and rhetoric is the 
propensity of western scholars to take the Greek characteristics for granted. There is a particular 
political development in each of the ancient civilizations, Greece and China, which becomes 
decisive in the development of that civilization and sends them down divergent paths. For the 
Greeks, it was the development of the polis and cultivation of democracy. For the Chinese, it was 
consolidation of the entire Middle Kingdom under a single source of power known as the 
Mandate of Heaven.  
Just as scholars of western rhetoric have realized the significance of the social and 
political conditions of ancient Greece to the development of rhetorical traditions, the same kind 
of intelligent cultural access is necessary to understand the rhetorical traditions of a different and 
distinct civilization. This kind of intelligent cultural access comes from knowledge about the 
historical and political conditions that put people into contact with each other in communities 
and grouped people according to shared interests. The multiple localities of Greece spurned on 
the development of rhetoric because it encouraged wagers of power between small individual 
units. Rhetoric developed differently in China. Histories like China: A New History by John 
King Fairbank and Merle Goldman provide the groundwork for western scholars interested in the 
historical conditions behind cultural development. However, they do not provide adequate 
cultural access for addressing the concerns of communication scholars.  
 Viewed as a vast communicative land tied together by human interactions based in 
cultural traditions of oral communities, communities of restricted literacy, and morally and 
ritually based political ethics, it is easy to see the great rhetorical significance of China. In some 
instances these traditions are uniquely Chinese, some traditions are common to Asia, and still, 
there are some traditions in China with similarities to the traditions developed on the other side 
of the globe under seemingly very different social and political conditions. In these similarities, 
scholars of rhetoric have the opportunity to learn about the aspects of human communication that 
are perhaps universal. Insight into differences and similarities between Chinese and Greek 
rhetorical traditions also provides scholars of western rhetoric with a new perspective from 
which to observe and approach their own culture. For a long time a Euro-centric paradigm has 
dominated the field of communication scholarship. I second Guo-Ming Chen’s advocacy for 
multicultural co-equality in communication scholarship.
6
 The insight one can gain about his/her 
own culture via the perspective of another culture is, I believe, foundational to co-equality 
between an Asiacentric paradigm and a Euro-centric paradigm. The process of viewing one’s 
own cultural traditions from another’s cultural perspective is uniquely capable of developing the 
researcher’s respect for the intricacies and special qualities of each culture’s traditions.    
 
Cultural Accessibility  
If we do not take the characteristics of Greek culture for granted when investigating the 
social and political conditions that directed China’s rhetorical development, the Greek analogy 
can be a significant resources for those places where authentic overlap exists. Hu Shi drew from 
this resource to develop his plan for China’s cultural reform. He used comparisons and contrasts 
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between ancient China and ancient Greece to gain new insight into China’s intellectual legacy. 
He was particularly drawn to incidents of overlap.  
Readers might better understand Hu Shi’s project of studying ancient China with 
perspective from ancient Greece if they think of his approach in terms similar to Tocqueville’s 
introduction of America to Europe. Tocqueville addressed the issue of cultural inaccessibility by 
introducing America to Europeans according to America’s foundational values. He differentiated 
the New World from its ancestral European countries by highlighting America’s single founding 
principle, democracy. He set the democratic principle apart from the others it still contended with 
in the old European societies, and thus, set America apart from the old world where it could be 
considered on its own terms, according to the values of its founders and the inspiration of its 
people.  
This introduction of America confronted the difficulty of one culture trying to gain 
intelligent access to another culture. Tocqueville understood that such access requires historical 
insight into the intellectual and spiritual motivations of another culture. It did not surprise him 
that democracy looked different in America, because he knew that un-tempered and 
unencumbered as it was in America, democracy would necessarily be different. Rather than 
being reshaped or altered by collision with competing principles, American democracy shaped 
everything else. From all the political and social beliefs of Europe, it was the democratic 
principle alone that American emigrants took with them; and they laid it as the bedrock of the 
government, economy, and civil society. Thus, Tocqueville writes, “It has there been able to 
spread in perfect freedom and peaceably to determine the character of the laws by influencing 
the manners of the country.”7 He saw this principle as inseparable from the New World, but 
different as it was, he maintained that by understanding how it functioned where the democratic 
revolution was “a fact already accomplished,” Europeans would better understand the 
revolutions happening at home.
8
  
Rhetoricians still need a Tocqueville to bring China’s political and rhetorical traditions 
within this kind of intelligible reach. Early on in his academic life, Hu Shi demonstrated a great 
ability to see beyond the culture of his own time and national land. When he studied in America 
he demonstrated the great lengths to which his cultural intelligence could extend. Still, and 
perhaps most impressive, Hu Shi returned to China to show that his cosmopolitan gains were not 
at the expense of his sensitivity to the nuances and longevity of national cultural legacies. Yet, 
Hu’s kind of expansive awareness is uncommon and he never tried to play the role of a 
Tocqueville in total. Rather, Hu followed in the Chinese philosophical tradition and grounded 
himself in the complimentary theories of pragmatism. From this vantage point, he tried to furnish 
understanding via a teacher’s cultural guidance and practical instruction.  
Hu Shi was essentially a reverse Tocqueville; he gleaned insight about his own culture 
from his understanding of another. He then called on the Greek analogy to teach his fellow 
academics about the scientific and democratic attitudes that he believed to belong in the modern 
Chinese civilization.   
His role as a teacher is consistent with the prevalence of teaching in China’s 
philosophical tradition. As Mary Garrett points out in her case study of Pathos during China’s 
Classical Period, “There is no Classical Chinese term for ‘philosophy.’”9 The intellectuals of 
China, who would be considered philosophers in the West, were not the sort who “engaged in a 
disinterested search for a transcendental Truth.”10 This is a very important aspect of China's 
intellectual legacy, which Hu Shi made sure to point out to an American audience in 1933. He 
gives the example of an associated Chinese word, 教 (chiao) [jiào], which means teaching or 
 15 
 
system of teaching. This word covers a wide array of teaching, he says. “To teach people to 
believe in a particular deity is a (chiao) [jiào]; but to teach them how to behave toward other men 
is also a (chiao) [jiào].”11 Hu played the role of philosopher in the sense of a cultural teacher. His 
work functioned as a philosophical bridge between the East and West in terms of explaining 
China’s intellectual tradition to the West and incorporating Western pragmatic and procedural 
traditions into projects for cultural reform in China. However, as Hu focused on his philosophical 
roles as teacher and reformer, he tended not to focus on historical translation of the political and 
economic communicative background. This background is still needed if western scholars are to 
gain intelligent access to China’s communication culture.  
Tocqueville's insight informs our present need in a couple significant ways. First, his 
intelligent assessment of the American culture and its founding political and rhetorical traditions 
is a model of the type of cultural exploration needed in order to gain intelligent access to those 
same traditions in China. No principle capable of inspiring revolutions is free of impurities. In 
America, Tocqueville writes that he saw “the image of democracy itself, with its inclinations, its 
character, its prejudices, and its passions.”12 This image of democracy, he thought, would give 
Europeans a sense of both “the evils and the advantages which it brings.”13 He explains, “I have 
examined the safeguards used by the Americans, to direct it, as well as those that they have not 
adopted, and I have undertaken to point out the factors which enable it to govern society.”14 
Second, Tocqueville explores the principle of equality as a condition attendant to 
democratic communities. He explains the far reach of effects, expanding to habits, ideas, and 
customs, and the drastic extent of change, equal to changes in the political world, which the 
principle of equality has wrought on civil society.
15
 The civic conditions that embody the 
principle of equality are revealed on both ends of their social institution. The characteristics of 
democratic civil society are, in some circumstances, symptomatic of political principle and, in 
other circumstances, the preconditions. Tocqueville’s project clearly draws illustrative 
connections from one characteristic to another and, taken in comparison, reveals aspects of Hu 
Shi’s cultural insight less clearly articulated in the formulation of his project for cultural reform. 
For example, Hu understood that society needs to be preconditioned for democratic living and he 
maintained that democratic life paves the way to an ethical economy, or what he later called a 
spiritual democracy. Hu had difficulty expressing these conclusions among his contemporary 
intellectuals in China. His meaning would often get sidetracked in the struggle to adequately 
define his terms. Or, like the mélange of principles that competed with democracy in 
Tocqueville’s Europe, the concepts Hu drew from the American pragmatic perspective would 
collide with the array of other Western conceptual imports.  
 
Social and Political Foundations  
The most significant characteristics of ancient Chinese society and politics are rooted in 
China’s agriculture. The rice economy is the bedrock of Chinese society. In his study of peasant 
life and rural development in the Yangzi Delta, Philip Huang, explains that there is a 
“presumption of the interdependence of natural environment, social-economic structure, and 
human agency” that is central to his work.16 While any one region of China is not suitable to 
represent all of China, each region individually operates as its own ecosystem comprised of these 
three interacting elements. Until recent times, these ecosystems were tied together by China’s 
rice economy, in which an “unfavorable population-land balance” necessitated reliance on rice. 
In effect, rice played a significant role in the unification of the Chinese civilization because it 
was one of two major native crops, and Fairbank and Goldman explain, it could yield twice as 
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much food as the other.
17
 Agricultural unification was reliable because until the latter half of the 
twentieth century, Barker, Herdt, and Rose note, most “Asian rice economies lacked the capacity 
for technical change that would permit rapid growth in rice production to create the food 
surpluses needed for economic development.”18 A food surplus is a necessary precondition of 
economic development, without which there can be no profit for the producer.
19
 
The physical construction of society impeded the development of logic just as much as 
the intellectual construction of society. Max Weber characterizes China as a “familistic state,”20 
which is similar to saying it is a clan state, for “the Chinese clan structure is a logical extension 
of the Chinese type of kinship in which all Sons inherit equally.” The historical situation that Hu 
contended with was like a structure of building blocks; the political development is related to the 
intellectual development, which is related to the organizational development, which is related to 
the land on which it all started.  
The entire mass of China needed to operate as a single economic unit due to differences 
in topography and the pressure of population on the land, which Barker, Herdt, and Rose point 
out, has historically been most severe in East Asia.
21
 However, economic unification called for 
political unification, which was no easy task given the difficulties created by the expanse and 
challenging terrain of the land. Like Greece, warfare was continual in Classical China. Garrett 
notes that the period of time referred to as Classical China, roughly 500-200 B.C.E., was is also 
called the “Warring States period.”22  
It witnessed nearly-continuous and brutal warfare between many city-states struggling for 
hegemony, or, less ambitiously, for survival. At the same time a series of dramatic 
technological and cultural changes, such as growing literacy, rapidly increasing 
urbanization, the buying and selling of land, introduction of money, and a shift from 
feudalistic and familial forms of rule to ever-more impersonal, centralized, and 
bureaucratic government relying on written laws and procedures, all weakened the hold 
of tradition.
23
  
Further, many of the problems faced by twentieth century reformers had to do with the fact that 
extreme measures had to be taken by Chinese rulers to consolidate land and disparate peoples. 
Inhospitable climates and geographic isolation kept some regions of China relatively 
autonomous from political centers.  
A common mistake is to assume the Chinese and Chinese culture emerged from some 
single ethnic stock, the origins of which could be linked to a particular place and time. 
But rather than attesting to such a common source, the evidence points to a pattern in 
which, over time, many distinct groups were blended and absorbed into the composite 
that we now think of as the people of the Han-names for the dynasty that constituted one 
of China's golden eras. This blending an amalgamation would be far less complete in the 
absence of the dynastic system for which China is famous.
24
  
The tough agricultural traditions of China gave rise to the placement of the Chinese people and 
the old religious practices that held agricultural and nomadic communities together. Likewise, 
the spread of these communities over an expanse of various difficult terrains led to a political 
culture that valued unity above all.  
 The next portion of this chapter will discuss five of the most significant aspects in the 
shaping of traditional Chinese culture:  
1. The Mandate of Heaven  
2. The Old Sinitic Religion  
3. Traditions of Stratification and Officialdom  
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4. Common Orality  
5. The Literary Elite   
This is by no means a thorough overview of these five characteristics, nor should this brief 
overview be taken to imply that other characteristics of China’s cultural development might not 
be equally significant, or even more-so, depending on the perspective of another investigation. 
This overview should be understood to assert the following: These five cultural characteristics 
are of especial importance to the development of China’s intellectual heritage, and as such, are 
exceedingly significant to Hu’s project for China’s cultural reform. As we look at these 
characteristics some interesting angles of Hu’s project will become more apparent, such as places 
where Chinese traditions become helpful to explaining Western traditions in China, places where 
Western traditions become helpful to explaining Chinese traditions in the West, and conversely,  
places where Chinese traditions can be explained in China by referencing traditions of the west, 
and in turn, western traditions can be explaining in the West by referencing traditions of China. 
After discussing these characteristics, I will give a brief overview of the kind of changes China 
was facing in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries which amplified a few important 
aspects of Hu’s rhetorical situation, namely that the western world is aggressive (in might and 
thought), the old world is not sustainable under the weight of the new world’s (systemic) changes, 
and the risk of China following the path of Japan.    
 
The Mandate of Heaven 
Questions about power, who had it and who might take it, were constant between Greek 
localities. In China, on the other hand, all of the Middle Kingdom was unquestionably subject to 
the power of Heaven. In essence, the Mandate of Heaven was the very definition of power. It 
sanctifies the right to rule and appoints the leader, or emperor, as Son of Heaven, the legitimate 
authority over all people. To understand traditional China, the Mandate must be understood in 
terms of political unification and structure. The geopolitical factors mentioned earlier, such as 
population pressure, harsh terrains, and food supply, both necessitated a sturdy political structure, 
and enabled total unification under the Mandate.  An all-encompassing definition of power, 
similar in kind, would not have been possible in water-based cosmopolitan Greece.  
Socially, Heaven’s Mandate permanently connects the interests of the elite and the common 
stratums of Chinese society, which otherwise, share very little in common. Two beliefs, at the 
crux of the Mandate, function as the binding tie. The first of these is the belief that “Heaven is a 
causal agent that affects the course of human history.”25 The Confucian philosophy of the elite 
and the Taoist philosophy of the common people overlapped at the implementation and honor of 
Heaven’s Mandate. Excepting this, the elite and common stratums were divided by daily belief. 
The common people were most concerned with a Taoist understanding of the universe, which 
made the most sense in light of their daily experiences living on the land and at the mercy of the 
elements. For them, the universe seemed a cruel place and the Taoist notion of non-intervention, 
which called for living in accord with nature instead of challenging it and incurring a brutal 
kickback, made sense. “The connection between man and the heavens lies at the core of virtually 
all ancient Chinese discussions about both society and nature.”26 The ability to communicate 
with heaven meant being able to communicate with the brutal force that accounts for the 
predominate focus of the old Sinitic religion and Taoism. Zhang Dai-Nian explains, “What is 
called heaven in ancient China had various implications, but after the middle period of the 
warring States most thinkers mean mainly nature by Heaven.”27  
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The language used by the elite stratum was most concerned with Confucian principles of 
duty and authority based on the idea that social stability results from the moral rightness of its 
constituent relations. Rightness could be found in the original ideas determined by the sages of 
old, held within the Confucian Canons, and communicated in the Classical language. The 
Mandate was conferred to the best of the scholar officials, who through great knowledge of the 
Classics and great skill with the Classical language, was positioned in closest proximity to 
heaven. The ruler is the pinnacle of the social hierarchy, and thus, the moral compass for all of 
society. His directives are passed down through the chain of command, and eventually, reach the 
common people who day to day live furthest from the throne. For both stratums, common and 
elite alike, the will of the universe, played a directive role.
28
 
The scholar is elevated in society by the second core belief in the principle of mutual 
reliance. It unites the people under the Mandate by contending that the people need the ruler and 
the ruler needs the people. For society to function harmoniously the people and the ruler must be 
faithful to their respective roles; the ruler must be benevolent and the people must be loyal. 
Benevolent rule begins with a ruler who is fit to be an exemplar. Education in the classics 
equates to social power because to be “classically literate” is to be literate in the ways of heaven. 
The common people who strive to live in accord with the heavens rely on the scholar’s insight 
into the ways of the universe.  A scholar gains access to the secrets of nature held within the 
classical texts in turn, they become indispensable to the common majority who has no access on 
their own. It was important to lead by example because scholars had difficulty communicating 
these secrets to the common people.  
On the one hand, the common people had no spare time and were mostly illiterate. They 
had to work the land, and as Fairbank and Goldman aptly put it, the people survived by 
supplementing “natural recourses with unremitting human endeavor.”29 Many of the common 
people were also illiterate or merely functionally literate. Until printed materials became widely 
available, this was no great matter. Once printing became widespread during the Northern Song 
(960-1126) elites would find it more in their interest to deter literacy than to advance it.
30
 After 
all, education begot power, and “printed matter was the life-blood of the expanding Song 
educated elite.”31 
According to the Confucian principle of mutuality, the common people should not have 
considered themselves at any great disadvantage for lack of literacy. The principle of mutuality 
is the ethical backbone of “rightful” authority; it accounts for a chief inconsistency in Confucian 
theories of social hierarchy, and yet, a major foundation for the success of these theories in the 
political realm. The principle of mutuality is a primary element of all Confucian Relations. The 
principle is most easily understood in Western terms as friendship. Friendship, is one of the five 
relationships, and is consistent in meaning to the Western notion. Friendship, is “based on 
neither rank nor age, [it] is the paradigmatic expression of the spirit of mutuality.”32 It is 
essentially the idea of exchange, or reciprocity. It says that although people fill different social 
roles, all people benefit, and to some extent rely on, the roles being played by others. The people 
need a ruler and the ruler needs the people. It is a symbiotic relationship that fits society together 
like a puzzle each piece holding the other pieces in place. It is only interrupted when the 
functions of one role or another are not being fulfilled as they are supposed to. Such interruption 
will either prevent other people from performing their roles adequately, or will create the type of 
animosity and intention that naturally arises when a few are left to take on more than their share 
of responsibility. 
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Mencius, a Confucian philosopher who lived during the Warring States period, was a 
strong advocate of the duty and responsibility bound relationships derived from the spirit of 
mutuality.
33
 The relationships prescribe standards of interaction based on one person’s relation to 
another within the filial or social unit. They exist between parents and children, ruler and 
minister, husband and wife, and between older and younger.
34
 Mencius records his thoughts on 
the principle of mutuality as he reflects on conversations he had with various rulers of the 
disintegrated states.
35
 Here he recounts the words of the ruler Yao, of the Tang state.  
Encourage them, lead them,  
Reform them, correct them,  
Assist them, give them wings,  
Let them ‘get it for themselves.’ 
Then follow by inspiring them to Virtue. 
36
 
According to Yao, this is the correct kind of behavior for the “ruler” of any relationship. A 
parent should encourage their child, a ruler should enable their minister, and a husband should 
inspire his wife. In turn, the “subject” of any relationship attends to the necessary and lowly tasks 
of life so that the ruler can fulfill his potential. This is the principle of the division of labor.  
Confucius said, ‘great indeed was Yao as a ruler. Only heaven is great, and Yao 
patterned himself after heaven. How vast, how magnificent! The people could 
find a name for it. What a ruler was Shun! How lofty, how majestic! He possessed 
the Empire as if it were nothing to him.’ As Yao and Shun ruled the empire, it 
could not have been done without their fully devoting their minds to it, but they 
did not devote themselves to tilling the fields.
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The principle of the division of labor, Mencius explains, enables the ruler to function as a ruler, 
which he cannot do if he were to spend his time working on the land.
38
 The people must till the 
land and the ruler must rule. The ruler needs the goods of the land and the people who spend 
their time with the land need a ruler. 
 The division of labor exhibits the principle of mutuality; it enables everyone to contribute 
their skills to society so that the entire society benefits. Mencius says that some work with their 
minds and some work with their muscles, they are the people who govern and the people who are 
governed respectively. The governed support those who govern, and those who govern do so for 
the good of the governed.
39
 The rulers serve the needs of society and the common people serve 
the basic needs of life.  
According to this exchange of skill, the king has a great responsibility to the many 
endeavoring below him. If the ruler fails to discharge his duties in accordance with the mutual 
agreement, the failure is evidence of his loss of the Mandate, and hence, loss of rightful authority 
to rule. Loss of the mandate is revealed a variety of ways, as Mencius says “Heaven does not 
speak but simply reveals the mandate through actions and affairs.”40 This could be the sickening 
of the king, a great flood of the state, or simply an overthrow of the throne. Of this element in 
“the established religion of Confucianism of the Han Empire (206 B.C.-A.D. 220),” Hu Shi 
writes, “great catastrophes (such as floods, famines, and great fires) and strange  anomalies (such 
as comets and eclipses of the sun) were warnings of an all-loving Heaven to terrify the rulers to 
repent and reform their acts of misrule.”41 
 
The Old Sinitic Religion  
The original faith of the Chinese common people, what Hu Shi calls, the old Sinitic 
religion is a primary base of Chinese culture, a product of an agrarian and nomadic society in 
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which the daily life experience of the common people coalesced with the simple mythology and 
limited ritual of a basic racial religion.
42
 Hu maintained, that the old Sinitic faith accounts for 
certain forms of thinking antithetical to modern politics and economy. It developed from “a 
series of historical factors… which tended to make the Chinese people less other-worldly than 
the other historical races of the earth.”43 These factors include China’s geographical position in 
the north-temperate zone and other philosophical developments that further simplified the 
already simple religion of old.
44
  
In the twentieth century, Chinese reformers wrestled with the characteristic of passivity 
that was common among the people. Passivity enters the culture as the legacy of topographic 
conditions that made life hard for inhabitants of the land and shaped their faith. “The bounty of 
nature was never abundant and the struggle for existence was always hard.”45 The toilsome life 
produced people who work diligently, live simply, and imagine little. Day-to-day survival 
required so much energy that too little remained for intricate religious developments. The 
agrarian experience in old China must have seen something of an uphill battle to the people. No 
matter where one lived, there were a variety of factors that worked to make food scant and 
survival hard. From climate, to an overabundance of people on just a small bit of arable land, to 
seasonal catastrophes like floods and droughts in different regions of the nation, to ground 
conditions that allowed the people to farm only one season of the year and rely on shipments 
over rough terrain from other parts of the nation for the rest, all of these factors came together to 
create a faith relevant to experience. The resulting faith was one with dictates of hard work and 
minimal expectations and joined by the passivity of acceptance and patience, to simply let nature 
move on. 
The old Sinitic faith of the common people tended to suppress critical thinking because it 
taught people to “follow the course of nature,”46 which for the farmer, moved in cycles and 
wholes far from the control of man. Then, Hu Shi explains, “This already very simple religion 
was further simplified and purified by the early philosophers of ancient China.”47 Laotze, for 
example, taught that “there was only a natural process which he called the ‘Tao,’ or way.”48 For 
the common people, living on the land, Hu writes, “the bounty of nature was never abundant and 
the struggle for existence was always hard;” the people had little time to partake in complex and 
speculative metaphysical notions, and would naturally welcome a faith that acknowledged the 
cruelty of the environment and offered a way to avoid its wrath.  
In a sense, China's philosophical landscape had emptied and was primed for constructive 
thinking. All philosophy was directed “in search of the tao, a word which” Hu says “has been 
unnecessarily mystified by amateurish translators but which simply means a way or a method; a 
way of individual life, of social contract, of public activity and government, etc. in short, 
philosophy had set out in quest of a way or method of ordering the world, of understanding it and 
bettering it.”49  
 
Traditions of Stratification and Officialdom  
As the pinnacle of cultural thought, the Mandate of Heaven shaped Chinese society by 
maintaining a highly polarized, though connected, social strata and by limiting oppositional 
forces among the elite members of the society. The Chinese common people, the majority, who 
lived day to day steeped in the cultural characteristics of orality, comprised one stratum. Across 
the divide, stood the elite members of society who were classically educated, and thus, powerful. 
The elite class experienced daily life very differently; theirs hinged on cultural characteristics of 
literacy.  
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In China’s traditional rhetorical culture, “literacy,” in the sense of being classically 
educated, translated directly to “agency.” To varying degrees, functional literacy existed among 
the illiterate common people, but this was not the kind of literacy they needed to change their 
“common” status. The term “literacy” is used here the same as used by Alexander Woodside 
who additionally explains that in late-imperial China, there existed two kinds of literacy: 
“significant literacy [that] brings with it power,” and the insignificant form of literacy used by 
the common people in daily life.
50
 The imperial state had an “inherent desire to limit politically 
empowering literacy.”51 Literacy, he notes, is something “which all societies ration” to some 
degree.
52
  
In traditional China, to gain power, one had to be classically literate, and thus, prepared 
to place through the civil service examinations. Literacy, to this “significant” degree, was a very 
difficult thing for the common people to obtain. It required a great expense of time. Time was 
greatly costly to the people ties to land, on which harsh conditions necessitated “unremitting 
human endeavor.”53 Time translated directly into food for most common people. “The gentry 
mainly produced the ‘scholar-gentlemen’ (shi) who carried on the great traditions of calligraphy, 
painting, literature, philosophy, and official life.”54  
Class relations were regulated in the minutest detail in dynastic China. As Hu Shi notes, 
the privileged class played a paternalistic role to the unprivileged class by overseeing the social 
and moral behavior.
55
 As it was believed, it was the “Confucian gentleman's duty to educate to 
morally transform (jiaohua) the people,” writes Jan Kiely.56 This form of moral teaching 
functioned as an apparatus of the Confucian philosophy, which had been engineered to pull the 
nation out of the throes of the warring states period to a stable and harmonious time like the 
Zhou Dynasty. For the sake of stability, the philosophy was equipped with many mechanisms 
that had the express intent of limiting anything that resembled something of a social impulse to 
change the status quo. The classical language is perhaps the most effective of these implements. 
The elite class or educated scholar-officials, or scholar-gentry, acted as marshals of the language 
and guardians of society. They stood atop the cultural hierarchy and wielded all of the power in 
the configuration of Confucian relations.  
The sanctity of the scholar official’s relation to the heavens, thus the legitimacy of their 
social power, required cultural reverence for of the classical language, the classic texts, and the 
examination system. The examination system played an essential role in Chinese society.  
From Song until the end of Qing (1644-1911) the examinations not only served as almost 
the exclusive means for Chinese men to enter the prestigious officialdom but shaped the 
values and structure of society.
57
  
The exams kept access to power limited. They were very difficult and required much preparation. 
The scholar also had to study the complex mechanics of classical Chinese writing, in particular, 
the “eight-legged essay,” the standard form of essay for the civil service exams that constituted 
the principal framework for Chinese expository and persuasive writing in China, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, and Singapore.”58 Essay writers had to be extremely well versed in the classic texts to 
meet the demands of the eight-legged essay form. They would have to write in the form of 
classical phrases and use many examples memorized from the canonical texts like the Four 
Books and Five Classics. All emphasis was placed on memorization; there was no tolerance for 
“individual self-expression, considered socially harmful.”59 
Even though the authority of the classical language faltered after China’s contact with the 
modern civilization west, intellectuals and government officials were one in the same in the 
traditional system of officialdom. So unlike the role intellectuals commonly play in the west, as 
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critics of the state and cultural institutions, the Chinese intellectual class was kept from 
criticizing the government.  
 After the Confucian social hierarchy had been firmly established, the division between 
the people mutated into a harsher version of its original form. Something very similar happened 
during the Bronze Age in Greece. Only the wealthy elite could afford bronze and other metal 
products and “possession of these and other prestige items set them further apart from the mass 
of the population.” 60 In Greece, like China, the elite used their power to perpetuate their status. 
The elite Greeks became exploiters of their labor force and the Chinese elite became exploiters 
of their moral obligates.  
Han period (206-220 B.C.) scholar-officials perverted the principle of mutuality, the 
ethical backbone of the Confucian social hierarchy, into a device of political control. Originally, 
mutuality meant that “one acts on behalf of the community.”61 Legalist Han scholars then 
revived an obscure portion of Confucian philosophy known as the “Three Bonds,” which are 
often “depicted as three forms of bondage,” Tu writes.62 Duties and pieties attached to the bonds, 
based on hierarchy, age, and gender, began to overshadow the spirit of mutually beneficial 
relationships.
63
  
Han scholar-officials recast the Confucian philosophy from a philosophy of morality to a 
philosophy of authoritative power. In turn, the Mandate of Heaven lost its ethical strength even 
while preserving its social strength. By highlighting the three bonds over the spirit of mutuality, 
the Han ideologists, Tu notes, “drastically altered the Mencian intention.”64 Wei-Ming Tu notes, 
they must have seen legitimacy in the altered emphasis, from the “morality of rule” to the “right 
to rule,” for the persuasive advantage it gives to the political authority of ruler and husband. In a 
hierarchic and patriarchal society, ruled by scholars who still longed for the Zhou ideal praised in 
the Confucian classics, such legitimacy would have seemed to hold great promise. The ruler, and 
in turn, the husband become “the interpreter, the executor, and the judge of the moral code.”  
 Indeed, the primary task of the scholar-officials at the top of the pyramid was to 
understand the classic words of the sages and apply them to the complex social situations of their 
present day. Words were seen as elements functioning in complex contexts, “One feature of 
classical Chinese language is its brevity, suggesting that a single term can encompass several 
meanings, only decipherable in context,” Xing Lu explains, “For instance, the term yan can mean 
speech, talk, or language in general; however, in a given situation or textual meaning might be 
argumentation, persuasion, eloquence, or explanation.”65 The scholar-official sought to first, 
understand a term as it was originally intended, and second, to socially restore the thing denoted 
by the word to its original meaning.  
 
Common Orality  
The day to day experience of the Chinese common people was heavily marked by the 
cultural characteristics of orality. Oral societies lack the ability to draw space between social 
memory and social awareness, as well as between the individual and the collective. In other 
words, nothing ranks as more important than a person’s present social experience. Therefore, 
orality can be described as a way of communicating, and the characteristics of oral 
communication are one and the same as the characteristics of oral culture.  
In oral communication, emotional experiences are undiluted and immediate. It is easy to 
see the similarities between orality and the old Sinitic religion. The old Sinitic and Taoist 
attitudes revolve around the same hopes, fears, and endurance that define orality. Like Veeck, 
Pannell, Smith, and Huang explain, contemporary China is the result of how people and 
 23 
 
activities have been spatially organized and the effects of the human-environment interactions. 
Villages arose and families clung to one another to face the challenges of the land. Belief in a 
Tao gave people hope for a harmonious existence despite the ever present fear of the universe’s 
cruelty.  
The only way to break free from orality is to gain the significant form of classical literacy, 
but the oral culture of the unprivileged results from, and reinforces, restricted literacy. Building 
on Walter Ong’s foundation, David Ze proposes that “the static development of Chinese science 
and technology” can be linked to the culture of orality that existed along the majority of Chinese 
people.
66
 Oral residue can be found in just about every aspect of Chinese society. Ze notes how 
the culture of orality is deeply inlaid into traditional Chinese education, where educational texts 
are designed for students to memorize and recite, rather than to practice and explore.
67
 “The 
main body of Chinese educational texts was Confucianism, including Confucian canons, 
commentaries by Confucian scholars, and standard histories that intended to verify Confucian 
political theories.”68  
A strong presence of a culture of orality not only indicates the lack of literacy, but also 
indicates presence of a characteristic that is common to societies which restrict literacy, “the 
tendency to secrecy.”69 The density and difficulty of becoming literate in the classical language 
gives it the characteristic of secrecy. Likewise, the neo-Confucian literati sent books to all 
corners of the nation, limited the number and chose materials that were made to be read or sung 
aloud rather than individually read or used as a tool to teach reading. “Such restrictive practices 
tend to arise wherever people have an interest in maintaining a monopoly of the sources of their 
power.”70 Oral traditions of learning by memorization and recitation orient learning toward the 
“traditionalist direction… initial instruction places more emphasis on the repetition of content 
than the acquisition of skill. Under these conditions book learning takes on an inflexibility that is 
the antithesis of the spirit of enquiry which literacy has fostered elsewhere.”71 The long term 
result is that ‘secrecy’ invades other areas of learning not because of the specific content but 
because under restricted literacy all books tends to take on a special value through the scarcity of 
interpreters.”72 
Even after the onslaught of print technology, the common people remained in the middle 
of a tug of war between traditional and modern influences. As Jan Kiely writes, “the first half of 
the twentieth century saw an unprecedented expansion of the production and circulation of the 
Imperial-era morality books and related new-style popular ethical guide in part because of the 
emerging mechanized print industry and new transportation networks.”73 In the new conditions 
of the 1900s, the old lessons would resonate in different ways.
74
  
 
The Literary Elite 
The face of China changed dramatically during the Song Period, from 960 to 1279.
75
 The 
population surged from 55 million people to 100 million and the national income rose 33 percent 
per head.
76
 The role to be played by the most elite members of Chinese society greatly changed 
as well. The political upheaval of the antecedent Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdom Period, and 
the rising threat of the Qidan, the Mongol people from North China who would become China’s 
first alien rulers, inspired a push to preserve China’s traditional culture and social hierarchy. 
Greater emphasis was placed on the civil service examination system, which was responsible for 
shaping China’s elite class of ruling intellectuals who were known as the literati. The literati 
filled the ranks of civil service following in depth education in the classics and successful 
performance on exams. The amplified integration of the intellectual and bureaucratic class is a 
 24 
 
distinguishing marker of Song Period China. It marks a historically specific entanglement of 
politics, society, and rhetoric of vital importance to the rhetorical development of dynastic China 
from then until the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1912.   
The classical language completely pervaded the lives of the literate elite strata of society; 
as per its institutional function, the structure of social hierarchy had grown completely dependent 
on its maintenance and veneration. A special name of respect was given to the scholars who 
acted as the conduit between heaven and the common people; they were called the “literati.” 
Honor for the classical language created a huge constraint for reformers of the literary revolution. 
The reformers who advocated the vernacular language for the entire gamut of cultural writings, 
academic, official, and popular, became acutely aware of what it meant to pull the classical 
language from its throne. To contradict the reverence that, over centuries, had been instilled in 
the Chinese people was to simultaneously contradict an ancient cultural tradition, contradict the 
structure of power from which the reformers themselves derived their scholarly authority, and 
contradict the foundation for political legitimacy and cultural morality affecting nearly half a 
billion people.
77
  
The neo-Confucian literati are a group of particular importance to understanding the 
social and intellectual constrains that Hu Shi and other scholars of the twentieth century Chinese 
Renaissance faced. The neo-Confucian literati were able to do what the preservationist scholar-
officials of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century were unable to do. The inability of the 
later literati is attributable, in part, to the severity of the changes China endured under the force 
of the modern western civilization of the twentieth century, particularly as the civilization first 
began to physically wrought China under the names of England and Japan. However, the 
inability is also attributable to the cultural gulf in Chinese society of the literati’s own making. 
The neo-Confucian literati had created a cultural gulf between themselves and the people that 
over time, had separate the groups to such an extent as to become un-crossable.  
The neo-Confucian literati of the Song and Mind dynasties mirrored many of the social 
ambitions of Confucius. Confucius lived during the Spring and Autumn Period, which 
corresponds to the Eastern Zhou dynasty running from 770 to 481 B.C. This was a time of 
political, social, and intellectual transition very similar to Song Period China. Loewe and 
Shaughnessy call it “a Jaspersian ‘Axial Age’ of civilization.”78 In response to anxieties of social 
flux, Confucius sought to restore the order of the early Zhou dynasty, when virtuous leadership, 
filial piety, and respect for rituals and authority subdued the people and ruled the land.
79
 The 
literati of the Song Period responded similarly with a Neo-Confucian creed,
80
 which they 
developed as a practical philosophy to guide daily life decision making on the basis of the 
Confucian classics.
81
 To spread their creed, the Neo-Confucian literati developed a rhetorical 
implement known as the Community Compact.  
With the Community Compact, the neo-Confucian literati, or educated ruling elite, 
introduced a new way of communicating with the illiterate common people. Meetings of the 
Community Compact were local monthly assemblies used to transmit the Neo-Confucian Creed. 
Fairbank and Goldman explain these meetings as an “institution,” seen “as fusing together 
private and public interests and as mediating between state and family.”82 The significance of 
these meetings resounds in practically all aspects of the rhetorical development of China up until 
the Chinese Renaissance. The Community Compact meetings mark the first conscious union of 
the vernacular language and the masses that can account for the stigma vernacular carried at the 
time of the Literary Revolution. Printed materials became widespread during the Song period. 
Rather than expand literacy, printed materials were distributed to Community Compact meetings 
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around the country that were written in vernacular and intended to be sung to the audience. The 
literati had no interest in expanding literacy among the common people as the security of their 
own position was being threatened by steadily rising numbers of educated elites. Fairbank and 
Goldman explain that “printed matter was the life-blood of the expanding Song educated elite.”83 
The meetings were designed in such a way as to utilize the available print technology without 
undermining the social hierarchy. At this moment in history, epideictic forms of rhetorical 
speech and philosophic and religious aspects of Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism become 
entangled with the security of the elite, the legitimacy of the dynasty, and the changes brought by 
trade and the development of print.   
 
Changes  
Half a century before the New Culture Movement, the Chinese thinker Wang T’ao, said 
“The steamship and the railway are the carriages of the ways of life.”84 Hu Shi was looking to 
develop in China a “way of life” suitable for the modern world. He conceived of that way as 
coming from both Chinese and foreign stock. Some of the Chinese stock would be known to the 
Chinese, and still, some would be reclaimed from a long forgotten era. These characteristics 
would weave together and create an integrated society. 
 This vision stands in contrast to the quickly disintegrating society of the early twentieth 
century. The disintegration seemed to have been propelled with each instance of China's 
exposure to the West. As new tools and ideas countered old tools and ideas, relationships 
changed including “the breaking-up of old homes, [and] the removal from family and clan 
ties.”85 As the transfer of technology continued, the puzzle became more complete. Goods that 
were once novel luxuries became standard necessities. The adoption of western technologies 
followed a pretty standard pattern. Hu notes that first the material good were accepted. These 
were the goods that were most useful in fulfilling and executing the daily needs of human 
existence, and at first appearance, once could not suspect them of “being prejudicial to the 
existing social life and institutions.”86 The clock, for example, was among the first tier of 
accepted technologies. It was introduced by Portuguese traders and Jesuit missionaries. “Slowly 
and imperceptibly, but irresistibly, the imported goods found their way into the villages and 
farms, and replaced all their rivals of native make.”87 The luxuries become necessities in the city, 
and eventually, necessities in the country. In part, material goods become woven into the daily 
activities of people be replacing old functionally comparable technologies. Some of the first 
replacement items in China included matches, the kerosene lamp, vegetable oil, cigarette, and 
English style piece goods. Further, trading companies and sales agents became known in China 
once again. The merchant class was elevated from the lowest rungs of moral society to among 
the highest. New forms of transportation and communication, such as “the steamship, the railway, 
the new road, the telegraph, [and] the post service,”88 carried people, goods, ideas, and manners 
of life around the nation. Besides rapid migration, Hu counts two other developments as 
significant in the spread of change.
89
 
The political revolution opened the door to cultural change, but in China, change met 
with resistance and the integration of new technologies happened gradually. China's gradual 
adoption of western technological influences set the stage for the reforms of the Chinese 
Renaissance. As Hu notes, “Radical social revolutions are made possible by the removal of the 
forces which were once the bulwarks of the institutions and usages of the old society.”90 With the 
old culture dethroned, the New Culture Movement was intended to develop the cultural capacity 
for new attitudes, new logic, and new social institutions. 
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 When western observers looked at China in the years following the revolution, they were 
quick to notice how Japan, also a traditional Asian society, seemed to respond to western 
exposure so differently than China. Japan appeared to adapt fast and purposefully. China, on the 
other hand, went through a much longer period of resistance. In the years of the Qing restoration, 
the 1860s, when the Imperial rulers realized that change could no longer be avoided and tried to 
greet the change and simultaneously preserve their power. They advanced a doctrine of “Chinese 
learning as the fundamental structure, Western learning for practical use.” Fairbank and 
Goldman remark that the doctrine was “attractive though misleading.” However, “the generation 
of 1860-1900 clung to the shibboleth that China could lead halfway into modern times, like 
leaping halfway across a river in a flood.”91 Meanwhile, Japan had a powerful ruling class who 
could make decisions about what to change and carry out changes from a point of centralized 
control. China also had rulers, but their political authority was predicated on cultural stability. 
Their power came from within the traditional culture. With centralized control, Japan's 
modernization has been “orderly, economical, continuous, stable, and effective,” Hu writes.92 
The problem with such fast and deliver change is that it is based on the observable superficial 
characteristics of culture. One might think of this process as a game of cultural costuming, which 
like any activity of dress-up, amplifies a few characteristics and abandons or oversimplifies the 
rest. Meanwhile, China has been changing slowly. China’s changes have been “sporadic, and 
often wasteful, because much undermining and erosion are necessary before anything can be 
changed.”93 Yet, Hu notes that there is undeniable advantage to gradual change, which is now 
being revealed in China's contrast with Japan. In 1940, Hu said that while Japan has 
demonstrated great aptitude with the technique and machines of the West, Westerners are now 
observing in Japan “the most strange phenomenon… ‘immunity to the dialectic play of deep-
lying evolutionary forces,’… being ‘devoid of dialectic and dynamic.’”94 In China, on the other 
hand, the old has-been eroded before the new has been adopted so that everything,  
From the lipstick to the literary revolution, from the footwear to the overthrow of the 
monarchy, all has been voluntary and in the broad sense ‘reasoned.’ Nothing in China is 
too sacred to be protected from the contact and contagion of the invading civilization of 
the West.
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The ruling class of Japan was a militaristic class based on the old feudal code. They quickly 
adopted technology to “build up a Western war machine” to protect themselves from the threat 
of invading Western troops and ideas.
96
 Originally, they just wanted a technological wall of 
protection, but then, having constructed machine so successfully, the wall worked to reach 
solidified Japan's medieval culture and effectively ward off any substantial change in thought 
and attitude. In other words, Japan was made immune to the dialectical interplay of Western 
logic. 
Quick to construct a protective war machine out of Western technologies, Japan turned 
into China’s aggressor number one. Japan’s sparse natural resources must have contrasted with 
China to make the latter appear an Eden ripe for the raping. Further, Chinese officialdom was so 
handicapped by corruption that wanting Japanese officials could have easily mistaken the 
whimpers of a self-dissolving institution as Chinese officials begging for exploitation.  
The Japanese had worked into positions from which they could cause the most crippling damage 
to China. Who gave many examples of how the Japanese came to wield so much power over 
Chinese affairs. They worked like the makeshift rigging for a crumbling house, positioned at 
essential points for the structure that once in place, could not be disturbed lest the whole 
structure came toppling down. Boycotts of Japanese stores and goods offer one example of how 
 27 
 
committed the Chinese team to ridding themselves of this influence. Still, many young 
intellectuals would have preferred to rip the entire building down rather than let Japanese power 
grow in China anymore. Their frustration is of course understandable. You must incipience of 
Japan's power was had by exploiting China's own failings.  
Corruption among officials greatly strained the everyday lives of regular people. This 
became particularly apparent in terms of natural resources when the corrupt leasing of land to 
Japanese companies prevented the Chinese from gaining access to nearby resources, like coal. 
“In corruption,” Hu writes, “China certainly leads the world. Not only is there an open and 
organized sale of offices in the State, not only has there been for twenty-five years no system of 
examination for government posts, but there is also the universal habit of bribery in every branch 
of Chinese society... in polite language [it] is called ‘dipping one's fingers,’ and in the common 
language, ‘rubbing oil.’”  Hu points out that in China “good” officials are recognized with the 
monument, but in “civilized” societies, officials are expected to be “good.” Corrupt officials get 
the special treatment; they get sent to jail.
97
 Tim Wright gives evidence of the extent of this 
problem, “The export of Chinese coal, almost all to Japan,” he writes, “increased very sharply in 
the early 1910, as the output of Chinese mines came on tap.”98 People couldn’t overlook these 
kinds of daily problems.  
Many Chinese students felt the conditions had become too shameful and unbearable and 
they were no longer willing to stifle their discontent. The following passage is from The Nation, 
which described itself as “a weekly journal devoted to politics, literature, science, drama, music, 
art, and finance.”99 It aptly illustrates the qualms and emotions that were common among 
students.  
Chinese students have recently organized and carried to a successful conclusion a series 
of popular demonstrations against the Shantung settlement which have resulted in the 
removal of three high Government officials accused of having betrayed their country into 
the hands of Japan The following article embodying the students point of view appeared 
in The China Press for June 10: 
For the first time in the history of China a genuine democratic movement has appeared 
The entire Chinese people has risen No officials head this movement No great men have 
attached their names to this cause Spontaneously out of the schools among boys and girls 
among shopkeepers and merchants among laborers and coolies has arisen this historic 
defence of the rights of China this demand for good government… 
On the anniversary of the Twenty one Demands when the Chinese people were in 
mourning because of the shame their country had suffered at the hands of Japan news 
arrived that China had been defeated at the Paris Peace Conference For months previous 
to this day since the signing of the armistice China had high hopes that she would have an 
opportunity to develop as a nation that the wrongs which she had suffered from 
militarism while the nations of the world were fighting militarism in Europe would be 
righted But now China was hopeless In Peking was a government corrupt to the core In 
one year it had borrowed $220,000,000 from Japan ceding to her the richest resources of 
the land Coal mines iron mines forests future railroad rights control of the army control 
of finances control of the few great industries of the country have been thrown away for a 
mess of pottage Great China the land richest in resources richest in man power richest in 
territory had become a plaything because of the militarism of Japan and the corruption of 
her own officials The Manchus were driven out by a small band of intrepid revolutionists 
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in league with enlightened officials But the Chinese people took no part in the first 
revolution.
100
  
The students saw this as a do-or-die moment for the nation. “This demonstration awakened the 
entire student body of China to the fact that immediate action was necessary. In every city of 
China the students left their books and went out on strike.”101 A feeling of crisis coursed over 
China’s young intellectuals, thus creating a very difficult situation for reformers like Hu that 
wanted to strike a balance between preserving cultural tradition and integrating western 
technology and science. Most of all, Hu wanted to implement change gradually, but China’s 
intellectual atmosphere was thick with hostility.  
Hu’s worry was that China, having already bore repeated blows of destruction, could not 
withstand further destructive force from within. These things could not be solved with violent 
force. Education was the primary resource of the New Culture Movement. Education, rather than 
gun boats or ammunition would save the Chinese from their real enemies. Hu writes:  
Our real enemies, as I have pointed out, are poverty, disease, ignorance, corruption and 
civil war. None of them can be conquered by recourse to violent force. The real 
revolution which shall overthrow these five devils, has only one path to pursue, namely, 
the royal road of peace-meal reformation under conscious and intelligent guidance. We 
must first clearly identify our real enemies and define our real problems, and then 
concentrate our energy and intelligence on the difficult and strenuous task of solving 
these problems step by step, and bit by bit. Every inch is a gain and leads so much nearer 
to our goal.
102
 
Corruption, he said, is one of the “five devils” hampering China's creation of a “new nation.” 
“The destruction of the five devils is simultaneously the creation of our new nation.”103  
He asserted that reform requires revolution, or in other words, construction requires 
destruction. Yet, one must be wary of even necessary events. “Revolutions also bring into power 
new groups of people who are energetic, unscrupulous, and capable of fishing in troubled waters. 
The rise of the new politicians and the military man is particularly noticeable.”104 Revolutions 
break up the old guard and rip apart old institutions. 
They release the individual from the collective responsibility of the whole family, and 
recognize in him the new rights and duties of an independent member of a larger society. 
The old framework has gone to pieces, not because of external attacks or criticisms, but 
because it was incapable of holding itself together in the face of the new forces which 
claim its members, men or women, for the school, the factory, the shop, and the world at 
large.
105
 
The problem following the revolution in China, he explained, is that “Nobody was leading; and 
everybody seemed lost in a sea of uncertainty.”106 This is why education played such a 
significant role in the Renaissance.  
 In the haze of revolutionary thought, Hu said people act “blindly.”107 We must remove 
the impetus to act without forethought or regard for the consequences of our actions. With 
education, he believed people would become dissatisfied with things like foot-binding, arranged 
marriages, and all superstitions.
108
 By dissolving the power of tradition in developing a new 
culture, China would find a permanent and self-perpetuating kind of change. He wanted to make 
sure that China did not go down a path similar to Japan's technocratic construction of a war 
machine. John Dewey reached the same conclusion, as he wrote:  
Asia has come to consciousness, and her consciousness of herself will soon be such a 
massive and persistent saying that it will force itself upon the reluctant consciousness of 
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the West, and lie heavily upon it conscious, and for this fact, China and the Western 
world are indebted to Japan.
109
  
Hu considered this sort of thing to be a violent and wasteful output of energy that ultimately 
would and without significant result. Hu favored the creative forces that followed from education.  
“The new education… was meant for everybody who came to take it; it was planned as 
education for citizenship.”110 In the wake of the throne’s destruction, when no other leaders are 
there to be found, and no old guard is there to block the way, the educated people will know how 
to lead themselves. 
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Chapter Two  Searching for Logical Consciousness  
 
Logical Consciousness 
For Hu Shi, the lack of a scientific spirit stood out as chief among China’s twentieth 
century dilemmas. He understood the “scientific spirit,” as a “critical consciousness,” or in other 
words, a way of apprehending the physical and social world that values situational analysis, 
views history as relevant to present day events and attitudes, and has the ability to bring ideas 
and behaviors into accord. The roots of this consciousness are found in “humanistic and 
rationalistic” traditions, which Hu maintained, are present in China’s intellectual history and can 
be “resurrected” by the scientific and democratic touch of the new civilization of the west.  Hu’s 
intellectual project revolved around the method of pragmatic judgment. He wanted contemporary 
decisions to value both new and old, and foreign and Chinese ideas equally so as to judge them 
purely on the basis of their merit in relation to situational needs and future goals. The same sort 
of judgments should be made in the process of reevaluating China’s intellectual legacy for the 
foundations of China’s own path to modern development. He exhibits this intention with his own 
search, The Development of Logical Method in Ancient China, his dissertation written under the 
advisement of John Dewey. Here, he investigates the characteristics of what he calls the 
“Chinese Sophist” and the original spirit of “courageous doubt.” He finds the Chinese Sophist 
beginning with the “Socratic Tradition of Confucius,” which he describes as “the tradition of free 
discussion, criticism, and intellectual honesty.” He then locates the “spirit of courageous doubt” 
in the Taoist’s early naturalistic conceptions of the universe. This chapter surveys the intellectual 
traditions of humanism and rationalism that Hu holds as most necessary for China’s transition 
into the modern world. Each major tradition is addressed with regard to the resources it provided 
for confronting the contemporary predicament, the limitations of the tradition in light of Hu’s 
ambitions for cultural reform, and the choices he made to practically appropriate the tradition or 
to leave it behind.   
China has been in close contact with the West for a hundred years and spent an equal 
amount of time in a state of “unfortunate resistance” to this exposure, Hu told a London audience 
in 1926.
1
 After the success of the anti-Manchu revolution and abdication of the Qing dynasty, 
China’s time to modernize arrived. However, Hu notes, the Chinese people have not been able to 
successfully adopt popular government.    
The Republic has failed, not because modern China has failed—there has never been a 
modern China—but because in all these processes the changes have been superficial and 
have hardly touched the fundamental issues of political transformation. There has been 
practically no modern leadership, practically no genuine admission of our real 
weaknesses, no recognition of the spiritual possibilities of the new civilisation.
2
 
The intellectual climate during the Republican Period was saturated with tension. Young China 
continually struggled against the old guard and Chinese Renaissance reformers who favored 
gradual changes, like Hu, undertook their reforms while bearing the constant threat of imperial 
imposition.  Hu called for a reawakening of ancient Chinese humanist traditions.  
A major goal of Hu's involvement in the Chinese Renaissance was to overcome the 
cultural divide that split Chinese society into two strata, and subsumed the constructive tenants 
of Confucianism into China’s combined political and intellectual structure of authority. The 
difficulty of this task was extraordinary because it required de-honoring the most honorable 
aspects of the traditional society. Further, the fact that politicians and intellectuals were in large 
part members of the same group, if not the same people, was also crippling to the movement. As 
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members of the same class, the interests of intellectuals and politicians were vested in one 
another. Even those intellectuals who wanted to change society did not necessarily want to do so 
if it meant undermining their own authority. Wang Ke-wen explains that “abolition of the 
examination system paved the way for the Qing dynasty’s own downfall.”3  
Hu and his contemporaries on the intellectual scene, many of whom had studied abroad 
and none of whom had come into academia via the classical examination system, must have 
easily seen how the old system of scholar-officialdom continued in unofficial replication without 
a viable alternative. Hu, himself, struggled to draw a line between politics and intellectualism. 
He maintained that he wanted to reform whatever political system was already instituted, that he 
did not want to be charged with the political role of creating or leading a political system. 
Likewise, conservatives and liberals were further separated within the ranks of the intellectuals 
by whether they had received classical or progressive educational rearing.  
Logic and technological progress was impeded by reverence for the significant form of 
literacy, the institutions that maintained that standard of literacy, and the oral traditions that 
persisted among the majority of the people who could not achieve that height of literacy. Even 
those who could gain significant literacy, and thus, attendant forms of social and political power, 
had limited agency. The emperor’s power extended over the entire life of the scholar-official, as 
Fairbank and Goldman write, “his books and education—the system of learning and its 
transmission.”4 Similarly, R. Kent Guy observes: “writing and ruling had become, in some sense, 
opposite sides of the same coin, characteristic and interrelated expressions of landed literati 
dominance of the Imperial China.”5 In the Western civilization the arts of ruling and the arts of 
writing usually served different functions. When the intellectual class and political class are kept 
apart, each develops its own set of critical tools to function on its own and resist the influence of 
the other. In America, for example, academics claim rights of intellectual freedom. Scholars are 
often the strongest critics of the state. In China, on the other hand, writing developed as a 
function of ruling. The classical civil service examinations guaranteed that scholars would not 
criticize the state because the scholars comprised the state. Hence, the interests of academics and 
the interests of rulers ranged from closely entwined to precisely the same.  
Like the European Renaissance, the Chinese Renaissance was a reform movement 
grounded in the principles of humanism that consisted of two motions: one to revive the 
characteristics of pre-science like skepticism, attention to nature, and focus on everyday life 
issues from the ancient secular philosophies of the respective culture, and another to develop the 
spirit of individualism.
6
 Socially and culturally, Europe and China shared much in common at 
the time of their Renaissance. Steven Kreis explains that in Europe, the Renaissance period 
marked a time when Europe straddled two worlds. “The humanist mentality stood at a point 
midway between medieval supernaturalism and the modern scientific and critical attitude... 
Modern historians are perhaps more apt to view humanism as the germinal period of 
modernism.”7 Thus, the basic experiences of everyday life highlighted the growing tension 
between faith and reason.
8
 
The “germinal” movement in humanism, is aptly described by Kreis as a “pre-scientific 
age.”9 The humanism of the Renaissance “did not free the mind from subservience to ancient 
authority… They shifted authorities rather than dismissed them.”10 The spirit of science was 
brewing, but it had not yet developed a methodology or the security of being a common mode of 
practice and thought. The Renaissance was a time of intellectual fission, violent in the way that 
any process of splitting or ripping must necessarily be. Oftentimes, studies of this period in 
Chinese intellectualism miss foundational similarities between the European and Chinese 
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Renaissance. In particular, assumptions of causality get in the way of understanding Renaissance 
humanism as a naturally occurring philosophy in societies that crave cultural reform on account 
of either desire or of necessity. In other words, we need to be wary of assuming that one period 
of Renaissance mimicked another just because it happened later in time. In fact, as far as 
assumptions go, it would probably be more accurate to claim that China’s Renaissance faced 
extra difficulty because it occurred after the European Renaissance.  
The humanistic tendency toward “recovery” did not require the in depth treatment in the 
European Renaissance that it did in the Chinese Renaissance. For one, the violence of the 
intellectual split between the traditional authorities and the new authorities of the individual, the 
natural sciences, and procedure naturally begets cultural anxiety and prompts the search for 
cultural reassurance. In Europe, the search inward, for ancient traditions of humanism, did not 
have to be explained in light of competing cultural influences. It was not posed as a search for 
something “authentically” European rather than something imported and foreign.  Chinese 
intellectuals, on the other hand, felt the same pull of humanistic recovery
11
 but were compelled 
to explain it in relation to the conversation about westernization, or modernization at the expense 
of the authentically “Chinese.” Such forced explanation antagonizes the practice of reform by 
drawing lines of division between reformers who root their sense of cultural security in 
subscription to one particularly defined interest over another. The conversation becomes one of 
distinguishing what is “Chinese” from what is “Western” without realizing that humanistic 
recovery of latent cultural thought is merely the same “process” that was taken in the West and 
the fact that it is naturally occurring in China is testament only to the idea that China is following 
a path of modern development that seems to be aimed at more or less the same place as was the 
path of European development.  
 The strength of the humanist philosophy in cultural reform is revealed here; doubt, 
investigation, and individualism function in the face of forces that operate by disabling or 
restricting. In Europe, for example, the Renaissance brought a resurgence of individualism, 
which “had been suppressed by the rise of the caste system in the later Roman Empire, by the 
church and by feudalism in the Middle Ages,” Kreis writes. The Chinese social hierarchy 
functioned similarly to the European caste system and authority of the church in that it held 
people in their respective places in relation to the structure of authority built around the classical 
language and the power held within.  
Medieval Christianity restricted individual expression, fostered self-abnegation and self-
annihilation, and demanded implicit faith and unquestioning obedience furthermore, the 
church officially ignored man and nature.
12
  
In Medieval society, the individual, standing alone, had little importance in the feudal regime. 
“The individual who attempted to challenge authority and tradition, matters of thought or action, 
was either discouraged or crushed.”13 The European Renaissance undercut the power of the 
church and caste by encouraging doubt and individualism. “Individualism and the instinct of 
curiosity were vigorously cultivated.”14  
 Hu Shi saw the similarity between China’s ancient intellectual legacy and the Greek 
traditions recovered by the Renaissance in Europe. The name of the movement in 20
th
 century 
China, “The Renaissance,” was coined by a group of Peking students in 1918 when they 
launched a monthly magazine under the same name.
15
 The relationship between the traditions of 
literacy and the state worked against China’s philosophical tradition of doubt. There needed to be 
a reassertion of the tradition of critical doubt if there were to be a modern China.  
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One of the reasons doubt had been lost in the development of Chinese thought, as 
identified by Hu Shi, was the way investigation into things never developed to far-reading 
inquiry into natural causes. Instead, it was relegated to the immediate ethical and practical 
benefits of something at best, and still more often, focused only on the sphere of general social 
relations.
16
 Reserving investigation for matters of social relations, Hu maintains, retarded the 
formation of rational principles, the creative potential of language, and natural affairs as a source 
or virtue of knowledge. Likewise, preservation of cultural hierarchy undercut development of 
empirical methodology and the corresponding scientific spirit. 
Hu had to look to a time before the stronghold of Confucianism. Developments in logic 
suffered during both the Sung and Ming periods because the Neo-Confucians read Confucianism 
into logical theories it didn’t belong to. So, while Hu says the Neo-Confucians of the Sung 
period were right to interpret the process of investigation as a search for logic and meaning, the 
influence of Confucianism caused the philosophers to overlook experimental procedure, the 
active and directing role of the mind in the process of investigating things, and worst, they took 
things to mean affairs. Similarly, the influence of Confucianism thwarted the development of 
logic during the Ming period, when philosophers moved further away from procedural forms of 
investigation into the natural world as they turned toward intuitive contemplative philosophy.  
Hu follows the lead of James B. Conant, an American chemist and educator 
contemporary to Hu, who said “it was the Humanist’s exploration of antiquity that came nearest 
to exemplifying our modern ideas of impartial inquiry.”17 Conant understood science to offer 
“opportunities for the expansion of the human mind and spirit,” James Hershberg writes.18  
Science, for Conant, wasn’t only a tool for understanding and affecting the composition of nature, 
but it was also a means of answering “philosophical, theological, and political quandaries.”19 
Science provided a way of thinking and learning. This realization had a similar result for Conant 
as it did for Hu. Conant also devoted himself to teaching scientific thought to regular people who 
had no scientific training and to reforming public education so as to develop the tools of 
scientific thought in all Americans. Scientific thought promised to see America through the 
confusing social and technological changes of the twentieth century. While the particularities of 
the problems in America were very different from the problems in China, both nations faced the 
kind of confusion that follows on the heels of great social and technological change. Hu’s 
conclusion was no different from Conant’s; scientific thought, Hu maintained, will see China 
through to a modern era. We must remember that Conant and Hu wanted the same things of the 
humanist philosophy that their intellectual ancestors had wanted so long ago; respectively, to 
usher ancient Greece out of the throes of warfare and division and restore ancient China to a 
place of social and moral unification remembered from the golden years of the ancient Zhou.    
Conant offers a good comparison to Hu because they held very similar ideas about the 
role of science in everyday social life. Rather than a particular “subject” they both understood 
science as a type of inquiry or mode of thought applicable to all aspects of life. Likewise, both 
men knew that a mode of thought had to be cultivated in the thinker. This is a hard idea to 
express to a Western audience who has themselves been so completely inculcated in this manner 
of thought as to accept it as innate. It is not uncommon for an American child to angrily retort 
“that doesn’t make any sense!” Reared in literacy and science as we are, it is hard for children 
and adults alike to conceive of a logic that makes sense in a way that is entirely different from 
the logic that we know—that something could be “illogical” but still make “sense.” American’s 
of today are the product of Conant’s “faith in neither science nor religion but in secular 
institutions that would give Americans the means to develop.”20 
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 Humanist doubt, the germ of scientific thought, developed in the west with the Sophists. 
In China, Hu notes, “the spirit of doubt has ingrained itself in the Chinese mentality ever since 
the days of Lao Tzu and Confucius.”21 Confused ideas about the Chinese Renaissance mimicking 
the European Renaissance, rather than developing on its own the same as the European 
Renaissance had done, can be attributed to comparisons drawn by Chinese reformers who sought 
to explain the legitimacy of their reforms to other Chinese reformers who had decided that 
China’s modernization relied fully on things outside of China. For example, Hu Shi wrote “And 
let us remember the early admirers of the West—from Wang T’ao down to K’ang Yu-wei—they, 
too, were thinking that the modern civilization of the West, in the words of Wang T’ao, 
‘embodied the best ideals of our classical antiquity.’”22 Liberal Chinese reformers faced a 
constant struggle; they were stuck between advocates of wholesale westernization and extreme 
preservationists. In truth, liberal Renaissance reformers wanted things from both the west and 
China’s past. Yet, positioned as they were between people who supported extreme variations of 
both ends of their platform, any effort the liberal reformers made to explain one aspect or another 
of their agenda, was interpreted either as fodder for one of the oppositional groups or in the 
extreme terms of one of the groups.  
 Hu Shi tried to overcome the divisions and misunderstandings by explaining the 
genealogy of the spirit of doubt in Chinese intellectual culture.  
This spirit of doubt has always manifested itself in every age in a critical examination of 
our own civilization and its ideas and institutions. Such self-critical examination of one's 
own civilization is the prerequisite without which no ‘profound and sweeping’ cultural 
changes are ever possible in any country with an old civilization. All such great and 
fundamental changes in the history of China--whether they be the result of China's own 
reformers or the natural outcome of China's coming into long contact with a foreign 
culture--have always been brought about by a critical examination of the older 
civilization and a profound dissatisfaction with its institutions.
23
  
The spirit of doubt created the foundation for scientific thought in Chinese intellectualism, 
but a legacy of doubt was not substantial enough to usher China through a modern Renaissance, 
and the practical element of creative doubt had been bred out of traditional philosophy long ago. 
China needed to reinvigorate a particular kind of doubt from very early on. As Hu writes, “it was 
the spirit of doubt—of what Goethe called ‘creative doubt’—which initiated, inaugurated, and 
animated the classical age of Chinese thought, the age of Lao Tzu and Confucius, down to 
Mencius, Chuang Tzu, Hsün Tzu, and Han-fei.”24  
As Hu developed his pragmatic theory of logic for China’s modern development, he 
realized that pragmatic logic was not only the means to a modern China, but also an end goal in 
and of itself. China had the groundwork of logic, but the foundations had been overgrown and 
had become obscured by the classicism, conservatism, and stratification that had become the 
mainstays of Chinese society. Thus, Hu’s could not simply teach a new kind of thought to the 
Chinese people because tools needed to work with that kind of thought had been buried or 
disguised. If pragmatic logic were to thrive, it needed fertile ground. The people needed the skill 
set to cultivate it and the environment needed the health to sustain it. As Hu surveyed the 
landscape he saw that it had been shaped by three general tendencies of thought, which included: 
1) a critical but passive tendency rooted in oral traditions; 2) the bureaucratic classical tendency 
rooted in highly literate traditions; and 3) a conformist tendency rooted in argumentation 
traditions. Hu associated these tendencies with the foundational philosophies of Taoism, 
Confucianism, and Moism respectively.  
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Three great leaders, lao Tze, Confucius, and Mo Ti, arose within the brief space of less 
than two hundred years (about 570-420 B. C.) and laid the foundation of Chinese 
philosophy for all the centuries to come. All three can only be best understood in their 
respective relation to the tottering Sinitic religion and to the critical and skeptical 
atmosphere of their times. Broadly speaking, Lao Tze stood at the extreme Left in the 
attitude towards the old religion; Confucius occupied the Centre with strong leanings 
towards the Left; and Mo Ti, founder of the Mo Sect, represented the Conservative Right. 
Lao Tse was a rebel in religion and a revolutionary in philosophy; Confucius was a 
Humanist and an Agnostic; and Mo Ti was a religious leader who sought to save the old 
Sinitic religion by purifying it and giving it a new significance.
25
  
Each tendency is here discussed in light of what Hu understands to be its major intellectual 
contributions and limitations to the construction of a modern form of pragmatic logic. In his 
investigation into the ancient development of Chinese logic, Hu finds many beneficial aspects of 
these tendencies.    
Whenever China had sunk deep into irrationality, superstition, and otherworldliness, it 
was always the naturalism of Lao Tzu [Lao Zi] and the classical Taoists, or the humanism 
of Confucius, or a combination of the two that arose to rescue her from her sluggish 
slumbers.
26
  
However, he also finds that none of them are adequate to the task of developing a modern form 
of thought that can see China into a new age. Further, not one of these tendencies has escaped 
molestation from the others. Some of the secondary amalgamations produced new contributions 
to the development of logic and others created new barriers.   
After discussing the resources of the foundational philosophies, Hu’s theory of pragmatic 
logic is pieced together along with the ideas he pulled from subsequent periods of cultural and 
intellectual development, such as Neo-Moism and Neo-Confucianism, when the grounds of their 
parent philosophy underwent some change significant to the development of logic in ancient 
China and Hu’s agenda for logic in modern China. Contributions are discussed with regard for 
the philosophical significance Hu Shi attributed to them in relation to his agenda for cultural 
reform, its limitations in light of the reform agenda, and finally, the aspects of each contribution 
that Hu thought should be cultivated and practically engaged in a modern theory of logic 
specifically, and more generally, in practical communication.  
 
Taoist Order 
The tendencies of thought that arise from the Taoist philosophical tradition are critical 
but passive and communicated in the oral tradition.  Lao Zi “revolted against the 
anthropomorphic and teleological conception of a Supreme God;” he tried to replace it be a 
reverence for the innocent state of nature. He maintained that the problems of his day, like 
corruption and violent crime, were the results of a fictitious social structure constructed against 
the ways of nature. He believed the problems could only be solved if people were to do away 
with the unnatural constructs of society and return to a natural and innocent state, where people 
lived according to Tao, that is, the pattern natural to their existence. When people stop trying to 
live according to unnatural structures of social organization they will stop suffering. Conversely, 
the longer people live unnaturally, the longer they will suffer, because they will be acting against 
Tao and Tao does not yield.     
Lao Zi was a critic, a doubter, and a rebel; Hu Shi calls him “the Protagoras of ancient 
China.”27 As an individual figure, Hu saw Lao Zi as beneficial to the advancement of logic in 
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ancient China because he was a bold critic of the established social order. He scrutinized 
accepted traditions and institutions, and thus, served a critical function akin to the Sophists of 
ancient Greece. Hu also counted certain aspects of the Taoist philosophy as contributions to the 
development of logic. The idea of tao was chief among these beneficial aspects. Tao essentially 
represents a method of conducting one’s daily affairs in accord with the varying energies of 
nature. In total, however, Lao Zi’s philosophy lacked the essential elements of logical theory. 
The philosophy was too “destructive and iconoclastic;” Lao Zi was too much of a “philosophical 
nihilist.”28 The critical aspect is good, Hu maintained, but if the destructive energy is taken too 
far, and not directed into a constructive medium, criticism is unable to advance logic or 
pragmatic reform.    
 
Criticism: The First Transvaluation   
The first major tendency in Chinese thought developed out of the critical attitude of 
Taoism. This tendency has remained a recurrent theme in the progression of Chinese thought and 
it is the aspect of Chinese thought that should be thanked for making the twentieth century period 
of Renaissance possible, same as all periods of Renaissance that came before. Hu likens the 
tendency of criticism to Nietzsche’s concept of transvaluation, which he described as a signature 
characteristic of the modern age.
29
 Transvaluation is a process of question and transforming the 
way values are determined and understood. It calls for the questioning of every accepted value 
and is found in any age of major social change. The transvaluation of Taoism was triggered by 
ancient China’s shift from the age of poetry to the age of logic, when figures like Lao Zi 
criticized society and wanted to change the way people lived from day to day.  
The time of the old Sinitic religion, the religion of ancient China that worshipped a 
Supreme God (developed as Tien or Heaven), the spirits of the dead, the forces of nature, belief 
in good and evil retribution, and a belief in a variety of divinations, based on the daily life 
experience in an agrarian or nomadic society,
30
 had long passed. So too had the stable age of the 
great Zhou dynasty, from 11
th
 century BC to 7
th
 century BC, when social life was highly 
ritualized and social relations were regulated down to the smallest of details.  
After the fall of the Zhou, the imperial state turned dark. Hu writes that it began to 
“decay… under weak and wicked emperors.”31 The poets record the desperate conditions of the 
times:  
You awe-inspiring Ministers of State, why are you so unjust? Heaven is multiplying its 
afflictions; the people are grumbling, and yet you do not correct nor bemoan 
yourselves!
32
  
The strict social system of the Zhou dynasty had held society stable for centuries. “The Emperor, 
or ‘Son of Heaven,’” Hu explains, “was not only the temporal but also the spiritual head of the 
empire, ruling in the name of Heaven to which he alone was privileged to sacrifice.”33 The 
emperor was lord atop a feudal pyramid. In descending order below the emperor there were “five 
ranks of vassal lords, the Grand Officers, the knights (sze), and the common people,” all of 
whom were “governed by rules prescribing inter-class and intra-class relations and duties.”34 
This system had kept society stable when it was head by a strong and benevolent emperor. Yet 
led, as Hu says, by weak and wicked leaders after the Zhou dynasty fell, the entire system turned 
weak and wicked in turn. While poets like the one mentioned above continued to appeal to the 
righteousness of the old order, other poets believed they were experiencing the disdain of 
Heaven itself. Hu mentions one such poet “who, in bitter distress and despair,” acquiesced that 
his fate must be the unfortunate “decree of Providence.”35  
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 The people are now in peril, In vain they look to Heaven:  
 All is dark and dumb.  
 Let its determination be fixed 
 And there is none whom it will not overcome.  
 There is the great God 
Does He hate anyone?
36
  
 Lao Zi enters the scene as part of this fatalistic crowd. The tradition of critical doubt in 
the Chinese intellectual tradition, Hu maintains, began with “the spirit of courageous doubt so 
early manifested in the postulation of a naturalistic conception of the universe by Lao Tzu and 
the philosophical Taoists.”37 Lao Zi likely would have responded to this poet by saying that God 
neither hates nor loves nor cares at all. Heaven, for Lao Zi, is indifferent. He was a “Sophist” like 
the “Greek Sophists with whom we have been made familiar through the Platonic dialogues,” Hu 
writes.
38
 His philosophy was fueled by skepticism and creative doubt. He juxtaposed the warped 
and malfunctioning imperial order of his time with life earlier, during the time of the old Sinitic 
faith, before the detailed rules and regulations that now bound the Chinese common people to the 
pain of their maltreated lot. The old Sinitic religion considered only what was relevant in daily 
experience. The people lived on the land and experienced the cruelty of the elements very much 
as if they were part of the land. This sentiment had much more fidelity than the conception of a 
benevolent Son of Heaven in the world Lao Zi knew.  “Nature,” he says, “is not benevolent: it 
treats all beings as if they were mere grass and dogs.”39 He thought the existing political and 
social hierarchy was “foolishly civilized and refined and artificial.”40 Worse, not only was the 
social organization contrived, but it had also become dangerous to those who partook in its 
foolishness. Hu explains how Lao Zi uses the “Master Executioner” as an analogy for “nature”:     
There is always the Master Executioner who kills. To undertake executions for the 
Master Executioner is like hewing wood for the Master Carpenter. Whoever undertakes 
to hew wood for the Master Carpenter rarely escapes injuring his own hand.
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Essentially, Lao Zi maintained that nature will steamroll anyone who stands in the way of its 
inevitable path. The best state to live in, Lao Zi maintained, was a state of non-interference, 
where people live in accord with the movements of nature, or in other words, without resistance.   
 As natural a course as this may be, humans had overcomplicated the world with 
institutions and regulated social relations. They now had to strip away centuries of artificiality 
and find a path back to simplicity. Much like Plato’s Allegory of the cave, the process of 
acclimating to a type of existence never before experienced would be jarring and difficult. This 
subversive and revolutionary element of Lao Zi’s philosophy lays the foundation for constructive 
philosophies. As Hu explains, “the age of Sophistry was fading into the age of Logic.”42  
This idea of re-evaluating social institutions is essential to the constructive form of 
logical consciousness Hu is trying to develop. Courageous doubt is an essential aspect of Lao 
Zi’s philosophy that Hu wants to reinvigorate. Hu wanted to use this spirit to nurture in 
contemporary Chinese intellectualism some of the spirit of skepticism passed down from the 
Chinese Protagoras, the rebel Lao Zi. Same as in Greek Sophistry, Hu Shi understood that 
nihilistic deconstructive thinking is necessary to clear away the way for something new.   
 
Tao: The “Native Innocence” 
Tao is a significant element in Chinese thought because it represents two important 
tendencies in Chinese thought: first is a tendency to find a way of living predicated on an 
understanding of one’s place in the world, second is the tendency toward the path of least 
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resistance. The first tendency is the associate of most of the constructive elements of Taoist 
philosophy. The second tendency is the associate of most of the destructive elements of Taoist 
philosophy. For people to shake away the artificialities of life and successfully set down a path 
of authentic and simple living they would need a method of living, or what Lao Zi called a tao. 
The tao is the natural course of life determined by one’s nature given purpose. Hu offers a 
commentary from 3
rd
 century BC that he finds particularly accurate.  
Nature produces no grass for dogs, but dogs eat the grass. Nature produces no dogs for 
men, but men eat the dogs. Nature does nothing for anyone, but everyone seeks to be fit 
for his own purposes. When that is realized, all is well.
43
 
The idea of tao, Hu notes, has grown complicated over the years. He describes it simply as a 
“method; a way of individual life, of social contact, of public activity and government.”44 Tao is 
not the way of nature itself, but rather, Tao is the way of acting in accord with nature so as to not 
struggle against a force infinitely stronger than you. To explain another way, the Taoist 
conception of nature is a lot like the western notion of natural laws. The universal law of 
gravitation, for example, says that a force called gravity pulls objects toward the earth and causes 
them to accelerate. As a natural law, gravity is morally indifferent and acts on every object 
irrespective of what kind of object it is. Gravity does not acknowledge any difference between a 
person, a dog, or a boat; gravity will act like gravity regardless of what it acts on. Therefore, 
human beings, breakable as we are, must respect gravity lest the indifferent pull smash us into 
the ground. This conclusion is much like the Tao, it is a way of life that coincides with nature. 
For Lao Zi, a good life is synonymous with a simple life, free of fictitious constructs and 
regulations and a good government is a government that goes unnoticed and does not meddle in 
the daily affairs of its constituents. Lao Zi’s philosophy contributes to the humanistic aim of the 
Chinese Renaissance because, even though it is so iconoclastic, it aims at a technique for living 
peaceably in the world. He was like other Chinese intellectuals of antiquity, in that he was 
“primarily interested in a happy, adequate, and efficient life here on earth.”45 Taoist 
intellectualism sought to directly confront the pressing problems of everyday life by returning to 
the more simplistic time characterized by the old Sinitic faith. In this sense the connection 
between Lao Zi’s philosophy and Renaissance humanism is clearly visible. “Humanism,” as 
Kreis explains, “directly and indirectly revived the pagan scale of virtues.”46   
 
Nihilism: The Undermining of “Self-Activity”   
The aspect of thought implied by Tao, that people tend toward the path of least resistance, 
is the bedrock of most of Taoism’s nihilistic qualities. This tendency of thought is detrimental to 
Hu’s agenda for pragmatic logic because it undermines individual choice and willful activity, or 
what John Dewey referred to as “self-activity.”  When Hu Shi hosted John Dewey’s visit to 
China from 1919 to 1921, Dewey advocated for the experimental method in education, which Hu 
writes, “shattered our belief in a rigid and uniform educational system, and challenges us to carry 
on innovations and experiments without which an educational system is lifeless.”47 Dewey 
pointed out the social aim of education and explained how an education in the scientific method 
develops the “natural powers” and “self-activity” of the child. It was imperative to the Chinese 
Renaissance that the Taoist concept of “wu-wei, of doing nothing.”48 This aspect of Taoist 
philosophy had been spawned by the rebel zeal of “Lao Zi,” who Hu explains, “doubted almost 
everything… he doubted the benevolence of Heaven… he doubted the efficacy of war and 
resistance to evil… he doubted the usefulness of too many laws and too much government… he 
doubted the utility of all the artificiality and over-refinement civilization.”49 Hu saw all of this 
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doubt as good and absolutely necessary to the reform of Chinese intellectualism and culture. 
However, to the extent that this doubt went too far and undercut constructive change, to the 
extent that is destroyed but did not create in turn, this doubt was detrimental to the reformers 
desires to build a modern China in place of the old civilization. Destruction without creativity, 
Hu maintains, results in the stagnancy of civilization. The state of wu-wei, Hu maintained, is a 
state of “over-simplicity” that must be gotten rid. Lao Zi’s philosophical answer to the dilemma 
of his day was to erase the defected social and political organization, and then to remain there, 
doing nothing to manage ones interactions with and in the world.  
 Hu gives an example of the specific sort of risk that is inherent in the drive for over-
simplification. He explains that Lao Zi understood the act of naming things, like objects and 
roles, as something that arose with institutions. In accord with Hu’s pragmatic understanding of 
names, Lao Zi said that names were designed to give order to the world and help people avoid 
perils. However, Lao Zi continued to explain that as man-made, unnatural constructions, names 
also create over ambition and strife.  
We name the things that we create. We create things to temporarily alleviate the stresses 
of disruption. However, each disruption begets more disruptions, which result in more categories; 
more artificially defined relations, labels, and socially constructed things. Hu explains, “such 
distinctions such as good and evil, right and wrong, beautiful and ugly, etc., were the symptom, 
if not the cause, of the degeneration of the original innocence of mankind.” Lao Zi maintains that 
things like “benevolence,” “wisdom,” “knowledge,” “filial piety,” and “loyalty” are the result of 
an unnatural, disorderly, inharmonious, corrupted life. In other words, “righteousness” and 
“innocence” cannot coexist. Righteousness is not born alone; its companion is corruption. When 
people feel the need to start distinguishing between the righteous and the corrupt, innocence is 
pushed from the frame. “When the world knows beauty to be beauty, there is ugliness… When 
‘wisdom’ and ‘knowledge’ appear, there is great hypocrisy.”50 To counter the problems that had 
been created by names, Lao Zi advocated a reversal of naming to return to a natural system of 
“namelessness.” Lao Zi elevated the natural state of “namelessness” to such a degree that it made 
names seemed wholly degrading and useless. All in all, the idea of devaluing names so totally so 
as to achieve complete namelessness was too deconstructive for Hu. However, the fact that Lao 
Zi was talking about names at all, was for Hu, evidence that Chinese intellectualism was 
beginning to pass from the undisciplined stage of cynicism and entering an age where culture 
and society were subject to a disciplined kind of examination and criticism.   
 
Confucian Humanism 
The Confucian philosophy gave rise to bureaucratic and classical tendencies of thought 
steeped in traditions of high literacy. Confucianism, for Hu Shi, was the next major stage of 
development for disciplined criticism and the first major stage of development for constructive 
philosophy. Hu highlights “Confucian skepticism” and the discussions of logical theory 
contained in the classic Confucian text, Book of Change, as the most significant of 
Confucianism’s contributions to the development of logical method in ancient China, and 
subsequently, to his own program for cultural reform. Conversely, Hu understood the 
conservative focus of Confucianism to be one of the most detrimental aspects of the Chinese 
philosophical tradition.  The regressive aim of Confucian conservatism, he maintained, runs 
counter to the objectives of a modern pragmatic reform.   
Confucius was not a common kind of philosopher, “he was concerned with drawing up a 
set of rules for human conduct… [not] the elaboration of theories.”51 This aspect of the 
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Confucianism shaped the philosophy into bureaucratic form. He was more tempered in his 
criticism than Lao Tze. “His philosophy was a compromise” between the naturalistic influence of 
the sixth century and the cautious attitude toward traditional values he maintained as a statesman.
 
52
 “Whereas Lao Tze’s naturalism was radically nihilistic,” Confucianism can be called a 
philosophy of moderation.
53
 It favored the stability of consistency, and thus, promoted a highly 
stable bureaucracy as a structure of authority. Legitimacy of the authority came from a literary 
tradition revolving around universal original ideas recorded by the sages of antiquity. Due to the 
reverence Confucius attributed to the history and institutions of the literary tradition, he was 
called the “father of Chinese history.”54  
 
Skepticism: “Doubt is Rarely Purely Negative”   
“Doubt is Rarely Purely Negative. It leads to inquiries which in most cases lead in turn to 
positive reconstructions.”55 The positive kind of doubt is exemplified by what Hu calls, 
“Confucian skepticism,” part of the “‘Socratic Tradition’ of Confucius—the tradition of free 
discussion, criticism, and intellectual honesty.”56 Unlike the Taoist style of criticism, intended to 
fully deconstruct all systems of social organization and social naming, the process of critique 
involved in Confucian skepticism was but the first step in a larger constructive process. First, 
Confucianism sought to critique and deconstruct, but then, to re-form whatever had been broken 
down. 
Confucian skepticism asserted “the right to doubt” that became part of the Chinese 
philosophical tradition with the courageous rebellion of Lao Zi, Hu explains. Confucius said that 
some things, like death, fall outside of our ability to know. We should not claim to know about 
topics we cannot know, he insisted. Such skepticism held the focus of society on the secular 
world and prevented the formation of metaphysical beliefs, such as belief in an afterlife. This 
wholly secular focus worked to further simplify the old Sinitic religion that already had little 
mythology or ritual but maintained some important practices, like practices of burial and 
ancestor worship. Confucian skepticism demanded that one “maintain an attitude of courageous 
doubt even in matters traditionally regarded as sacred or sacrosanct.”57  
 
Logical Theory of Change: Scientific Roots in Divination   
Confucian determinism is rooted in the ancient belief in divination, which was the 
“logical outcome of the naturalistic conception of the universe,” Hu explains.58 The concept of 
determinism maintained that things happen according to fate, or ming, which literally means “an 
order or ordaining, which had come to mean ‘what has been allotted’ to the individual.”59 This 
belief maintains that man should not be concerned with trying to appease the gods because his lot 
has been pre-ordained by Heaven’s hand; now his main concern is abiding by his lot.60  
The tradition of divination informed man of his particular position in the world. If a 
culture has a history of divination, the culture has a history of records, which Hu translates to a 
history of chronology, history, and of literature. “This, too, marked the beginning of literary 
education and of an intellectual class.”61 This tradition is also a telling aspect of history because 
it is one of the first places where the roles of priests, scientists, and philosophers are clearly 
merged. They read the oracles and interpreted them as guides for moral behavior. They looked 
into the skies and made the calendar. They recorded their findings and they maintained the 
structure of their class.
62
  
While Confucian class organization led to the bureaucratic tendency of thought, 
Confucian intellectual organization accounts for the constructive aspect of the Confucian 
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philosophy. Confucius was responding to the same conditions as Lao Zi, roughly his 
contemporary.  Confucius attributed the “moral perversity and degradation of his age” to a “long 
and gradual process of intellectual disorganization, decadence of beliefs and convictions, and 
relaxation of duties and relations.”63 Like Lao Zi, Confucius conceived of change as continuous 
and unfolding, as a natural sequence of events moving away from the simple toward the complex. 
Social disorder accompanies intellectual disorder, or in other words, wrong practice follows from 
wrong belief.  
Discussions of logical theory were naturally attendant to the Confucian conception of 
change. Hu explains this connection via the Confucian campaign for the rectification of names. 
Like the Taoist movement toward namelessness, Confucian rectification was a critical campaign 
premised on the idea that institutions and relational roles no longer functioned as originally 
intended. However, rather than aim at a state of namelessness and non-action, the process of 
rectification consisted of re-evaluation, intellectual re-organization, and ultimately, aimed to 
reform. First, one must determine the original meaning of a name, free of the baggage it has 
accumulated throughout the years. Second, the political or social institution represented by the 
name must be re-evaluated in light of the uncovered meaning. Third, institutions should be 
realigned with their names, meaning, if it is revealed that an institution does not function in 
accord with the original meaning of its name, it must be made to function as it ought to. In this 
way, Confucius advocated for a “judicious” use of names. In all, Hu saw the entire Confucian 
program, the reform oriented process of critiquing, judging, and molding in response to social 
disorder, as an essentially practical affair. Judgments made about the original meaning and value 
of the name “tell whither things are tending, point to what is good and what is evil, and thereby 
‘inspire the activities of the world.’”64 To reform on the basis of names, is to change the system 
of practice be re-working the structure of belief.  
Hu also saw signs of China’s “age of constructive thinking” in the parallel he saw 
between Confucian and Platonic logic.
65
  
It has been said that the Platonic logic originated as a reaction against the Heraclitean 
doctrine of change; that, impressed by the all-pervasiveness of change, Plato sought and 
found stability in the changeless ‘ideas.’ It is significant that the book which, in my 
opinion, contains most of the basic doctrines of the Confucian logic is known as the Yi, 
or Book of Change.
66
  
This book has not been recognized for the contributions it makes to the development of logic in 
ancient China because for centuries, Hu writes, “occultism and the moralisticism… have 
prepossessed the minds of the critics… [and] obscured the meaning of the book.”67 Like Platonic 
logic, discussions of logic in the Book of Change connect intellectual stability to changeless 
ideals. Stability is achieved when there is intellectual organization around the ancient sages 
interpretations of the Eight Kwas. Confucius says that “the Eight Kwas may be used to determine 
all good and evil, and therefrom arises the great complexity of life.”68 The best of the ancient 
sages deciphered the Kwas and recorded each interpretation as “a hsiang [xiang]… an image or 
‘idea’ which one forms of a thing” each meaning they interpreted from the universe.69 Having no 
means other than language, the sages of antiquity expressed the xiang, or original ideas, in the 
form of names.  
 The theory of xiang, original ideas, impacts society in two extremely significant ways.  
First, since the sages impressions of the universe and the perfect ideals are held in names, 
language, and the keeping of language, becomes a very important affair. In the Classical 
Language, a scholar will find all the tools needed for intellectual reorganization; authority is 
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predicated on moral strength, which is obtained by vigorous study of the words and meanings of 
the sages. Classical literature becomes the corridor to “the simple,” unadulterated meanings of 
names in the past. Since scholarship in the classics means access to the moral authority of the 
sages, scholarship in the classics becomes the gateway to social power. Second, since 
instruments, customs, and institutions are developed as social representations, or 
implementations, of these names, historical record of these developments becomes extremely 
important tool for social reform and intellectual reorganization. Hu notes that for Confucius, the 
history of these developments is a record of the attempts people have made to realize the “‘ideas’ 
or perfect heavenly ideals” into the things of practical life. Intellectual organization is achieved 
when the things align most closely with their ideals.  
 The arts of writing became inextricably linked with the arts of ruling in traditional society 
because of the importance of names and histories in society’s moral and intellectual organization. 
Following from the original premise of Confucian scholarship, classical scholarship was 
employed to govern behavior by organizing the belief. The intangible quality of the original 
ideas, xiang, behind the name of each object, device, or institution guaranteed the possibility for 
revision depending on the state’s political or cultural need. The original ideas are by nature 
complex and elusive, being the impressions of wise men from antiquity who understood aspects 
of the universe that only few have been privy to. Likewise, after centuries of reinterpretation and 
reorganization, the original idea is sure to become even more difficult to locate and decipher. 
Still, once understood, once could never be sure they had interpreted the idea behind the name 
correctly. To understand how elusive the original ideas must have seemed to classical scholars, 
imagine for a moment a large gallery in an old English manor house. It begins at the entrance 
and extends deep into the center of the building. The walls are lined with great commissioned 
portraits from each generation. Each portrait is larger and more ornate than the one before. Each 
member of the family is depicted more handsomely and with more regalia than the one before. 
Far into the house, long after your trip through the gallery began, a salon comes into view at the 
end of the hall. You continue moving toward it, but you can never get quite close enough to take 
stock of who is in the room. The salon at the end of the hall is like the highest realm of our 
human world, where the wisest sages of antiquity gained access to the meaning of the 
phenomena of the universe. The figures in the salon are like the names the sages gave to the 
ideas. The names are the sages’ best attempts to translate the ideas of heaven into the language of 
humans. The portraits spread out along the walls are the generations of interpretations of the 
name, each one representing the values and ambitions of its position social, economic, and 
political time.   
 
Conservatism: Blocking Change with Deductive Habits of Mind   
It has been justly said that the greatest obstacle to progress in China is the deductive habit 
of mind; that is, the willingness to accept things on authority, to acquiesce in ideas and 
ideals without questioning whence they are derived and whether they are true or not. A 
quotation from the classics is sufficient argument for national policy, and a serious saying 
of Confucius is good enough to justify the existence of any obsolete custom or institution. 
This habit is the most formidable enemy to innovation and progress.
70
 
While the Confucian program for reform contributed to the constructive turn in 
philosophy, the constructivist elements were ultimately overshadowed by the philosophy’s 
conservative aim. Even the campaign to rectify names, which originates from the discussions of 
logic that Hu attributes Confucianism’s biggest contributions to, exhibits the strength of 
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Confucianism’s regressive tendencies. The critique and judgment of the name was the only 
practical aspect of rectification. Unlike the pragmatic kind of reform that Hu advocated, where 
problems are assessed in light of their historical bearings and situational context, and then 
remedied by actual changes in the bearing of history or contemporary context, the success of 
rectification could not be checked against the situational context. One cannot judge the efficacy 
of restoring a name to its originally meaning by checking to see if a practical problem has been 
remedied. After all, social disorder will persist so long as intellectual disorder persists and while 
restoring one name to its original meaning is a step in the right direction, it is hardly enough 
make a practical difference in such a disorderly world. Furthermore, rectification is never 
complete. As change is a continual process of unfolding from the simple to the complex, every 
arduous step back toward the simple is countered by another shift somewhere else toward the 
complex.   
Since the rectification of names is never a finished reform, classical scholarship must also 
rely on the study of history to direct social order. Hu explains that it is because of the traditional 
philosophy of history that “histories are entitled ‘mirrors.’”71 The implication, he explains, is that 
reflections of the past can shed light on conflict in the present.
72
 The present is understood to be 
a reflection of the past in the same way that an adult reflects the child they once were. Some 
fundamental aspects of the adult and child, such as fingerprints, remain exactly the same. Some 
features of the adult and child maintain a similar appearance, such as the shape of their lips. 
Other features change over the course of time, testifying to the transition from childhood to 
adulthood, like creases in the forehead, a hardened look in the eyes, and worn skin. We could 
extend this analogy even further to describe the ambition of Confucian reform. Confucius 
“conceived of human history as a continuous process of gradual development from crude ways 
of living to complex forms of civilization… it is therefore necessary, in order to understand the 
complex and confused institutions and activities of the present, to begin with a study of the 
earlier and simpler forms of the past.”73  
Hu explains that investigation of the past would be good if it was used to determine what 
lessons are applicable and helpful to understanding the complexities of the present circumstance. 
However, for Confucius, the reason to investigate the past was to “manifest what has come 
before,” to turn away from the complex and retreat to the simple.  This regressive tendency, Hu 
maintained, must be excised from modern Chinese intellectualism. A culture should not be 
forced to stand still despite the continual movement of the world around it.  
 The Confucian doctrine of determinism, however, held that the less a culture changes, the 
happier the people of that culture will be. Like Lao Zi, Confucius understood change as a 
continual process from simple to complex forms of civilization and social organization. Also like 
Lao Zi, Confucius would call the road of complexities the “easy” way; the road back to the 
“simple” is difficult. For Lao Zi, a return to the simple meant a complete return to nature, the 
complete deconstruction of all social constructions. For Confucius, a return to the simple meant 
vigorous intellectual reorganization, a complete reshaping of the ideas from their morphed forms 
back to their original forms.  
Even though Confucianism introduced constructivist elements into Chinese 
intellectualism, it is important to point out that Confucianism, like Taoism, is essentially a 
passive philosophy in the sense of its final aim. Both Taoism and Confucianism wanted to end 
the disorder that plagued society in their time. Both philosophies tried to determine a method of 
limiting the kinds of disruption that seemed to antagonize and play into this disruption. 
Confucius maintained that “all change… arises from motion, which is produced by the pushing 
 49 
 
of that which is active against that which is passive,” Hu writes.74 Thus, for Confucius, to be 
“passive” is to remain simple and close to the original ideas. In this idea of change, the “passive” 
is natural, good, and difficult. The “active” is the unnatural, bad, and easy. All of the other major 
elements of the Confucian philosophy must be considered in this context. Confucian education 
gave the society access to the original ideas that all things should closely adhere to. Further, 
since Confucian determinism maintained that “wealth and honors are in the hands of 
Providence,”75 and since Confucian skepticism prevented belief in an afterlife, all of man’s 
energy should be focused into the one thing over which he has any control, which is, keeping 
man’s institutions aligned with their ideal purpose.  
 
Mohist Pragmatism 
The philosophy and religion of Moism gave rise to tendencies of thought that encouraged 
behaviors of conformity. The Mohist philosophy also developed critical tendencies of thought   
with argumentative traditions. The polemic machinery of Moism was engineered to counter the 
protests of atheist rebels and agnostic reformers with a united religion of altruism. Mo Zi “openly 
condemned the Confucians as ‘atheists’ who denied the existence of gods and ghosts and yet 
ceremoniously practised all the rites of ancestral worship!”76 He said it was useless to practice 
the rituals premised on belief in the gods, but at the same time, deny the gods. “That is as 
meaningless as throwing a fishing new where you are sure to find no fish!”77 With the intention 
of defending his theism against the atheists and agnostics that Mo Zi “invented the logic of three-
fold argument,” which maintained the importance of history and the sages of antiquity, but which 
also developed the importance of practicality. In short, the most pragmatic of the leaders in the 
foundational Chinese philosophies, Mo Zi, was also the most conservative. For him, there was 
nothing inherently impractical about theism. Theism became impractical when theistic practices 
were maintained in the absence of belief; at that point, how could the practices serve any utility 
at all?  
Mo Zi was a great religious leader and reformer born around 10 years after the death of 
Confucius (490-415 B.C.).
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 Hu likes Mo Zi as a character; he explains him as the type of person 
who was strong enough, and could endure enough, to advance a different kind of thinking. In 
particular, Mo Zi aimed at reducing doubt.  
Mo Tzu doubted the doubters, and wanted to restore faith and belief in the traditional 
religion of the people--the religion of God's Spirit. He believed that all evil came from 
doubt, from freedom of thought and belief, especially from diversity and standards of 
right and wrong. 
Hu understands Mohist thought as very similar to utilitarian and pragmatic thought.
79
 It focuses 
on practical questions about the benefits of things and ideas in light of present day circumstances. 
As a historical figure, Hu maintains that Mo Zi represented important characteristics that create 
leaders in heavy concentrations and create modern scientifically minded individuals in lower 
concentrations.  
Mo Zi rebelled against Confucian ritualism and formalism, the atheism and agnosticism 
begot by Confucian skepticism, and the doctrine of determinism, and most importantly, “he 
rebelled against their attitudinarianism which refused to consider the practical consequences of 
beliefs, theories, and institutions.”80 Mo Zi worried that people would lose the capacity for 
practical judgment if they did not exercise it. He believed that Confucian naming tended to bring 
about this sort of regression by keeping the intellectual and ruling class focused on the classical 
literature written by the sages rather than the practical world surrounding them. The rulers would 
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continue to be drawn into the literature until they became very distant from society and its 
problems.  
By constantly confining one’s mind to defining and re-defining general principles 
without testing their validity by examining the kind of conduct and character they are 
fitted to produce, one gradually loses one’s sense of proportion and valuation and tends to 
‘strain at a gnat and swallow a camel.’81 
Both Mo Zi and Hu believed that knowledge involves the process of choice; knowledge is not 
related to the ability to name, but the ability to choose, to make a practical judgment.  
 
Practical Reasoning: “The Best Antidote”   
The Confucian deductive habit of mind, that accepted the prevalence of a truth without 
practical assessment, disabled the constructive potential of Confucian principles of intellectual 
reorganization. The best doubt to the deductive habit of mind, Hu said, “is found in the scientific 
attitude which seeks to find out truth for oneself and refuses to [believe] in anything without 
sufficient evidence of its credibility.”82 The difference between Confucianism and Moism is 
essentially the difference between what and how.
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 While Confucianism asked what is good 
government? Moism said, we know what good government is; how do we make it happen?  
Applicability of the Confucian model to Hu’s reform includes criticism of the current 
institution and investigation into its origin but it cannot extend any further because the Confucian 
model did not allow for ideas or institutions to be revised into anything other than what they 
were. The Mohist model realizes that the original idea of an institution was conceived in relation 
to the circumstances of the originating day. Thus, the principle should stay the same but not 
necessarily the institution.
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 Hu uses the following passage from Mo Zi to show where the 
Mohist method separated from Confucianism.   
Now a blind man may say, ‘That which shines with brilliancy is white, and that which is 
like soot is black.’ Even those who can see cannot reject these definitions. But if you 
place both white and black things before the blind man and ask him to choose the one 
from the other, then he fails. Therefore I say, ‘A blind man knows not white from black, 
not because he cannot name them, but because he cannot choose them.’85    
Confucianism does not consider the practical results when setting a course for the ideal. Moism 
considers the ideal, considers the practical results, and then, sets a course. This shift is important 
for the consideration of practical consequence, but also because it incorporates the aspect of 
choice into the philosophical equation. One must consider the possible outcomes, weigh them 
against the ideal, and make a judgment about the relative value of each. For Hu, this is a great 
stride toward the scientific spirit.  
For proper judgment, Mo Zi advanced three laws of reasoning.  First, reasoning must 
have a “basis or foundation,” which can be derived from studying “the experiences of the wisest 
men of the past.”86 The second law of reasoning held that one must take a “general survey.”87 
The general survey acts as the bridge between the present time and the past. The general survey 
requires an examination of the fidelity between the foundational experiences of the past and 
actual experiences in the world today. Third, proper reasoning must culminate with “practical 
application.”88 The final test of sound reasoning is actual public experimentation. For reasoning 
to be complete there must be a test of “whether or not it is conducive to the welfare of the State 
and of the People.”89  
 As the first law of reasoning shows, Mo Zi continued the respect for history demonstrated 
in the Confucian philosophy. However, he revamped it and changed it into something much 
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more favorable to Hu’s idea of logic and the scientific spirit. While the history could lend us 
theories, a theory was useless unless it was proven to be compatible with “the facts of 
experience.”90 Mo Zi contended that the problem with society didn’t have anything to do with 
how far it had drifted from history; rather, the problems are the result of condemning belief in 
fatalism and the attendant belief that only the sages of antiquity who had ever, or would ever, get 
a glimpse of the larger meaning and ideal arrangement of the fated world. Determinism, he said, 
does nothing good for society. It makes officials dishonest and leaves rulers unprotected. It 
makes people lazy and irresponsible. Most important, determinism undermines people’s ability 
to learn through experience.  
 The second law of reasoning called for a survey of the actual experiences of people living 
in the contemporary world. “This reliance on direct observation was historically of no small 
significance,” Hu writes.91 Although this was but a first attempt at empiricism in Chinese 
intellectualism and had a flawed method that relied too heavily on easily fallible forms of sense 
observation, Hu was enthusiastic about what it meant for the development of logic. By 
advocating for a process of learning based on direct observation, Mo Zi was protesting the 
“ready-made knowledge” that Confucianism revolved around. It said that learning is something 
that must happen in the experiential world.  
 
Universal Laws of Action: Throwing the Net at the Fish   
Interestingly, Mo Zi’s motivation for developing the art of polemics, which accounts for 
the model of practical reasoning discussed before and the Mo Zi’s conception of universal laws 
of action discussed here, was to refute the destructive thinking of the atheists and agnostics like 
Lao Zi and Confucius respectively and to found the Mohist religion. It is actually Mo Zi’s 
doctrine of altruism, the most supreme of all universal laws and the foundation of the Moism 
religion that accounts for the furthest reaching agenda of Hu’s reform. Likewise, the test of 
practicality for the universal law of altruism is very similar to Hu’s understanding of the 
principles of democracy. “Democracy… is no more and no less than the sum-total of all the 
democratized and democratizing forces, social, economic, moral and intellectual.”92 The 
principle of democracy, in other words, must be practically resilient in all veins of cultural life: 
social, economic, moral, and intellectual. For Hu, the source of democracy’s practical resilience 
is much the same as Mo Zi’s explanation of the founding principle of Moism, the universal 
benefit of altruism. Mo Zi, Hu writes, 
Was essentially a believer in one Supreme God who wills, feels, and watches over his 
human world with unlimited love. ‘The will of God is love,—love for all and without 
distinction.’ This was the greatest contribution to the history of Chinese religion. He was 
trying to purify the old religion and give it a new meaning which he found in the idea of 
‘love for all.’93  
Mo Zi worked hard to disprove the Confucian belief in determinism. He thought it was 
impractical to practice the rituals of Confucianism without believing in their religious 
foundations. To do so, Mo Zi said, “is as meaningless as throwing a fishing net where you are 
sure to find no fish!”94 Moist faith was conceived of as something truly practical in the respect 
that it could be shown to improve the lives of those who partook in it according to the Mo Zi’s 
three laws of reasoning. When something can be proven practically beneficial time and time 
again, like the altruistic foundation of the Mohist faith, it can be called a universal law of action. 
For Mo Zi, the process of learning, or of building knowledge, revolved around developing 
universal laws of action. The laws are like rules of habit, or general principles that act as 
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guidelines to reasoning, choice, and action. “To perpetuate a general principle,” Hu explains, “is 
to work it into our habits, to generalize as widely as possible, to establish it as a universal law.”95 
Hu credits Mo Zi with the beginning of logic in China, and notes, “Truly, as John Dewey has 
long ago pointed out, logic always arose as an instrument for the defense of a faith that was in 
danger of being overthrown.”96     
 
Narrowness: Another Enemy to Innovation  
Hu called the willingness to accept things on authority alone, “the most formidable 
enemy to innovation and progress.”97 Also quite detrimental is to employ logic as a tool of 
validation or to require practical evidence but accept too narrow a range of evidence. Hu offers 
Dewey’s critique of employing logic to either vivify or validate rather than to criticize and revise. 
The kinds of judgment intended to bolster rationalistic philosophies rather than to continually 
alter pragmatic theories on the grounds of experience, Hu explains, is not conducive to the 
scientific sensibility. On the one hand, logic applied like this merely verifies a decision already 
made, and on the other hand, it is too short sighted. 
He explains that Mo Zi did not always acknowledge short term verse long term 
consequences, “the difference between that which is immediately practical and that the practical 
worth of which cannot be immediately seen.”98 Fundamentally this problem Hu has with the 
philosophy of Mo Zi is the same problem he has had with all of Chinese philosophy leading up 
to this point. He understands that there is a leap of faith, inherent in science, that discoveries will 
be beneficial down the road even if they register no immediate viability. This is a pragmatic 
assertion that allows for investment in science—I don’t see the consequences yet but I will know 
them when I do. Further, Hu maintained that there are practical consequences that have to do 
with the aesthetic and larger sense of life. These are consequences of quality that should not be 
viewed or judged in terms of instrumental value—while I don’t understand the value of the 
things I see right in front of me, I know that they are of a large and encompassing value.  
Pragmatism, for Hu, refers to practical consequences that are both near and far reaching. 
He criticizes the pragmatists of China’s past for defining practical consequences with too narrow 
a scope. Just like Hu is trying to develop the more nuanced and inclusive conception of science 
as a “spirit” that touches all aspects of daily life and thought, he is also trying to introduce a more 
mature and expansive conception of pragmatism with which reformers will be willing to 
introduce the kinds of changes that do not promise quick returns, but that stand on strong 
grounds and indicate a strong likelihood that they will reshape culture in broader and more 
lasting forms. Hence, when Hu critiques the pragmatists of China’s past, in his critiques we can 
see how he is choosing to define pragmatism for modern China.  
  Hu’s critique of Mo Zi’s short sightedness is very telling of the difficulties Hu faced in 
pursuit of intellectual reform. When practicality was mistaken for immediate utility, even 
purported proponents of pragmatic reform would mistakenly judge knowledge based on the 
exceedingly limited criteria of knowable benefit. As an advocate for gradual reform, the kind that 
is founded in tendencies of thought, encouraged by institutional changes, and only becomes 
visible much later, Hu needed people to understand that the practical benefits of the scientific 
spirit are rolling, the causal line is not always immediately apparent. The Mohist structure of 
practical reasoning calls for people to act based on an informed premise, the accuracy of which is 
revealed in the immediate wake of the action. Hu asks people to act on the basis of an informed 
premise, with faith in knowledge and the future.  
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Hu’s Pragmatic Theory of Logic  
Reform, for Hu, should be a gradual process. He equated the pattern of pragmatic thought 
with gradualism; it is not acutely utilitarian and it does not expect grand, sweeping, and 
immediate changes, the likes of a revolution. It has faith that practical reasoning and procedural 
science will bring forth benefits and it understands that some of the benefits will not be 
immediately recognized for what they are or could one day be. These characteristics form the 
general tenor of the pragmatic mind Hu hoped to develop. He would begin development on the 
grounds of the traditional tendencies of thought discussed in this chapter. Then he endeavored to 
add various contributions from later installments of the foundational philosophies, like neo-
Mohism and neo-Confucianism.  
From the traditional tendencies of thought Hu’s pragmatic theory of logic included the 
following characteristics: the ability to doubt and criticize, attention to one’s situation and 
immediate practical consequences, also a far-reaching vision of consequences, an appreciation of 
history as a resource for re-construction, and an ability to form knowledge from various forms of 
reasoning. From the neo-Mohist and neo-Confucian schools, Hu drew the following 
characteristics: an understanding that naming is important but names are flexible and based on 
consequences, an understanding of conduct as the completion of knowledge, the methodical 
procurement of knowledge, social institutions and organizations informed by knowledge, and an 
appreciation of the role education plays in nurturing the scientific mind. While Hu’s thoughts on 
pragmatic thought were certainly informed by the Western logical tradition and it is plain to see 
that the characteristics listed above are all present in the Western logical tradition, Hu’s theory of 
logic is built from characteristics that originated in the Chinese intellectual tradition.  
The previous section accounted for the constraints to the development of logical 
consciousness as well as the foundations for development of logical consciousness with 
explanation of the three dominant tendencies in Chinese thought: 1) the critical but passive 
tendency rooted in oral traditions; 2) the bureaucratic classical tendency rooted in highly literate 
traditions; and 3) the conformist tendency rooted in argumentation traditions. The following 
section provides an overview of the system of logic Hu tried to construct on the foundation of 
these tendencies along with the contributions he pulls from the neo-Mohist and neo-Confucian 
schools.  
One of the things that Hu realized needed to be added to the formula for logical 
consciousness is the understanding of plural causality. Hu realized the importance of this idea 
after his mother died; he rethought a doctrine he had learned when he was young that said 
immortality can be achieved through virtue, service, and wise speech, or in other words, through 
words, work, and words. As he mourns his mother's death and observed the other mourners, his 
face is clearly displayed the great impact his mother had on them, Hu decided that “everything is 
immortal.” 
Everything that we are, everything that we do, and everything that we say is immortal in 
the sense that it has its effect somewhere in this world, and that effect in turn will have its 
results somewhere else, and the thing goes on in infinite space and time.
99
  
Then, in 1923, after a long debate on science and the philosophy of life between China's top 
thinkers, which lasted the better part of the year, Hu set forth his credo on the topic. He called it 
a “Naturalistic Conception of Life and the Universe.”100 It is not a “scientific credo” he explained, 
but rather, it is "a framework for new philosophy of the universe and life."
101
 Essentially it was 
his attempt to outline, as conclusively as possible, the direction he would like to see thought tend 
instead of where it had thus far been tending. He was proposing an outline of logical 
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consciousness that could provide the foundation on which a scientific credo, or credo on human 
morality, or credo on spiritual democracy, could find sturdy footing. 
 Hu’s “Naturalistic Conception of Life and the Universe” had 10 major points dealing 
with the following topics: space, time, movement and change, the biological struggle for 
existence, the human species, historical and biological evolution, the law of causality, the 
mutability of religion and morality, the perpetual motion of matter, and social immortality. Every 
assertion he makes on any one of these topics is made on the grounds of some category or history 
of knowledge. “Specialized histories,” meaning such categories as the history of language, the 
history of literature, history of economics, political history, history of international 
communication, and so on, should be developed on their own terms to enable a thorough and 
systematic approach to comparative studies. These histories along with welcome use of source 
materials of all kinds, rather than just those traditionally accepted and scholarship, will enable 
China's intellectuals to develop a method of evidential analysis capable of specifying the most 
acute problems and developing plans capable for attending to them. In the framework of 
philosophy and life outlined in 1923, Hu grounds his assertions in the following histories and 
categories of knowledge: astronomy, physics, geology, paleontology, the scientific method, 
biology, physiology, psychology, anthropology, sociology, religion, morality, physics, and 
chemistry. This kind of inclusive comparative approach to knowledge of the vast array of human 
experiences allows once you make judgments, informed to the best extent possible, about the 
course of their life as an individual and part of the larger social being. It is a testament to Hu’s 
views about the considerable intellect and imagination each human being is imbued with, and 
simultaneously, his respect for the power and forces of the natural world. He explains that man 
both acts on and is acted on by the world. "Every change follows laws of nature,... Causality 
governs man's life and the struggle for existence spurs his activities-- in such a universe man has 
limited freedom indeed."
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 Yet part of the naturalistic universe, as man is, he possesses causal 
significance. 
Yet this tiny animal of two hands has his proper place and worth in that world of infinite 
magnitude. Making good use of his hands and a large brain, he has actually succeeded in 
making a number of tools, thinking out ways and means, and creating his own 
civilization.
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Understanding his own worth and legacy, as respecting the nature of which he is part, man can 
even make use of the law of causality. Rather than render man helpless in a stream of brutal 
events, "the law of causality not only enables him to explain the past and the future, but also 
encourages him to use his intelligence to create new causes and obtain new results."
104
  
 The old causes, of traditional Chinese intellectualism, included such things as Taoist 
iconoclasm and the concept of wu-wei, or non-action, the conservatism of Confucian deductive 
thought, and the Mohists’ too narrow appreciation of practical applicability. Hu’s “Naturalistic 
Conception of Life and the Universe” outlined the new causes that would develop a logical 
consciousness among the people or the establishment of China's modern civilization. It's major 
premises can be summarized as follows: 
1) The universe extends over infinite space 
2) The universe extends over infinite time 
3) The universe is governed by natural laws of movement and change 
4) All creatures struggle for existence in the biological world 
5) Man is an animal, different from other animals in degrees but not in kind 
6) The history and causes of biological and social evolution are important 
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7) Psychology is also dependent on the law of causality 
8) The causes of moral and religious change can be scientifically studied 
9) Matter is not static; it is full of motion 
10) The individual self will die but the individual's achievements live on in social immortality.  
 
“To live for the sake of the species and posterity is religion of the highest kind.”105 In these 
assertions we can see those remnants of China's foundational philosophers that brought China 
into the age of logic: Lao Zi, Confucius, and Mo Zi. The naturalistic conception of movement 
and change, the position of humans as animals among animals in an unconcerned biological 
world, the importance of procedural and historical study, and investigation into changes in 
morality are all ideas carried over from the foundational philosophies.  
To develop logical consciousness needed a stronger emphasis on conduct. He pulled 
some of these missing elements from the neo-Mohist school. Who understood conduct as the 
culmination of perception, mind, desire, and knowing. Desire, for him, is akin to the Aristotelian 
notion of rational desire, as a directing force behind behavior. When we lack some needed 
amount of knowledge, we find ourselves in a doubtful situation. The doubt functions to check 
desire by causing hesitation. “Morality… is an art,” Hu writes; “the end of moral education is 
right desires and right aversions.”106 Moral conduct, for Hu, is an art the same as would be 
practiced by a potter, welder, or any other artisan. It requires a wide enough breadth of 
knowledge that the least informed of our thoughts, our desires, tend in the right direction. 
Hu also needed stronger emphasis on causality, specifically the multiplicity of causes. Hu 
understood the importance of investigating into the causes of social institutions. As mentioned 
earlier, he maintained that man's agency in the world comes from his causal significance. That 
man could understand the law of causality and will it is what set him apart from the dogs and the 
grass. In this respect, the neo-Mohists developed an aspect of pragmatic logic that Mo Zi could 
not. It is a division between types of causes, which for Hu, is necessary for developing the 
scientific spirit. There are major causes and there are minor causes him major causes a complete 
cause and a minor cause is only a partial cause. There are multiple minor causes. This sense of 
plurality in causation was indicated earlier by Hu’s description of social immortality, that each 
seemingly insignificant individual leaves the facts on the social being by the combination of his 
contributions. Further, the plurality of causes counters the deductive thought of Confucianism, 
which had such a detrimental effect on the development of investigative thought. By appreciating 
that an array of causal forces act together, logic is no longer dominated by the idea of single 
finite causes. 
Hu also pulled a couple missing pieces for the development of logical consciousness 
from the neo-Confucian school. Social institutions and organizations must be informed by 
knowledge. In particular educational institution must play a decisive role in nurturing the 
scientific minds. Progress, Hu maintained, is nurtured triumphing over nature. This is how Hu 
understands the social role of science, as the apparatus for leveraging change and inspiring new 
ways of thinking. Science and the study of nature give people outside of entrenchment in human 
convention to see life from a different perspective. Hu belief that as long as society maintained 
respect for natural inquiry, then there would always be opportunities to break from conventions. 
Likewise, the ongoing process of and respect for natural inquiry is related to the most important 
ability to comprehend consequences that are not immediately beneficial but that possessed long-
reaching benefits for problems that are not yet perceptible, or as yet, only barely perceptible. 
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In Communication  
 Standards of logical consciousness correspond with certain characteristics of social 
communication. The kinds of communication that are most necessary are those that allow people 
to educate and be educated, exchange ideas, and deliberate on ideas without feeling beholden to 
them. There needs to be opportunities for social reflection, discussion, and argument. Moreover, 
people must possess the means of learning, articulating, and deliberating. In other words, they 
must possess language. The foundational philosophies of traditional China made contributions to 
the communicative round that corresponded with their contributions in the logical realm each of 
the three founding philosophers was advancing a particular way to live as an acting individual, as 
a moral individual, as an acting social being, and as a moral social being, each of which 
employee communication and language in particular and different ways. 
 For Lao Zi, language represented the crux of the social problem. With language, people 
had tried to redirect the world they could feel at ease and. Yet, every step they took away from 
natural innocent, the more troubled a feast and discomfort they felt. In response, they made more 
rules and names more things, with every addition mounting their stress. The answer was the 
“exaltation of the non-being.”107 This was the core of Lao Zi’s philosophy, Hu explains.  
By a kind of metaphysical analogy, he conceived of a ‘State of Nature’ as a state of 
extreme simplicity and natural innocence, as a state of non-activity. Therefore he 
constructed his utopia as ‘a small country with few people’ where, ‘though there be ships 
and carriages , there is no occasion to ride in them; and, though there be armor and 
weapons, there is no occasion to use them’ where ‘knotted cords are to be revived (in 
place of writing).’108 
The Taoist philosophy translated into tendencies of destructive and defeatist thought. In 
communication, Taoism translated into tendencies of pacifism. For a Taoist society, a good 
government is one that would be barely noticed by the people.
109
 It would not be an 
argumentative society because there would not be many occasions for disagreement; no one 
would try to state any claims or exert any control. People would focus mostly on their daily 
experience in the world this is the communicative form that comes closest to what Hu termed 
Siniticsm, the old simple religion that was based around elements of the world that people had 
experience with. There are no elaborate ritual practices, and the rituals that do take shape, 
develop out of naturally occurring events, such as death and birth. In this society the ‘world’ 
would be spoken about in the abstract because anything outside of the realm of the people's daily 
experiences would not be known in any tangible way. Even the immediate world would not be 
known in concrete terms, or there would be no artificial names or divisions. The environments 
would be known according to its natural signals time, cycles, and continuity. There would be no 
clocks ticking through uniform segments of the day. Divisible units would seem arbitrary. The 
attempt to name community associations and record their functions explicitly and words would 
seem arbitrary too. People in a Taoist communicative world would be much more interested in 
performing their duties than in naming them. 
 Confucian thought is regulated by a higher authority. The finite ‘good’ can go in the face 
of experience. It is a deductive logic that asserts that contradictions between experience and 
moral authority simply mean that the world is so maligned that the ‘good’ cannot be experienced. 
The same influence of authority holds true in the communicative world of Confucianism. 
Communication happens in highly literate forms. It is staunchly recorded and very hierarchal. 
Practical communication in the Confucian system is a very cognitive affair, as opposed to the 
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world Lao Zi would like to see, where record-keeping would grow no more complex than how it 
was originally done in China, by knotting cords.   
 Communicative authority would follow from the hierarchy of cognitive authority. Hi 
literacy equates with social power. For example, by literacy gives scholars access to the ethical 
judgments recorded by the stages of antiquity in the dead classical language. In turn, be scholar-
officials become the executioners of classical morality. This role does not translate into a legal 
system per se, because the features of social authority that hold rulers in close proximity to 
Heaven does not lend itself to a code of law with attendant penalties applicable to all. Thus, the 
communicative lines of authority are further cemented in an atmosphere of paternalism where 
the scholars are trusted to self-regulate their behavior and to oversee the behavior of the common 
people who cannot self-regulate.  
Perhaps as should be expected, and ironic aspect of the Confucian communicative world 
occurs where the lines of authority and doubt me. Confucian doubt is the bedrock of the 
Confucian philosophy of education, which says “that men are near to each other by nature, that 
only practice sets them apart and that ‘with education there will be no classes.’”110 The civil 
service examination was founded on the idea that all people should have the opportunity to fulfill 
their calling. Like many aspects of the original Confucian philosophy, the examination system 
took shape in traditional China as something very different from its original conception. For 
example, in traditional education, the student is supposed to memorize classical texts. Outside of 
the teacher’s explanation of what the text means, there is no other discussion. If the student were 
to ask a question, the teacher might understand it as a critique of their inadequate explanation. 
This is very different from what Hu explains that Confucius expected of his students. 
What Confucius expected of his favorite students was the exercise of the right to doubt, 
to question, and not to be pleased or satisfied with whatever a great master or authority 
might say. Confucius himself fully exemplified this right to doubt and his teaching. On 
several occasions, he expressed satisfaction that his students were able to ‘come back’ at 
him and to ‘stir me up.’111 
Although students in traditional China were not encouraged to stir their teachers up as Confucius 
might have preferred, the civil service examinations preserve the pathway to power for those 
who had been selected by Heaven as moral leaders of their fellow man. 
 The Confucian rectification of names was central to execution of solid moral leadership. 
“The final aim of the rectification of names,” Hu notes, “is to reestablish on earth the ideal 
relations of society, to make every prince a prince, every minister a minister, every father a 
father, and every son a son.”112 This final aim is also known as the li, “a body of positive rules of 
propriety.”113 Essentially li accounts for the rules to practically order a society.  
 Moism promoted conformist tendencies of thought. Since Mo Zi was most concerned 
about the loss of religious faith and believe that doubt was the worst offender of faith, he was 
trying to establish a religion that was completely philosophically sound and with universal laws 
of action to function as unquestionable gods of action. Thus, the communicative realm of a 
Mohist society would be argumentative with a very utilitarian and final end in mind-to remove 
doubt and to restore faith in religion and faith in actions guided by religion. Mo Zi reasoned that 
the doubters, Lao Zi and Confucius, had used criticism and logic to undermine religion, so he, 
doubter of the doubters as Hu called him, would use criticism and logic to restore it.  
Hu worried about the kinds of communicative reasoning Mo Zi undertook that combined 
his “religious temperament” and “his pragmatic method” to “a conception the validity of which 
has not been seriously subjected to the pragmatic test.”114 Another tendency of Mohist based 
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communication that worried Hu was the conformity inspiring doctrine of “Agreeing Upward.”115 
It is a politico-religious doctrine that maintains first, that general principles of action are 
necessary for accomplishing action. Second, general principles of action become universal law 
when they have been so widely spread and deeply ingrained that they are in our habits. Third, 
that social order should be maintained by a standard of conformity with the universal law. What 
does this mean for communication? Essentially, it means that society respects argumentation, but 
there is definitely a time and a place to employ it, but more often, one should be content to toe 
the line. Hu quotes the following example: 
Anyone who acts must have some rule of action… Even the artists and have their 
standards of action. They make squares by a try-square; circles by compasses. All 
artisans, skillful or stupid, conform to these standards. While the skillful ones may hit 
upon them (without actually using them), the unskillful ones may thus be unable to work 
according to the standards, and to accomplish much more than if they worked without 
them.
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Hu worried about the totalitarian tendency of Agreeing Upward, or which social communication 
aims at unifying everyone and all action under the “highest standard of right.” 
 However, other social communicative aspects of the Mohist religion were more pleasing 
to Hu. For example, Mo Zi denied Confucian determinism; he insisted that a person can earn 
their salvation through good efforts and actions.
117
 Since salvation is possible, a key feature of 
the Mohist religion was asceticism,
118
 which corresponds to communication focused around the 
individual’s personal motivations and efforts to self-actualize. Above all, Hu appreciated the 
kind of social communicative environment that follows from Mo Zi’s fundamental doctrine of 
“love all.” Moism held that altruism is the highest of the universal laws.119 Hu believed that a 
spirit of altruism is the cornerstone of a good democracy. It is enabled by access to wealth in a 
marketplace of goods and it is encouraged by access to innovation in a marketplace of ideas. In a 
society where people learn, imagine, and aspire, they can more easily recognize the value of their 
own life, and in turn, the value of their fellow man. 
 The origin of logic, and thus the scientific spirit and democratic spirit, and everything 
else that can follow is doubt. “The spirit of doubt in criticism does not spring up of itself. It is 
always the outcome of the new vision and new when a few. There must be sufficient data for 
comparison and reflection before the mind is freed from the shackles of the old standpoint which 
had long been taken for granted.”120 All of these thousand new points of view are expressed on 
the many pages of the new periodicals that have sprung up that almost every educational center.” 
All this has not been done merely to keep pace with the fashion of the world, but largely to 
furnish the nation with sufficient material for comparison and suggestion in dealing with our own 
problems.”121  
The logical consciousness that Hu aims to develop is a “new mental attitude” comprised 
of the “willingness to look facts in the face and… boldness to raise unpleasant and unwelcome 
questions… the critical and problem-loving habit of mind” that enables progress.122 To 
accomplish the end of logical consciousness, the people needed to reform of the language of high 
literacy, they needed to raise the status of the vernacular language. Hu realized that if he was 
going to see social change, he would need to see a change in logic, which would necessitate 
changing the standard ways of thinking, reading, and communicating. People need to learn how 
to think and read and discuss in a way that allows for and promotes the critical and pragmatic 
functions of logic. Hu saw the need for a common spoken language that can be used for 
“educational purposes.” Thus, “for popular dissemination of useful knowledge,” Hu and his 
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fellow liberal reformers undertook the Literary Revolution with “advocacy of the vulgate tongue 
as the only legitimate literary medium.”123 
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Chapter Three  Building a Literary Aesthetic Awareness 
 
The New Education of Hu Shi: How “Fitness” Became his Name  
When Hu Shi began to develop his theory of modern logic, he considered it the means of 
achieving social reform. Yet, from his survey of China’s intellectual and cultural legacy, he 
realized that development of a logical consciousness was, in fact, an end in itself. China’s path to 
reform would not simply be a matter of engaging new tools for a new end. Hu realized that the 
people were not predisposed to appreciate the implements of scientific thought, such as 
methodological practices or exploratory investigations into the natural world. They might learn 
to use the tools of science, but without the scientific attitude, they would never inhabit the spirit 
of the modern civilization.  
Without belief in possibility, logical developments like the scientific spirit or social 
developments like respect for the individual, remain out of reach. The spirit of doubt, Hu 
explains, has long been present in Chinese thought. However, it has not been intellectually 
cultivated to the point of constructive attitudes, like belief in possibility. This means imagination, 
the ability to conceptualize oneself in a different predicament with a different set of skills and 
different set of expectations than they have at present. It is the feeling of capability, inspiration, 
and optimism that propels a young person out of their home and toward something. Stated simply, 
it is the existence of choice, judgment, and personal responsibility.   
In essence, Hu understood China’s situation as a stacked problem; the problems of 
society are rooted in problems of thought, and problems of thought are culturally reinforced. 
Hu’s ideas on reform were formulated to address particular challenges culture posed to social 
change. Recounting his experiences as a leader of the New Culture Movement for Columbia 
University’s oral history project, Hu explains that the movement was split in two parts, the first 
part focused on linguistic reform, and the second part focused on developing new thought. Hu 
held that particular ways of thinking enable particular kind of thought. Intellectual patterns of 
critique enable scientific investigations. The exercise of imagination enables anticipation of 
alternative futures.  
 The Literary Revolution was designed to apprehend the cultural challenges related to 
language, such as the authority of the classical language and subsequent social stratification, the 
stagnancy of cultural development, and the characteristics of oral culture that kept people 
mentally and physically bound to their locality. We can better understand the cultural challenges 
of the age by looking at Hu Shi’s personal encounters with them.  
 
The Master, (Shèngsēng 圣僧): A Learned Youth 
A primary cultural challenge of the age was the authority of the classical language and 
the heavy focus on the traditions of classical education at the expense of educating the individual 
child. This aspect of the culture is reflected in Hu Shi’s first experiences with education. Hu 
began his schooling at a traditional school, where the day lasted about twelve hours and the 
students bowed to both the teacher and a large portrait of Confucius before leaving for home in 
the evening.
1
  
The universal experience of the authority of the classical language was felt by the 
extraordinary weight academic success brought to bear on the potential a person had to succeed 
in all venues of life dealing with social ranking and social legitimacy.  Hu’s mother had married 
into a less than ideal situation in part because of the importance placed on classical academic 
success. Hu’s father was thirty years older than his mother. His father had been married and 
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widowed twice before and had seven children from the second marriage. After he lost his second 
wife, he told his family he would “marry a girl of the good, sturdy stock of the farmer class.”2 
The girl he found came from a farming family of meager means. Her mother worried that if their 
daughter married a man thirty years older than her, with children from a previous marriage that 
were older than her, people would think they had sold her to an official for money and prestige. 
Yet, the prospective husband was known to be kind and he was respected as a scholar and 
official. Since the parents were divided over the issue, they turned the decision over to the girl.  
The experience of Hu’s mother was typical for a culture so heavily focused on the 
integrity of classical education; she genuinely respected his father’s accomplishments. Further, 
she saw her father struggling to support his family as a farmer and tailor. She knew that her own 
father had come from a respectable family, which may have increased the hope she had for the 
capabilities of her offspring. Her father’s family had been massacred during the Taiping rebellion. 
Her father was the only one who survived. He was kidnapped and made to serve with the Taiping 
army. He eventually managed to escape and make it back to his destroyed home where he has 
been laboring, carrying six loads of stones a day in addition to his work in the fields, to rebuild 
the family home. Hu’s mother would have known that the marriage would be hard for her, as Hu 
says, “the position of a Chinese stepmother is proverbially difficult.”3 Yet, she would have seen 
hope in the proposal. She believed Hu’s father had great abilities as a scholar and administrator.  
The standard day at a traditional school consisted of little more than a rigorous exercise 
in memory. To study meant to memorize; students were expected to read aloud and recite by 
heart.
4
 The objects of study, the classic texts, were written in the dead language of classical 
scholarship. The European comparison would be studying classical Latin works while speaking 
Middle English vernacular. Thus, the task of a young student in a Chinese village was something 
akin to a child in Medieval England memorizing a philosophical treatise written by Cicero.  
 Although this aspect of culture was reflected in Hu’s situation, his personal experience 
was exceptional in an extremely significant way—Hu was taught to understand the meaning of 
what he memorized. Frist, he learned to read at an early age. Hu’s father passed away when he 
was only four years old, but by the time Hu was three years old his father had already taught him 
eight hundred characters on flash cards. Second, Hu’s mother continued the commitment to his 
education with extra pay for Hu’s teacher. Because of this extra amount, Hu explains, “I alone… 
enjoyed the rare privilege of having every word and sentence of the readings explained to me, 
that is, translated from the dead language into the colloquial dialect.”5 Before Hu was eight years 
old, he could already read the classics with little help. He also began reading novels written in 
pai-hua, or the spoken language. “They taught me life, for good and for evil, and gave me a 
literary medium which years later enabled me to start what has been called ‘the Literary 
Renaissance’ in China.”6 Hu was an exceptional pupil and he memorized ten of the classical 
texts in nine years. He was nicknamed “the Master,” (Shèngsēng 圣僧).  
 A religious blend of Taoism and Buddhism was practiced in most peasant households. 
Although Hu’s father had been a classical scholar and, as Hu describes him, “a stern follower of 
the neo-Confucianist rational philosophy,” the uneducated members of Hu’s family, including 
his mother, worshipped deities and practiced the rites of ancestor worship as was common for the 
peasant class.
7
  
 Again, Hu’s experience deviated from the common experience in a significant way that 
allowed him to see his environment from a different perspective. Even though Hu was immersed 
in the idolatry of the common religion,
8
 he was aware of competing ideas. Since Hu was able to 
read and understand on his own, he was able to pursue other works on his own and think on a 
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variety of topics that the other children had no exposure to. Hu recounts a few instances from his 
childhood when he went against the grain of thought. At one point he read that the soul is part of 
the body, and so, they die and decay together. This led him to the radical conclusion that there is 
no such thing as an afterlife. Another example is when he left for Shanghai. He says that he left 
to seek out his education “in the great world all alone armed only with a mother’s love, a habit of 
study, and a little tendency to doubt.”9 In an environment of strong traditional education and 
religious influences, where any deviation was suspect to cultural sanction, Hu’s “tendency to 
doubt” was surly formulated on his own time by reading and thinking about the ancient 
philosophers, for whom we have seen, doubt was common.  
 
Shanghai Days: Hu’s Education in Evolution, Revolution, and Pessimism  
Hu had the chance to pursue what was called a “new education” in Shanghai. It was the 
year 1904 and was thirteen years old. Many common teenagers did not even get to continue their 
education; most certainly didn’t get to do it in a place like Shanghai, where the revolutionaries of 
the first wave of Young China had begun offering a non-traditional education that covered such 
things as history, geography, English, mathematics, and bits of natural science. Yet, even in 
Shanghai, Hu’s experience was something of exceptional among the exceptional.  
The universal experience for students in Shanghai was heavy exposure to revolutionary 
propaganda and strong advocacy of westernization. “Students in Shanghai” Jerome B. Grieder 
writes, “had easy access to such contraband publications as Liang Ch’i-ch’ao’s reform paper, the 
Hsin-min ts’ung-pao, and the Min-pao, the propaganda organ of Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary 
T’ung-meng hui, both published in Tokyo and smuggled into the city.”10 The new, or modern, 
education in Shanghai was engrossed by issues of China claiming status in the world and making 
sense of the calamities that had overrun the latter half of the nineteenth century.
11
  
Students in Shanghai had access to novels translated from English and other European 
languages. Liang Qichao, part of the first wave of Young China and a proponent of 
Westernization, spread the ideas of Western thinkers like Hobbes, Descartes, Rousseau, Bentham, 
Kant, and Darwin. Works like John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty and Huxley’s Evolution and Ethics 
were available in translation.
12
 Huxley’s work, in particular, received warm reception among 
Chinese intellectuals who believed “the Darwinian hypothesis, especially in its social and 
political application, was a welcome stimulus to a nation suffering from age-long inertia and 
stagnation.”13 Terms and phrases associated with evolution became something of a trend. They 
appeared often in journalism and people even took them as names. “Numerous persons adopted 
them in naming themselves and their children, thereby reminding themselves of the perils of 
elimination in the struggle for existence national as well as individual.”14 Even Hu’s name 
reflects the evolutionary vogue of the time. He adopted Shih on his brother’s suggestion. It 
means fitness, in reference to the slogan “survival of the fittest.” In 1910 he officially took it as 
his permanent name.
15
  
Hu was exposed to the same things in Shanghai as the other students, but his reactions to 
them were very different. He had a different political temperament and different objectives than 
his classmates in Shanghai. His experience with the new education was unusual, Grieder writes, 
“for while other young students were even then embracing political revolution as the means 
through which to accomplish the great tasks of modernization, he remained outside the 
revolutionary movement from the beginning.”16 Later, when studying in America, Hu developed 
his ideas on political temperament more fully and called himself a pacifist, but one can see that 
these tendencies were already influencing him in Shanghai.  
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 The experiences of Shanghai foreshadow many of the troubles Hu would encounter as a 
leader in the reform later on. Financial troubles compelled Hu to leave school in 1908. Between 
1908 and 1910 he taught classes in English and Chinese to send money home to his family. He 
lived among revolutionary-minded friends who had participated in some of the provincial 
revolutions happening throughout China and now had to live under the radar as political fugitives. 
He describes those years as a dark period in China and his personal life. Many of his friends had 
grown cynical and pessimistic. They spent much of their time fearful and drunk. The zeal of 
vogue thought and the pessimism of fearful idealists are troubles that Hu faced time and time 
again throughout his career. Perhaps because of the historical perspective Hu gained from being 
able to independently study and understand the classics so early on, he could not adjust to the 
Shanghai temperament and did not stay there for long.  At his core he was too optimistic and he 
resolved to shake off the malaise and get back on course with his studies.  
  
From Apples to Pragmatism: An American Education  
The Chinese students who studied in America were part of the second wave of Young 
China, many of whom felt their education should have a patriotic imperative. They went abroad 
seeking practical degrees in fields like mathematics and science where higher education in China 
was most lacking. They hoped to bring these new tools home to help build the infrastructure of a 
modern nation. 
Hu reflected this sentiment when he chose to major in agriculture at Cornell University.
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Typical to agricultural programs, students in Hu’s program focused on the agriculture local to 
that region. For Hu, at Cornell, this meant apples. Hu studied all kinds of American apples that 
he had never seen in China and would likely never see in China. Further, he struggled on his 
apple exams, which asked him to describe many apple varieties in terms of shape, color, texture, 
taste, and smell, in ways that native English speakers could do easily but non-native speakers had 
much more trouble with. He began to question the actual practicality of his degree in the applied 
sciences.  
A modern nation’s infrastructure, Hu realized, is built with intellectual and cultural tools 
as well as physical ones; practicality should not be thought of merely as that which is 
immediately applicable or most likely to yield some specific outcome. Rather, practicality is 
determined over a range of time and across an array of results. He understood that China’s 
cultural predicament poised as it was between an old and new world had developed slowly. 
Society had taken its initial shape from the geopolitical landscape. Then, it was altered and 
seasoned over centuries of political and intellectual developments. Advances in agricultural 
yields undoubtedly benefitted Chinese society in the late nineteenth century, but for China to 
complete the transition from the old world to the new world, the twentieth century needed 
contributions of a wholly different sort of practicality. Hu transferred to the Sage School of 
Philosophy at Cornell University and, as he says, “never regretted the change.”18 He completed 
his undergraduate and master’s studies there.  
The reactive and revolutionary temperament that was common in Shanghai had carried 
over and was also common among Chinese students studying in America. Just as he had avoided 
it in Shanghai, Hu was opposed to the revolutionary temperament in America. He thought that 
the character of revolutionary thought was too destructive. He knew that the detrimental aspects 
of China’s old culture had to be destroyed in order for Chinese society to move forward, 
however, he believed in destroying by replacing, or in other words, dethroning the old by 
legitimating something new. “Destruction of the ‘false’ and ‘dead,’” he said, “would follow 
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naturally from… creation.”19 The classical language must lose its authority, but the most 
effective way to accomplish that, Hu maintained, was by elevating the language of the people. 
He wanted his fellow students to focus on the potential of creative forces rather than the 
immediacy and retributive qualities of destructive ones.  
In Shanghai, Hu warned his peers to resist revolutionary propaganda explaining that war 
is a “crude” and “wasteful use of force.”20 He lamented how young intellectuals are often taken 
by propaganda that encourages prejudice and exclusionary nationalism. The propaganda stokes 
their anxieties, and warns them about the dire consequences guaranteed by nationalistic 
shortcomings.
21
 This kind of propaganda worked in Shanghai by painting a dystopic picture of 
“China’s deficiencies as a nation,”22 and encouraged the students to pull together against the 
forces aimed at destroying Chinese civilization. The students felt like they were pitted against a 
ravenous enemy in a heroic battle, and in a desperate sort of excitement, would just as fast 
destroy the nation as demonstrate their love for it. Propaganda, Hu said, has very real destructive 
powers; it can destroy opportunities for cultural renewal and incite blind preservation of deficient 
traditions, and worse, it can provoke war.   
Having understood that appropriate intellectual apparatuses are just as necessary for 
erecting a modern nation as is the appropriate physical infrastructure Hu did not want to lose the 
support of the young intellectual class who were most equipped to confront the nation’s 
intellectual needs. When Japan presented China with its offensive list of Twenty-One Demands, 
some Chinese students urged for declaration of war,
 23
 and once again, Hu used this opportunity 
to urge his peers to commit themselves to a tempered course of reform.  Hu responded to the 
fevered pitch of his fellow students with “A Plea for Patriotic Sanity.”24 In it he said, “My 
Brethren, it is absolutely useless to get excited at such a critical moment. No excitement, nor 
high-sounding sentiments, nor sensational suggestions, have ever helped any nation.”25 He urged:  
Let us apply ourselves seriously, calmly, undisturbedly and unshakenly to our studies, 
and PREPARE OURSELVES to uplift our father-land, if she [sic] survives this crisis—as 
I am sure she will—or to resurrect her from the dead, if it needs be!26  
Hu spent much of his life urging people toward intellectual temperament.  
 Hu’s sentiment is most aptly displayed by the following Huxley quote Hu chose for two 
commencement addresses he delivered at American universities in the 1940s and then referenced 
again in his Living Philosophies essay.  
The great English scientist and philosopher, Thomas H. Huxley, has said: “The most 
sacred act of man’s life is to say and feel ‘I believe such and such to be true.’ All the 
greatest rewards, and all the heaviest penalties of existence, cling upon that act.” The 
discipline and training of the mind in judgment, thought, and belief are necessary for your 
successful performance of this “most sacred act of a man’s life.”27 
His faith in the potential of rationality and consciousness and the subsequent potential of the 
human species to improve the quality of their existence is the bedrock of his unrelenting 
optimism for reform. Once in America, he writes, “the naïve optimism and cheerfulness of the 
Americans impressed me most favorably.”28 The pragmatic theory of logic that Hu developed 
while studying in America, the ten year plan he devised to reform China’s universities, the 
vernacular movement’s push into primary schools, and his larger plan for a new system of 
learning and scholarship in every vein of Chinese culture, all testify to Hu’s fundamental belief 
in the sacred potential of humans and the absolute necessity of disciplining and training one’s 
mind for this pursuit.  
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 Hu determined to see China down a path of real and gradual change and this is how his 
study of the history of Chinese logic, discussed in the last chapter, came to pass. In 1915, he 
went to Columbia University for his PhD. He wrote his dissertation, “The Development of 
Logical Method in Ancient China,” under the guidance of John Dewey. He became, what he 
calls, “a historical research worker,” that thinks “genetically.”29 Rather than rip the culture and 
society to shreds, he wanted to uncover specifically what was there and then nurture it to develop 
gradually.  
By genetically investigating the development of Chinese thought, Hu had come to 
understand which characteristics of modern thought were already present and which remained 
lacking. He developed the Literary Revolution as a way to teach people the processes of thought 
and judgment that would develop the capacity for modern thought. The remainder of this chapter 
discusses Hu’s agenda for gradual reform, that is, his plan to change society by changing its tools 
of thought.  
 
The Literary Revolution: Cultural Utensils of Logical Thought  
 The Literary Revolution aimed to practically confront universal cultural challenges. Hu 
developed it with the insight of his own experience with those universal problems and the other 
exceptional experiences he had that allowed him to view the culture from a different perspective. 
The major theme underwriting all of Hu’s exceptional experiences is the belief in “possibility” 
and the creative potential of cultural forces. Even his very first experiences with school amount 
to a lesson on the significant difference alternatives can make in a child’s education.  
 Considering that Hu generally looked on “revolutionary” temperament with disfavor, one 
might wonder why he referred to the linguistic reform as the “Literary Revolution.” The answer 
to this question is twofold. First, Hu did not choose the name entirely by himself. Hu first began 
pursuing linguistic reform while he was studying in the United States. Aside from a couple of 
people, he did not receive much support from his fellow Chinese classmates. However, after 
writing a more or less reserved article about sensitive reforms in Chinese literature, which 
appeared in The New Youth in January 1917, he earned the impassioned support of Mr. Ch’en 
Tu-hsiu, who took notice, supported the article, and published his own much less reserved article 
called “On a Revolution in Literature.”30 In it “he described what he called the 'eighteen demons' 
who had obstructed the task of the revolution in literature already started throughout the Sung 
and particularly the Yuan (the Mongol) periods, when the novels and plays were beginning to be 
produced in the vulgar tongue.”31 This enthusiastic endorsement furnished the initial power of 
the movement and provided Hu with the support he needed to get the movement off the ground.  
Second, “revolution” is an accurate term because, for Hu, destruction is a necessary part 
of creation. This point must be completely clear: revolution equates with destruction; Hu 
acknowledges that there are things in culture that must be destroyed; Hu’s Literary Revolution 
was a campaign to destroy those detrimental aspects of Chinese culture. However, above all else 
it was a “reform,” meaning a creative thing. The twentieth century reform movement needed a 
strategy that could bridge the divide between the literate elite and the illiterate masses. By 
understanding new influences in light of the concerns and judgments that made tradition what it 
is, there could be a “new synthesis of written and oral education” to reverse restrictions on 
literacy, lift the vernacular language from its vulgar state, and to engage print for the structure of 
thought it inherently imparts rather than the moral dictums the classical words preserve within.
32
   
Loss of the old is necessary for creation of the new. A “new culture” equips people for 
“new thought;” institutions buckle under the weight of new thought and society takes a new form. 
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The “new thought” portion of the New Culture Movement would develop on the cultural 
foundation laid by the Literary Revolution. Just as Hu had diagnosed the cultural cause of 
China’s institutional stagnancy as the product of a social hierarchy founded on the authority of 
classical language and subsequent stratification of society, the Literary Revolution would till the 
ground for something different. Each practical aspect of the Literary Revolution would bring a 
particular quality to bear on the cultural landscape. Cumulatively, they would create fertile 
conditions for logical consciousness. The remainder of this chapter discusses what I have 
surmised as the seven primary qualities that Hu intended the Literary Revolution to establish in 
Chinese culture. In preview, the seven qualities can be summarized as follows:   
1. Form a linguistic and imaginative nationalistic infrastructure for a nation of individuals. 
2. Give each individual access to education via the vernacular language.  
3. Elevate the status of the vernacular language, and thereby, enable the creative potential of 
the common people.  
4. Encourage the competition of ideas, and thus, the people’s exercise of doubt, judgment, 
and choice. 
5. Undertake a comprehensive education reform, particularly to include a variety of subjects 
and methodological approaches, such as comparative and genetic analysis.  
6. Cultivate imagination and the sense of possibility among the people.  
7. Cultivate the role of the arts and the artists in society so as to enable full use of habits and 
language among the people.  
 
Build Toward a Nationalistic Consciousness  
Our task is, therefore, very clear. It is to do our part to remove a bit of the backwardness. 
It is to contribute our utmost to the future building of the nation. Our task is of the future. 
At present, we can’t do very much. We should dedicate ourselves to the great task of 
eliminating our backwardness and of building up the future of our national life. We are 
builders; at least, workers of the future China.
33
  
All of the gradual and deliberate intellectual changes produced by the Literary Revolution, 
including those changes in cultural patterns and social designs, would culminate in a nationalistic 
consciousness that would enable development of the ethical and spiritual society Hu desired for 
modern China. The next chapter takes up this stage of Hu’s plan for social reform, once 
substantial cultural changes had been made and the national future came more clearly into focus. 
At that stage of the reform, nationalistic consciousness would function as a means to an end. 
Conversely, for the Literary Revolution, the development of a nationalistic consciousness, or 
more specifically, development of the linguistic and imaginative infrastructure that would 
comprise the nationalistic consciousness, was the primary goal. All of the other cultural qualities 
were directed toward this end. As Hu explained, a nation of individuals is held together by a 
linguistic and imagined nationalistic infrastructure. Multiple veins of the Literary Revolution 
converge in nationalistic consciousness. Consciousness requires connection. We are conscious of 
something when we are aware of it. To have nationalistic consciousness, then, is to have 
awareness of the nation: its structure, its constituent parts, and its identity. Increased access to 
education, heightened respect for the vernacular language, a space for competitive ideas, an 
independent system of education, and an optimistic spirit come together to log the groundwork 
for a linguistic and imagined nationalistic infrastructure. 
When the reactive anti-imperialist nationalistic sentiment ran high, Hu warned: 
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National salvation is not something that can be achieved in a short period of time... The 
salvation of the nation must begin with the salvation of yourself! In a time of ferment and 
chaos, you cannot consider that you have discharged your patriotic duty simply by 
chasing after others and, by running and shouting. Over and above this you have another 
more difficult and more precious obligation: to be able, in the very midst of the shouting, 
to plant your feet firmly on the ground, to make your plans, to save yourself, to struggle 
to turn yourself into something useful!
34
 
Throughout China’s political history power is intimately connected with the national mind, 
meaning the body of thought that is imagined and held as part of the social and political 
construction known as nationalism. For centuries, the classical language stood at the pinnacle of 
the cultural imagination, and hence, as the embodiment of power. Therefore, one should see the 
connection between the movement for China’s educational independence as a movement to 
rebuild nationalistic consciousness free from the vestiges of old forms of cultural power.   
Hu maintains that changes in national language will necessitate changes in all other 
aspects of life. It will give the people the intellectual tools they need to take what they have 
observed from other cultures and use this information to “re-examine” and “re-evaluate”35 their 
own culture and then consciously reform those aspects of culture that have been proven 
detrimental to Chinese interests in the modern day. This will be China’s “transvaluation of 
values,” a process for which “nothing is too high or too low… [or] too sacred to be allowed to 
pass without criticism.”36  
By the latter part of the Chinese Renaissance, the term renaissance, “wenyi fuxing 
became an emblem of new birth and of many forward looking features of modernity and 
progress,” Zhou notes.37 Reformers wanted a new type of thought in China, a system of 
consciousness grounded in the accumulation of knowledge, or in other words, a systematic 
process of knowing. “A renaissance as a period of liberation, a period when individuals are freed 
from the bondage of tradition, echoed perfectly the iconoclastic spirit of the New Culture 
Movement.”38 Other terms associated with the Renaissance also reflected this desire. For 
example, rather than use a term that literally denotes “modernity,” Jones explains that words like 
“development,” and others like “growth,” “evolution,” and “progress” appear much more often.39 
The term “wenming,” or civilization, for example, shifted use between classical and vernacular 
literature. In classical, it “had been used in a far more restricted sense… as a laudatory term for 
literary élan.”40 In vernacular writings, “wenming… signifies both an intransitive state and the 
transitive process required to attain that state: a process of development that implicitly posits the 
divide between those who are already developed, those who develop, and those who [are] still in 
need of development.”41  
In addition to changes in language, changes to the social strata, the old family system, 
and the improved means of transportation have worked to weaken “the old hold of the elder over 
the younger generation.” He continues: 
The young students who leave their homes to get an advanced education in the cities find 
it difficult to return to live and work. They have come under new intellectual influences 
and new social contacts which make them dissatisfied with the old ways of life back in 
their ancestral villages. They break their old betrothals and even marriages, and often 
carry out what they commonly call ‘revolutions of the home’… All these disintegrating 
tendencies soon began to worry the conservatives in the old society. For a time they tried 
to make scapegoats of the leaders of the new intellectual movements, and rallied their 
attacks on them.
42
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Yet Hu points out that the disintegration of one form of the society signals the formation of a 
new form, what he calls a, “new social consciousness,” with new codes of morality, new cultural 
aspirations, and a new sense of identity.
43
  
 
Educate the Individual: Gaining Access through Vernacularization 
The line of power in traditional Chinese society runs between those who have received an 
amount of classical education worthy of the civil service examinations and those who have not, 
or in other terms, the literate elite and the illiterate masses. In this sense, “illiterate” does not 
strictly refer to the inability to read or write, but rather, it refers to a lack of training in the 
classical language, and thus, a lack of social power. The ruling class and the literate class 
remained synonymous throughout China’s imperial history. Power was predicated on extensive 
training in classical literacy. Hence, so long as the majority of people did not have access to 
extensive training, the power of the ruling elite was secure.  
This sort of social stratification prevented modernization because it kept the masses 
bound to the oral culture of tribal communities while the ruling elite balanced atop a power 
structure predicated on stagnancy. Any hint of a constructive social impulse would appear 
threatening to their authority. Therefore, the cultural role of the ruling elite was to keep the 
people disinterested in the power structure all together. Correspondingly, the political role of the 
ruling elite was to serve the system rather than act as leaders of the people.
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The ruling elite kept language out of the reach of the common people by elevating it as 
the worldly form of heaven. The literate elite functioned as heaven’s medium. “People 
worshipped written words and subsequently the persons who knew the words,” David Ze 
explains.
45
 The ideograms of classical Chinese were like “mystic charms,” each symbol 
“embodied profound meanings, but only experts could interpret them.”46 The sacred meaning of 
scholastic literacy set it apart from common literacy, “such as informal narratives, miscellaneous 
notes, recorded tales, songs, folk lyrics, and informal letters” that circulated among the common 
people.
47
 By maintaining a sacral divide between the scholastic language and the common 
language, education took a central position in the power schema of imperial China.  
The function of the educated class, as interpreters of the word of heaven for those who 
could not interpret it but who lived under its control nevertheless, made sense to the common 
people of the tribal communities. In the oral culture of tribal communities, sacred meanings 
readily translate into real-world experiences. Oral cultures are ruled by the cosmos; the life of the 
common man is an insignificant part of a much larger and more powerful cosmic system. Hence, 
the people of tribal communities must stay attuned to the natural pattern of the cosmos and find a 
way to live in accordance with it. If he resists it, it will crush him. Marshall McLuhan called this 
kind of world a “tyrannical cosmic machine,” more severe than anything dreamed up by the 
Western literate world.
48
 Thus, the people of tribal communities are patient and passive.
49
 They 
do not think they can exercise control over the world; further, they believe that the world will not 
hesitate to crush anyone who pushes against it, and so, all they can do is wait and believe.   
The separation between the literate elite and illiterate masses intensifies as time wears on 
because they experience the world in wholly different ways. The oral experience of the tribal 
masses is intense. In oral culture people “feel” change more intimately, suffer more deeply, and 
have no ability to structure causal arguments or political policies.
50
 The tactile emphasis in oral 
cultures leads to perceptive and expressive communities. Unlike visual emphasis which fashions 
experience according to the patterned observances of the eye, experience in oral culture is tactile, 
directed by sensory based stimuli and reactions situated in the environment. The people of oral 
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cultures have little recourse for expectations, they can make predictions based on what they 
believe about the large cosmic universe of which they are apart, but these predictions are based 
on day to day interactions with the natural world that controls them. There is no cause or cultural 
memory to make predictions about anything else.  
Vernacularization gives the common people access to education, and in turn, education 
gives people access to everything else. Without recourse for expectation, without the ability to 
predict, imagine, or propose, there will be no modern civilization, Hu maintained. Had it not 
been for his mother’s belief, his father’s early tutoring, and his teacher’s translations of the 
classical texts into vernacular, Hu would not have learned to understand the classics on his own, 
let alone win the scholarship to study in the United States.  
To break away from the old social trappings, the people need a means of cultural escape; 
vernacular language provides this means. Although writing has been seen as sacred, “a rare gift 
of the gods to the favored few,” Hu writes, “the efficacy of the pei hua has emancipated the 
youths from this timidity… The spirit of Young China was never at ease in its ancient 
garments.”51 The Chinese Renaissance is a movement to free the people “from the shackles of 
tradition.”52  
 
Elevate the Vernacular Language: Breaking through to the Other Side  
In expanded use, the vernacular language functions to separate public and private 
interests. The vernacular language, or pai-hua, has a rich history in Chinese society. Hu notes 
that it was the linguistic medium used for some of the greatest works of Chinese poetry. It was 
also the linguistic medium employed to mold the traditional structure and to bind public and 
private interests together. The state run morality outreach programs developed by the Neo-
Confucians used the vernacular language to keep the people informed of state dictates. The neo-
Confucian, Zhu Xi, developed local monthly assembly meetings known as the community 
compact. The assemblies were held in every village across China. The local people would gather 
together to hear the latest codes of morality and conduct from their rulers. The announcements 
were laid out in vernacular, but since the villagers would possess varying degrees of functional 
literacy, and some none at all, a village official would read the announcements aloud. In some 
cases, the announcements would be sung aloud so the people would be better able to understand 
and remember. The meetings also featured other activities, like public accolades to reinforce the 
messages. The institutional function of the meetings was to join private and public interests and 
act as an intermediary between the state and the family.
53
  
With vernacular language, traditional society effectively delayed the development of 
print culture. By uniting private and public interests in this way, the vernacular language was 
used to reinforce social stratification. Chinese rulers had devised a means of employing print 
technology to communicate out from a central hub of authority over vast distances. Yet, by also 
using local assemblies and vernacular announcements, the rulers preserved the traditions of 
orality and local webs of tribal authority. In essence, rulers had managed to utilize the printed 
word without sacrificing the subservience of the people to the explosive qualities of print 
technology.  
The vernacular movement of the Literary Revolution attempted to reclaim the vernacular 
language as a tool of empowerment for the common people. Besides elevating the vernacular 
language, the Literary Revolution had to provide “clear and conscious recognition that the 
classical language was long dead.”54 Scholars struggled to reconcile the traditional understanding 
of scholarly prestige with the demands of the reforms. Intellectuals worked to overcome this 
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hurdle by reappraising the despised language according to new ideas from the West and the 
classical legacy of the vernacular language long before it was employed toward neo-Confucian 
ends. Reappraisal of the language enabled the intellectuals to appreciate the beauty of the novels 
they once loathed.
55
 Yet, even though intellectuals could appreciate novels and dramas created in 
the vulgar tongue, the problem remained that they were not necessarily excited to use the vulgar 
language in their own academic work. Just as Hu’s mother had so greatly respected the academic 
and administrative abilities of Hu’s father, scholars felt pride for their achievements and had 
difficulty shaking the cultural allure of their scholarly status.  The language of the people 
struggled, but it did catch on, and “the result has been that the taboo of the year ago has become 
a fashion of the day,” Hu writes. “From Peking to Canton, from Shanghai to Chengtu, there is 
hardly one educational center which is not at least one vulgate paper of its own. Never before has 
China had so many new writers.”56 
The vernacular language can be defined both in terms of what it can do for speech and 
what it can do for thought. As it pertains to the Literary Revolution, vernacular language is a 
linguistic medium, pai-hua, the vulgar tongue of the common people. As it pertains to the 
Chinese Renaissance at large the rise of the vernacular language signals tension between the 
common and official stratums of society. Vernacular language connects the common people 
across different localities and dialects. Foreign ideas are digested and made accessible with 
vernacular language. Further, after an idea’s initial reception, the vernacular language functions 
as a distillery, gateway, or chamber that signals the progression of an idea through a population, 
until eventually, it becomes popularized and the new corresponding terminology is adopted into 
vernacular. Andrew Jones explains how discourse on evolutionary biology went through this 
process during the Chinese Renaissance. The ideas circulated “as narrative frames and images 
that were localized, fragmentary, easily assimiable across different media, and generative of new 
forms of social and political and cultural practice.”57 The larger discourse worked its way into 
popular understanding by spreading out in smaller conceptual pieces, like development, natural 
selection, and inheritance.  
 
Exercise Doubt and Judgment: Choosing between ideas on Equal Ground   
The Literary Revolution took direct aim at deductive habits of mind by spreading literacy, 
and thus, enabling the exercise of doubt, judgment, and choice. A more thorough definition of 
literacy, as it was conceptualized by proponents of the Literary Revolution, includes the 
universal ability to read and the plentiful availability of materials made accessible by vernacular.  
Before literacy, the value of each member of a tribal community is determined in relation 
to the community. Apart from the community, there is no way to conceptualize the value of an 
individual. Value is determined according to one’s social role and function. Subsequently, the 
community judges the individual by determining if that particular role and function has been 
satisfactorily fulfilled.  
Literacy reverses the direction of judgment; it enables the individual to judge the 
community.
58
 The techniques of literacy, thinking and writing, impact our relationship to the 
content of language. During the Chinese Renaissance, preservationists echoed the sentiment 
voiced by Lao Zi nearly twenty-five centuries earlier. Hu writes:   
[Lao Zi] doubted the utility of the artificiality and over-refinement civilization and 
advocated a return to the simplicity of the state of Nature, in which all human inventions 
‘that multiply the power of man by ten times or a hundred times’ shall not be used and 
man will discard all writing and restore the use of knotted cords.
59
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Like Lao Zi, the preservationists worried about the ramifications of changing people’s 
perspective of society.  
The Chinese Renaissance shared much of the spirit of the European Renaissance; in 
particular it shared the humanist emphasis on individualism. In the beginning, this emphasis was 
expressed as the spirit of revival, in individualism functioned promises new insight, (i.e. I can 
see things in the classics that I could not see or that I was prevented from seeing before.) This 
form of expression was “consciously cultivated… between the European Renaissance and the 
May Fourth Literary Revolution,” Gang Zhou explains.60 Early on, she writes, “wenyi fuxing (a 
revival of literature and art) had already become the standard Chinese equivalent of 
renaissance.”61  
 Vernacular language, however, is a practice that turns against the rules and hierarchy of 
the classical language.
62
 It later encouraged individualism to find new expression in the spirit of 
rebirth, wherein the rules and hierarchy of the classics are questioned to such a degree that they 
are entirely toppled from their foundation and alternatives are considered in their place (i.e. I can 
look back at the origins of Chinese culture and imagine a China that could have been.)  
The idea of cultural alternatives is most tangibly seen in the effects of “vernacularization,” 
translation from classical language into the living language.
63
 The spread of vernacular language 
impacts society in both practical ways and conceptual ways. Andrew Jones explains that 
vernacularization, tends toward a revised version of the original. “The notion of the vernacular, 
in short, may help us approach from a fresh angle the question of how new epistemologies and 
new kinds of knowledge were appropriated and disseminated in this period.”64 In other words, 
the vernacular language, pai-hua, worked to spread new ideas and modes of thought not only 
because it gave more people access, but also because the vernacular provided a habitat and 
vehicle for the new ideas and modes of thought.
65
  
The preservationists during the Chinese Renaissance worried about the consequences of 
these kinds of re-evaluations and conceptual habitats. What would provide for social stability 
once the Chinese culture had been scrutinized and toppled? The Renaissance preservationists, on 
the other hand, worried what would be left of “knowledge” once stripped from its home in the 
classical language and subjected to “vernacularization,” (or “vulgarization,” as the 
preservationists undoubtedly would have preferred to call it). The predicament of the 
preservationists was similar to that of Mo Zi, who employed logical reasoning to doubt the 
doubters, and to advocate for social return to the old morality.
66
  
Lao Zi also wanted to return to a previous manner of living, but he wanted to return to the 
time before the old morality had been conceived of. He wasn't concerned about what society 
might amount to. He had seen what it amounts to; he wanted to backtrack to the time before the 
technologies of society had complicated and disrupted the functioning of the world. Lao Zi 
maintained that he had witnessed the bitter result of words invested with too much meaning and 
the struggles these artificial symbols and meanings are certain to bring. Proponents of the 
Literary Revolution agreed that Confucian habits of deductive thought have many detrimental 
tendencies. For one, deductive habits of thought amplify the tendencies already common in oral 
culture to view things in terms of a struggle between polar opposites, like good and bad, or right 
and wrong.
67
 In oral culture, social interactions are of the highest importance and instances of 
interaction are characterized as right or wrong, good or bad, with no in between. Oral cultures 
tend to have the structure of a tribal, or clan based, community. Oral cultures primarily rely on 
the spoken word over literacy; although, communities are likely to have varying degrees/rates of 
 77 
 
functional literacy, and the occasional person with some level of classical training, usually of the 
local ruling family. Social interactions are marked by the tension between right and wrong 
behavior, and people are characterized as virtuous or vital. The tension of moral polarization 
amplifies the feeling of struggle that is already a prevalent part of the experience of the common 
life tied to the earth. The neo-Confucians put the moral battle into a ritualistic a theatrical form 
by giving commendation and disgrace an audience and record at meetings of the community 
compact. Such displays would highlight a person's moral aptitude, or lack thereof, by recounting 
how that person either demonstrated, or failed to demonstrate their commitment to fulfill the 
duties prescribed to them by lot and clan.
68
  
Hu understood the willingness to accept ideas on authority to be a key weakness in 
Chinese thought. Although Confucius, a reformer himself, encouraged the exercise of doubt, he 
did so in the restricted sense. Questions should be aimed at things like institutions and social 
roles and they should ask whether or not that thing is performing the function that its name 
indicates you should. For example, is a father acting like a “father” should? Confucian doubt 
does not question if the role of the father should change according to changes in circumstance. 
The most learned scholars might investigate the description of the father's role as reported by the 
ancient sages to see of the stages have been accurately understood by later scholars. The salience 
of their decree, however, should not be made the subject of staring. Limitations on doubt were 
intensified by the neo-Confucians who amplified distinctions of social hierarchy. With stricter 
guidelines money was appropriately qualified to doubt and the circumstances under which they 
should exercise it, the downward direction of knowledge was further cemented into Chinese 
culture. 
By encouraging the exercise of doubt, proponents of the Literary Revolution sought to 
level the playing field for ideas. The Chinese Renaissance, Hu maintained, will give them a “new 
outlook on life” that will “make them feel at home in the new world and its new civilization.”69 
By elevating the vernacular language, proponents of the Literary Revolution endeavored to level 
the playing field between those who confused the classical language and those who could not, 
and thus, to enable the creative potential of all people. The people, however, can affect little if 
they feel compelled to support an idea on the authority of its source rather than practical merit. 
Competing ideas are not worthy opponents without equal footing. When ideas are advanced 
because the people have judged them to be of pragmatic value, then people will understand what 
it means to choose, Hu maintained. Then, the people will understand possibility.  
It should be noted that placing ideas on equal footing does not mean considering an idea 
for no other reason than the fact that it has been proposed; this quality of the Literary Revolution 
is not underwritten by the value of inclusion or inclusions date. Ideas must practically achieve 
their place in public consideration. Rather this quality is underwritten by the value of pluralism; 
cultural respect for pluralism challenges cultural respect for moral polarity. All old ideas should 
face the same fate as all new ideas; both would undergo the people's exercise of doubt, criticism, 
and choice. 
Expanded abilities of valuation are deeply entangled with literacy. The exercise of doubt, 
and thus the breakdown of moral polarity, requires the capacities of language. Language, Hu 
maintained, is one of the most powerful mechanisms for changing culture and society because of 
the tools it gives its users to doubt, judge, criticize, and re-evaluate. He calls language “the most 
important vehicle of thought and of expression,”70 because its initial effects are instantaneous, 
and its subsequent effects are self-perpetual. In time, language can reach out to even the most 
secluded members of society. For example, when language is accessible, meaning when it can 
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stand apart from the authority of the classics and can be employed to construct and compare new 
ideas, language user gains a new perspective of the old morality. They can detach from what the 
old morality means with regard to their personal relations and stations in life, and can see it in 
comparison and contrast with ideas from other cultures as well as alternative ideas latent in 
Chinese culture.  
 
Reform Education: Educating for Possibility  
Hu changed the path of his own higher education when he realized that a degree in 
philosophy could fill just as practical a need in China as a degree in agriculture. In 1938, Hu 
spoke before a group of Chinese students in Chicago, IL. China was then confronting the crisis 
of imminent war with Japan. He told the students: 
Today, it is too late to do anything of immediate effectiveness. But to prepare for the 
future, you are never too late… This is high time to work hard…If there were any 
religion worth believing now, it is this new religion of hard work. 
He said they should focus on their individual abilities and aptitudes. Don’t worry about what 
China needs, he said, because China needs everything. Further, he said, “If you are good for 
nothing at present, you may be good for the future. So follow your own interests and aptitudes 
and prepare yourselves!”71  
The Literary Revolution aimed at developing the kind of education system that would 
cultivate the sense of possibility in Chinese thought. This quality would confront such challenges 
as the inaccessibility of education to even the youngest of China's students, China's dependence 
on universities in other nations for modern higher learning, and the lack of other technologies of 
the new civilization. 
 To appreciate the difficult task of reforming education in China, Hu says it must be 
viewed with historical perspective. Hu took issue with the pessimistic attitude that seemed to 
pervade the age. He says that this pessimism results from lack of historical perspective, without 
which, it is impossible to grasp the great deal of time that must be spent doing the work of 
destruction and re-construction at the foundational level of Chinese thought. Hu gives the 
example of primary school textbooks. In 1910, just seven years before the official launch of the 
Literary Revolution, primary school textbooks were still filled with classical text written in the 
classical language, meaning that teachers would have to translate the content of the books into 
pai-hua if students were to understand the content of the words they memorized. This was true 
even in the most progressive city of Shanghai, Hu notes.
72
 If one knows the historical backdrop 
of China’s situation, they can better appreciate that in the 11th year of the Republic, five years 
after the start of the Literary Revolution, a national ruling was passed that all primary and middle 
school students were to have textbooks written in the contemporary language.
73
 Another example 
he gives is of the mammoth task of dethroning the classical language. He explained that it was 
the great power of the classical language, socially reinforced by the civil examination system that 
held China in a cultural stalemate in the days of the Empire. Until the structure was disrupted, 
nothing else could be done. He writes, “It is therefore no mere accident that the revolution in 
Chinese literature came ten years after the abolition of the literary examinations in 1905, and 
several years after the political revolution of 1911-12.”74 Further, one must realize that the 
effects of centuries under the authority of the classical language and its institutional compliments 
cannot be easily or quickly undone. Hu offers the example of the eight legged essay:  
[The] mechanical and exacting form of literary composition known as the Octopartite, 
which had been required as the standard form in Allstate examinations, and for the 
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mastery of which the best years and energies of the whole educated class of the past six 
centuries had been sacrificed.
75
  
The ramifications of the examination system extend further than the authority of the classical 
language that it was used to enforce and the subsequent social stratification it helped perpetuate. 
The ramifications of the exams include centuries of lost talents and minds. 
 To change the standards of education, Hu maintained, modern China requires an 
independent system of higher education. The lack of adequate educational facilities, modern 
curricula, and graduate programs to produce skilled researchers and teachers presented a grave 
challenge to intellectual and social reform. Hu believe that a plan for university development was 
imperative for China’s scientific and technological advance. This is something that he devoted 
himself to for many years. In 1947, he laid out his ideas on higher education reform most 
explicitly with the four characteristics he wanted to see developed as markers of China's 
academic independence.
76
 
1. China's universities should be capable of training students in the basic sciences. 
2. Institutions need the equipment and capable teachers for training students in science. 
3. There should be enough research institutions and experts to assist governments and 
private people with their problems concerning Pure Science, Industry, Medicine, Public 
Health, and National Defense. 
4. Researchers and research institutes in China should be able to cooperate with the 
development of science and technology world-wide. 
The nation's most capable universities, like Peking University, should act as “operation bases for 
the movement of national academic independence.”77 For ten years, the focus should only be on 
improving the existing universities; no new universities should be built until the existing ones are 
up to par. Hu was determined to not perpetuate the outmoded style of education any longer. 
Further, he wanted an infrastructure of higher education the Chinese people could take national 
pride in. He writes that it is an “unsound psychology that to be an expert one has to go abroad for 
further studies,” and that must be corrected.78  
The plan Hu outlines for China's independent system of education includes the 
institutional, or systematic, elements of infrastructure, criteria for standards, leadership, and 
training. It is also a plan for national unification in that it looks to make a self-reliant and self-
perpetual mechanism for continuing the intellectual and technological advancements of the 
Chinese people. Still, it includes a third characteristic that makes it most comprehensive, 
necessary, and Hu maintained, effective for dealing with China's educational obstacles. Part of 
the overall plan to reform education included the plan Hu outlined in 1923 for a “new revival of 
learning.” Hu frequently referred to the reform in terms of a revival, rebirth, and renaissance. 
Likewise, he always maintained that matters of logic and aesthetics are of utmost significance to 
the development of a modern culture. The 1923 plan for new learning stands out as one 
intellectual strain from among many that Hu grew increasingly committed to. This strain is 
important because it is indicative of Hu’s culminating rhetorical synthesis. Whereas the revival 
sought to dig logic out of obscurity and the rebirth was expressed as an aesthetic awakening of 
the scientific spirit, Hu’s idea of Renaissance, a fusion of revival and rebirth, becomes more 
clearly defined with his plan for new learning.   
The plan for new learning was sensitive to the strengths and weaknesses of China's 
existing educational system. Hu took into account the fact that Chinese scholars could not 
quickly feel at home in a foreign academic environment, such as the laboratory, with different 
forms of methodology, different equipment, strange sterility, and even the odd lab coat attire. Hu 
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and the other proponents of educational reform during the Chinese Renaissance had reintegrated 
around the pursuit of scientific, critical scholarship, which was reinforced by the legacy of the 
New Text scholars such as Cheng-yi and Chu Hsi whose scientific spirit “lived on and brought 
about an age of scientific scholarship in the humanities.”79 Chu Hsi, for example, had “raised 
numerous problems for critical study: textual criticism, philological reconstruction of the 
meaning of old words, and the determination of authorship and date of ancient texts.”80 When the 
Chinese scholars were not able to feel at home in the laboratory, they were able to feel at ease 
exercising laboratory methodology in the world of words and texts.
81
  Both Cheng-yi and Chu 
Hsi “were conscientiously scientific in their methods… [and] this scientific spirit and 
methodology placed the new scholarship on a solid basis, and produced the age of scientific 
research in the humanistic and historical studies during the last three hundred years.”82  
Hu continued in the critical vein of the New Text movement by advancing his 
genealogical methodology, advocating for the comparative study of histories, and advocating for 
the inclusion of formally excluded source materials. Hu maintained that scholarship should 
advance study of particular histories, or genealogies, such as the history of language, history of 
literature, history of economics, political history, history of the international communication of 
ideas, and so on, to open scholarship up to reference materials of all kinds. With specialized 
histories and ample sources for comparison, Hu reasoned that China’s intellectuals could develop 
a more thorough and nuanced understanding of the interconnectedness of causal forces in the 
social, political, economic, geographic, and technological world, and thus, a method of evidential 
analysis capable of specifying the era’s most acute problems and developing plans suitable for 
attending to them.  
 Chinese society, Hu said, must embrace the technologies of modern civilization, that is, 
the technologies that coordinate and accelerate. Subjects that had traditionally fallen outside the 
realm of Chinese education, such as science, math, and geography, will play an especially 
significant role in China's transition into the modern world. For Hu, the technologies that played 
an important role in the European Renaissance had an important role to play in the Chinese 
Renaissance as well. 
 He distinguished the Chinese civilization from the Western civilization by differences in 
thought that developed into differences in tools. “The civilization of a race is simply the sum-
total of its achievements in adjusting itself to its environment,” he writes; such adjustments are 
made by intelligently creating and importing “necessary and effective tools.”83 The Chinese felt 
at odds with the new civilization of the West only because they were not equipped with the tools 
that are necessary and effective for that kind of civilization.
84
 “Renaissance” in China, meant 
rebirth and revival; it also meant refurbishment in the sense of inheriting these same kinds of 
technologies that we know to characterize the Western Renaissance, such as typography, 
organization, the clock, industry, centralization, nationalization, printing, uniformity, and a 
national language.
85
 One of the most important qualities of education in math and science 
combined with the new technologies of coordination and acceleration is the self-perpetual effects 
they have on society. These subjects enable the creation and implementation of the effective 
technologies, but further, “the print culture those efforts produced,” as Jones explains, became a 
conduit for mathematical and scientific learning. “[The] textbooks, primers, children's stories, 
monthly magazine, and multivolume ‘treasuries’ for school libraries serves as one of the most  
important conduits for the vernacularization of biological knowledge and, along with it, the 
evolutionary episteme.”86  
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 Technology carries information and vernacularization adopts the ideas therein. Hu 
maintained that logical minds engender the scientific spirit. The evolutionary episteme, in 
particular, can awaken a sense of possibility among the people it touches. While emphasis on 
evolutionary survival can prompt the revolutionary spirit that Hu experienced in Shanghai, 
emphasis on progress can do something wholly different. 
 
Encourage Optimism: Cultivating the People’s Imagination  
A society’s cultural vision, or cultural imagination, must exceed the scope of tradition if 
that society is to enable real, that is, lasting and self-perpetuating forms of social reform. Time 
needs to be divisible for causality to be discernible. The present must be separable from the past 
and future and the future must become visible in the social imagination. If the developments of 
time are understood as causal events, alternative futures become a possibility. And, if alternative 
futures are imaginable, they can be contrasted and judged in relation to one another. Thus, new 
ideas can earn consideration on level ground with the old. 
With perspective, the language user can reaffirm or delegitimize the old value.
87
 Hu 
offers the example of “the spirit” of western civilization, which emphasizes scientific reason as a 
constructive power. John Dewey’s philosophy on force greatly impacted Hu’s ideas on pacifism, 
optimism, efficiency, and progress.
88
 Hu gives the quote from Dewey’s article, Force and 
Coercion, in his Oral History: “Power or energy... denotes effective means of operation; ability 
or capacity to execute, to realize ends.”89 Hu understood power in complimentary terms, as that 
which is cooperative, constructive, and hopeful. He explains:  
If the two parties agreed to combine forces in the common fight against nature for life 
and sustenance, both are liberated and they have found that partnership the true economy: 
still better, they have found in it the true basis of human society and its spiritual 
possibilities. For there can be no union without some measure of faith in the agreement 
on which it is based, some notion of rights. It indicates the true policy, whether national 
or international--agreements for united action against the common enemy, whether found 
in nature or in the passions and fallacies of men.
90
 
Conversely, without cooperation, when resistance is met with force, the result is weakness and 
wastefulness. Both winner and loser are weakened by their relationship; the latter is subjugated 
by the former and the former is trapped by the need to maintain power over the latter. Bound in 
struggle, forceful energies and resisting energies faceoff. “Thus,” Hu concludes, “two energies 
are canceled and end in sterility or waste.”91  
 The spirit of reason is connected to the cultural ability to conceive of the future, Hu 
maintained, and conceptualization of the future requires conceptualization of the past. Even 
though Hu’s attempts to coordinate the efforts of intellectual proponents of reform were 
repeatedly frustrated, and despite the staunch pessimism of many of the Chinese intellectuals that 
surrounded him, he remained defiant in his optimism. For him, and optimistic outlook is a 
marker of utmost significance. He loves the naïve sense of optimism he encountered in America, 
where everywhere he felt a sense of forward-looking hope. Americans, he understood, are 
optimistic because they believe in the possibility of a future that is different from the present. 
Today is not a condemnation of tomorrow, but rather, each day is its own. The events of 
yesterday weigh on today, but they do not determine its end. This sense of possibility enables 
creativity and imagination because a dream can be made into reality of the dreamer takes the 
initiative to thus affect their situation. 
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 The cultural imagination is enabled by causal understanding of events, the kind that 
developed in literate communities. The experience of oral culture is the world in the round, so to 
speak, whereas literate communities experience the world as a lineal string of events. Once an 
experience is recorded as a single event, in a line of events, before some and after others, the 
recorder is able to view the event on a time continuum, part of an ongoing causal string. Further, 
readers of this record understand the event from a point of view, or a place of perspective, along 
the string of events. This point of view enables the reader to understand himself/herself as an 
individual person, separate but in relation to a larger group and ancestral legacy.
92
 
 Each person is implicated by a chain of events but does not have to play puppet to this chain.
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When the majority of the population can read and write, and have the cause and materials to 
regularly do so, the effect is a culture capable of imagination. Chinese culture, proponents of the 
Literary Revolution maintained, is in desperate need of imagination. This need was 
acknowledged across the board. Jones notes that even reformers focused on children's literature 
felt that a devastating deficiency among children of that era was a lack of imagination.
94
  
 Material progress, Hu maintained, is a precursor to spiritual progress. “Raising the level 
of man’s enjoyment of material objects and increasing his material advantages and security… 
leads toward the liberation of mankind’s abilities and enables men to do more than dedicate their 
every energy and thought to survival alone; [it] furnishes men with a reservoir of strength which 
allows them to seek the satisfaction of their spiritual demands.”95 Unlike members of the first 
wave of young China, such as Liang Qichao, who became concerned about the brutality of 
materialism after political revolutions rocked industrialized European democracies, Hu Shi 
defended materialism. He maintained that spirituality is not hindered by materialism; but quite 
the opposite, the material liberates the spirit. Physical demands prevent people from satisfying 
their spiritual demands. When people are liberated from physical need, they are able to pursue 
spiritual development. Further, he maintained that science without intelligence is spiritually 
bankrupt. He was not arguing for a technocratic application of science. He was arguing for a 
pragmatic application, where guided by reason, people can find freedom and can become 
creative. Reason does not cause despair; reason lifts the human spirit. Reason allows for 
optimism because a culture that is guided by reason is a culture that believes it can change itself.   
When a society can imagine an alternative future, they can affect an alternative future; in 
other words, they can progress. Imagination is enabled by the causal perspective cultivated in 
literacy. Cultural understanding of causality disposes a culture to scientific and mathematic 
pursuit. Further, the literate perspective enables one to appreciate specialize roles that are created 
by the technological and mechanized products of scientific and mathematical pursuits in relation 
to the bigger picture. Therefore, people are willing to play specialize roles in the mechanized 
production of good because they see value in each role. The increased availability of material 
goods leads to increases in material sustenance and well-being. Once humans are no longer 
enslaved by hunger and basic necessities, they can pursue a more valuable existence. Hu 
emphatically offers the following example.  
All those who have been in the Far East and have seen those millions of human beings 
toiling under that peculiarly Oriental form of human slavery, the rickshaw, or ‘man-
power carriage,’ cannot fail to agree with us modern Chinese thinkers, that there is much 
spirituality in material progress which has at least relieved that much of human slavery by 
means of mechanical inventions.
96
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When people are freed from physical slavery, they will be better able to appreciate the value of 
their existence. The less often humans can be observed working like beasts of burden, the more 
unforgivable such a site will appear. As material well-being increases, so too does the human 
capacity to care for oneself and others. This, Hu insisted, is the groundwork for a truly “spiritual” 
civilization. After all, he asks, “what spirituality is there in a civilisation which has maintained a 
caste system for thousands of years, or which has bound the feet of its women for a thousand 
years, and has sought justification in claims of duty and beauty?”97 The tools of reason and 
language enable cultural understanding and appreciation of new ideas, even where experience is 
minimal, because analogies can draw out the similarities between the unusual experience and 
more common experiences. In turn, the increased capacity for understanding reveals causal 
relationships between particular forces of culture and certain kinds of social and political 
experience.  
 
Cultivate the Arts and the Artists: Rearranging Aesthetics and the National Future  
The final aspect of developing a nationalistic infrastructure is aesthetic rearrangement, 
the cultivation of the arts and the artists to enable full cultural use of habits and language. The 
culminating quality of the Literary Revolution is cultivation of the arts and artists for a 
comprehensive nationalistic cultural infrastructure. The cultural benefits of a national living 
language extend beyond reading and learning. A nationalistic culture also thinks and creates in 
the national vernacular language. The written arts create an aesthetic infrastructure for a nation 
which accounts for as much of the national identity as the nation’s geographical boundaries. The 
aesthetic infrastructure is begun with periodicals, fastest of the literary ventures. As the case was 
for Hu and his associates, they began with academic articles, political exposes, and social 
editorials written in pai-hua. Then, there are new artistic creations, like poetry and short stories. 
A bulk of the infrastructure is also composed of translated works, scholarly and common alike. 
The crowning literary achievement, however, is the novel. The novel gives the aesthetic 
infrastructure its national identity, it accounts for the character associated with the national 
culture. As Jones says, the novel is “the presumptive endpoint of most histories of the 
development of vernacular fiction in the West.”98 The novel was also the final aim of this 
vernacular movement in China.  
Proponents of the Literary Revolution did not achieve a novel. The famous May Fourth 
writer Lu Xun did not, nor did any of his contemporaries. The lack of the novel “became a 
defining feature of the May Fourth rewriting of Chinese literary history,” Jones points out.99 He 
suggests that the novel was too difficult to accomplish because of the daily demand for copy and 
“perhaps the difficulties of producing a sustained narrative effort in an era of ever-increasing 
temporal fragmentation and political crisis.”100 Chinese society, during the Republican Period, 
was continuously rocky, never allowing for the kind of cultural cohesiveness or consistency that 
Hu understood to give rise to artists or the naturally occurring cultural function of art. 
Reformers saw the end stage of the Literary Revolution as the organized expression of 
the democratic spirit. Hu maintained Dewey’s belief that this spirit “must be a transforming 
growth from within,” as Dewey writes.101 Following the spread of literacy, there will be artists 
who step out of the mass and give it voice in print. The success of the Chinese Renaissance 
would hinge on the artists who could question and shake seemingly impregnable institutions of 
belief and create the opportunity for new institutions, legitimately founded on an understanding 
of the reasons for their development. Just as reading and writing changes the individual by 
providing a point of perspective apart from the community, and hence, releasing the individual 
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from continual social immersion to develop a reflective identity, as well as to look upon, and to 
judge the community.
102
  
Vernacular and literacy is to bring the illiterate masses into the fold, so to speak. The 
vernacular movement is to create a language whereby the masses could bridge the differences of 
location and clan to find their sufferings and common experiences. Creative individuals who 
stand out from the masses may then articulate those experiences in literature that will connect the 
common people to the elite by communicating the sufferings of the masses to the elite who have 
lost a sense for the day to day life of the people.  
Each form of literature written in the living language brings something different to the 
experience of the reader. Books, for example, give the reader imagination. New works written in 
the living language of the day; give the reader an invaluable experience national spirit. For 
example, “the lyrical poems of love,” Hu notes, “reveal the innermost part of the soul of the 
nation better than anything else.”103 Other works encourage literate thought by reflecting on 
social problems. As Hu notes, there is a “distinct group” of “poetry that deals with the concrete 
problems of social life, written sometimes in the manner of realistic presentation, sometimes in 
the form of satirical criticism, but mostly in the spirit of protest.”104 The use of vernacular 
language not only makes universal literacy much more plausible, but also, frees language of 
classical meanings, and thus, enables literature to apprehend, playback, process, and judge the 
situations of the day.
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The academic reformers tried to encourage expansion of the arts with their own 
contributions. Hu Shi’s Experiments, for example, was one of the first attempts to write new 
poetry in the vernacular language.
106
 The final version of Experiments contained 63 poems, only 
14 of which are written in the vernacular language.
 107
 Hu had difficulty performing the artistic 
role of the poet. As Leonid Cherkassky notes in a review of Experiments, Hu often relies on “old 
principles and methods of depicting reality” to construct poetic images.108  
Yet, Hu was more successful with highlighting the importance of experiences in his 
poetry.
109
 As an example of the significance Hu attributes to “experience” Cherkassky offers the 
following portion of the translated version of Hu’s poem “Kai-yu Hsu.”110  
Once intoxicated, one learns the strength of wine. 
Once smitten, one learns the power of love; 
You cannot write my poems 
Just as I cannot dream your dreams. 
Hu thought that Poetry fused with respect for experiential knowledge would orient readers to two 
ideas that ran counter to traditional teachings. First, is the idea that things to be known, can be 
known, such as objects (wine), emotions (love), perspective (personal poetry), and individual 
motivation (dreams). Second, is the association between personal investigation, thus removing 
knowledge from the divine realm, which had kept it inaccessible to most, partially accessible to 
some, and fully accessible only to the son of heaven and sages of old.         
 Even though Experiments was not wildly successful as a collection of poetry and 
although Hu wrote only part of it in the vernacular language, he bravely used the medium of 
poetry to express his theoretical outlook and lead the Literary Revolution by example. As  
Cherkassky contends,  
Hu Shi’s Experiments cannot claim the honour of being the first collection of the new 
Chinese poetry, as it contains almost no new poetry. Rather, the book is the predecessor 
of the new poetry that was created by the efforts of Liu Bannong 刘半农, Liu Dabai 刘大
白, Shen Yinmo 沈尹默, Zhu Ziqing 朱自清 and many other May Fourth poets.111  
 85 
 
There are three primary concepts involved in Hu’s take on the cultural function of arts 
and artists: aesthetics, experience, and experimentalism.
112
 He associates an aesthetic 
understanding with the way one would understand a “rhythm.”113 It is not as explicit as 
“intellectual recognition;” it is something more sensual than that. Likewise, the experience is not 
as explicit as a situation; it is not merely an event or occurrence at a particular point in time. 
Rather, an experience includes everything an individual brings into a situation, such as attitudes, 
values, and beliefs, and the meaning of an experience is not necessarily something of immediate 
perceptibility.
114
 Like the pragmatic benefits of reason and science, the value of an experience 
can be revealed right away or it can resonate and be revealed somewhere down the road. In short, 
“an esthetic experience, the work of art in its actuality, is perception.”115 Or, in other words, a 
work of art takes affective form in the historical moment it is encountered in a culture, as it 
resonates in cultural memory, within the individualized but also culturally connected context of 
the viewer, and in the potentiality it has to take new creative shape and receive new artistic life 
by the will of any one of its viewers. In this way, Hu’s conception of an aesthetic experience 
blends Dewey’s two notions: “art product” and “work of art.”116 For the latter, emphasis is on 
work. A work of art is “active and experienced.”117 Poetry, for example, is a social and creative 
act, or work of art. The poetic work is of primary importance to cultural progression and aesthetic 
rearrangement. As Hu explains, cultural change lives in poetic content.
118
 Poetic technique, 
conversely, is like the formal housing of poetic content. The formalities of poetry, the technique, 
can do more harm to poetry than good “when applied without an adequate content or when it 
restricts rather than helps the free development of the poetic content.”119 To think of this once 
more in structural terms, the technique is like a school building and the content is the curriculum. 
If the conditions of the school building enhance the children’s ability to master the curriculum, 
the building can be said to have functioned appropriately. If, however, the school building is a 
shoddy structure with leaks, creaks, and bugs that disrupts the learning process, it can be said 
that the building is impeding the work of education. The stress of “art product,” on the other 
hand, is on product. Dewey describes the product as “physical and potential.”120 An example of 
the art product is Hu Shi’s Experiments, “the predecessor of the new poetry… created by the… 
May Fourth poets.”121 As a work of art, Hu Shi’s poetry is not very noteworthy, but it proved 
significant as an art product.  
With literary arts, artists unify the people by offering them a reflection on the experiences 
common to all. This stage, of artistic cultural cohesion, is the final stage of the Literary 
Revolution. With the Literary Revolution Hu sought to change society by changing the culture 
that shaped it. To change the culture, he sought to change the morality preserved it. To change 
the traditional morality, he sought to give people the cognitive ability to break free of it. For 
people to progress beyond the initial change, he called on artists to ground the culture in unity 
with reason.  
No one is more capable of establishing the living language as the standard and respected 
language of the people than “the poets, the novelists, the great prose masters, and the dramatists,” 
Hu maintains.
122
 These artists “are the real standardizers of languages.”123 They understand 
language as a tool that equips the individual to be simultaneously self-reflective part from the 
group and part of the community. Further, the artist can make sense of the function new 
technologies play in coordinating and spreading the communal appreciation of the artists’ 
reflections of socially shared experiences.
124
  
To achieve the creative potential of aesthetic experience, Hu believed the artist must 
experiment. Without experimentalism, it is difficult for a culture to steer clear of preservationist 
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trappings. Hu writes, “Vocal classicism, that which preaches rather than enacts as does that 
which genuinely becomes classic, is always based on fear of life and retraction from its 
exigencies and challenges.”125 Such was precisely the case with the development of classicism in 
China. Hence the role of the artist: to keep the energy moving in the way of creation and 
negating the stress of new technologies by employing those technologies to creative and 
cohesive ends.  
 
End Notes  
                                               
1 Hu Shih, Essay in Living Philosophies, (NY: Simon & Schuster, 1931), pp. 235-263, in A Collection of Hu Shih’s 
English Writings, Volume I, 387.  
 
2 Ibid., 383.  
 
3 Ibid., 385.  
 
4 Ibid., 389.  
 
5 Ibid. 
 
6 Ibid., 390. 
 
7 Ibid. 
 
8 Ibid. 
 
9 Ibid., 394.  
 
10 Jerome B. Grieder, Hu Shih and the Chinese Renaissance: Liberalism in the Chinese Revolution, 1917-1937, 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999), 21.  
 
11 Ibid., 21.  
 
12 Hu, Essay in Living Philosophies, 395.  
 
13
 Ibid., 396.  
 
14 Ibid. 
 
15 Ibid., 396-397. The fashion of evolutionary theory was also demonstrated by the startup of The Struggle, a student 
run journal at the China National Institute. Hu’s classmates began the journal and asked him to contribute to it. A 
year later, when Hu was sixteen years old, he became the journal’s sole editor. The Struggle marks the first occasion 
Hu had to work with pai-hua as a literary medium. The journal was intended to spread new ideas to the common 
people, and so, the students chose to use the only language the people would be able to understand it.  
 
16 Grieder, 33.  
 
17 Hu, and the others to first study in America, went there on scholarships that were included as part of the Boxer 
Indemnity Settlement included scholarships for Chinese students to attend University in America. After a 
competitive exam selection process in Peking, Hu was able to secure one of these few coveted scholarships.  
 
18 Hu, Essay in Living Philosophies, 400.  
 
19 Grieder, 86.  
 87 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
20 Ibid., 60.  
 
21 Ibid., 57. 
 
22 Ibid. 
 
23 Ibid., 61. 
 
24 Ibid. 
 
25 Hu Shih, “A Plea for Patriotic Sanity: An Open Letter to All Chinese Students,” The Chinese Students’ Monthly, 
10.7:425-426 (April 1915).  
 
26 Ibid.  
 
27 Hu Shih, “Intellectual Preparedness,” 1940, A Commencement Address at Union College, June 10, 1940. This 
was also the commencement address given before Purdue University in 1941. In A Collection of Hu Shih’s English 
Writings, Vol. II, 829.  
 
28 Hu, Essay in Living Philosophies, 398.  
 
29 Ibid., 403.  
 
30 Hu, Oral History, 158.  
 
31 Ibid., 159 
 
32 Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (Cambridge: MIT Press,  
1994), 71.  
 
33 Hu, “National Crisis and Student Life,” 764. 
 
34 Grieder, 215. The translated text used here is from Grieder. He gives the following citation: Hu Shih, “Ai-kuo 
yün-tung yü ch’iu-hsüeh” (The patriotic movement and getting an education), HSWT III, ix, 1146, 1149, 1150-1153. 
First published in Hsien-tai p’ing-lun, 2.39:5-9 (Sept. 5, 1925).  
 
35 Hu Shi, The Chinese Renaissance, 47. This process is meant to solidly refute the opposition to the Literature 
Revolution, who never used historical arguments, but rather, met only with blind forces of reaction, being defended 
for no reason other than an inclination on the part of the defender that it was the right thing to do.  
 
36 Hu Shih, “The Renaissance in China,” 273. 
 
37 Zhou, Gang. “The Chinese Renaissance: A Transcultural Reading,” The Modern Language  
Association of America, (2005), 787.  
 
38 Ibid., 786.  
 
39 Andrew F. Jones, Developmental Fairy tales: Evolutionary Thinking and Modern Chinese Culture, (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2011), 15. Also on p. 19: “Chinese intellectuals of the early 20th century, modernity have 
not yet taken on its present-day sense of a universal endpoint for which China was compelled to search. 
Modernity—understood as China's humiliating and unequal participation in the globalized historical time of the 
modern interstate system—had already arrived, and its logic of struggle and survival was undeniable. Development, 
on the other hand, was understood as a means of managing the consequences of modernity, one that necessarily 
invoked wenming as a pedagogical process.” 
 88 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
40 Jones, Developmental Fairy tales: 18.  
41
 Ibid.  
  
42 Hu, Chapter VI, “Social Disintegration and Readjustment,” in The Chinese Renaissance. 
 
43 Ibid.  
 
44 Hu, The Chinese Renaissance, 8. Hu Shi says of the examination system: “But this bureaucracy was one of civil 
servants and was never born and bred to undertake the leadership of the nation.”  
 
45 David Ze, “Walter Ong's Paradigm and Chinese Literacy,” Canadian Journal of Communication, Vol 20, No 4 
(1995) 
 
46 Ibid.  
 
47 Ibid.  
 
48 McLuhan, Understanding Media, 156. “primitive man lives in a much more tyrannical cosmic machine than 
Western literate man has ever invented.” 
 
49 Ibid., 155. He lives according to “a cosmic clock and a sacred time of the cosmogony itself.” 
 
50 Ibid., 84. “Tribal cultures” have a great “range and delicacy of… perceptions and expressions,” McLuhan notes. 
 
51 Hu, “Intellectual China in 1919,” 112.  
 
52 Hu, The Chinese Renaissance, 46. 
 
53 John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman, China: A New History, 2nd enlarged edition, (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2006), 99-100.  
 
54 Hu, The Chinese Renaissance, 61. 
 
55 Hu, The Chinese Renaissance, 62.  
 
56 Hu, “Intellectual China in 1919,” 112. 
 
57 Jones, 68. 
 
58 Walter J. Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word, (NY: Routledge, 2002), 54-55. Lack of 
familiarity is precisely the point: an oral culture simply does not deal in such items as geometrical figures, abstract 
categorizations, formally logical reasoning processes, definitions, or even comprehensive descriptions, or articulated 
self-analysis, all of which derive not simply from thought itself but from text-formed thought. 
 
59 Hu, “The Right to Doubt,” 297. 
 
60 Zhou, 787. 
 
61
 Ibid. For information about Renaissance humanism see Steven Kreis, “Lectures on Modern European Intellectual 
History: Renaissance Humanism,” The History Guide, 2000, accessed 1-11-2012, 
http://www.historyguide.org/intellect/humanism.html. Renaissance humanism “intensified the assertion of personal 
independence and individual expression.” “Zeal for the classics was a result… Men thus affected – the humanists – 
welcome classical writers who revealed similar social values and secular attitude.” 
 
 89 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
62 Jones, 67. 
 
63
 Ibid.  
 
64 Ibid.  
 
65 Ibid. Example of how cultural products harbor new ideas and carry them across culture. Jones comments on the 
“promiscuity with which they [evolutionary ideas] move between and across widely divergent disciplines, discursive 
registers, literary genres, and media.”65 full accounts for this spread it calls for examination of “the vernacular 
context in which they came to be reproduced, recycled, and refashion.” 
 
66 Also like Mo Zi, who used the conceptual tools of the age to make his point against the changes of the age, the 
preservationists of the twentieth century had been part of the new text movement, which instituted new methods of 
scholarship toward the end of the nineteenth century. They were versed in the methods and structure of 
contemporary academic arguments.  
 
67 Ong, 43-45. Ong explains, “orality situates knowledge within a context of struggle.” The oral world is a “highly 
polarized, agonistic, oral world of good and evil, virtue and vice, villains and heroes.” 
 
68 Ibid., 45. “Name-calling or vituperation,” and conversely, “fulsome expression of praise… [are] found 
everywhere in connection with orality.” 
 
69 Hu, The Chinese Renaissance, 46. 
 
70 Hu, “The Renaissance in China,” 273. 
 
71 Hu, “National Crisis and Student Life,” 765. 
 
72 Hu, “An Optimist in a Sea of…” 621.  
 
73 Ibid.  
 
74 Hu, The Chinese Renaissance, 61. 
 
75 Hu, “An Optimist Looks at China,” 639. 
 
76 Hu Shih, “Ten-Year Plan,” in Hu Shih Yingwen Wencun (胡適英文文存, A Collection of Hu Shih’s English 
Writings). Compiled by Chih-P’ing Chou (周質平).  3 vols. Taibei: Yuanliu chuban, 1995., 1195.  
 
77 Ibid.  
 
78 Ibid., 1198.  
 
79 Hu, The Chinese Renaissance, 69 and 88. “The new intellectual life, which was characterized by the development 
of the humanistic and historical studies, was a continuation of the tendency traceable back to the early days of the 
Chinese revolt against Buddhism.”  
 
80 Hu, “Intellectual Life, Past and Present,” 69. 
 
81 Ibid.  
 
82 Ibid., 69-70.  
 
 90 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
83 Hu Shih, “The Civilizations of the East and the West,” in Whither Mankind a Panorama of Modern Civilization, 
first edition, edited by Charles A. Beard, (NY: Longmans, Green and Co., 1928), 27.  
 
84 Multiple times throughout his writing, Hu has noted that the adoption of tools has been the primary difference 
between China's reaction to the Western world and Japan’s. Since Japan had a social structure that enabled cultural 
adoption of new set of tools much more rapidly than China, Japan took a very different course. 
 
85 McLuhan, Understanding Media, 148-149. McLuhan offers the clock as an example from the European 
Renaissance: “In the Renaissance the clock combined with the uniform respectability of the new typography to 
extend the power of social organization almost to a national scale. By the nineteenth century it had provided a 
technology of cohesion that was inseparable from industry and transport.” 
 
86 Jones, 24. 
 
87 McLuhan, Understanding Media, 155. McLuhan explains the visual emphasis as a desacralizing force that pulls 
the tribal man out of cosmic time. He writes, “the visual desacralizes the universe and produces the ‘nonreligious 
man of modern societies.’”  
 
88 At this period of time, Hu refers to his pacifism as his “new pacifism” because it is not the same as the pacifism he 
originally asserted. But I was beginning to change in the year 1915 in 1916. In one of the intellectual forces that 
influenced me was Norman Angell-- one of the greatest minds of the Anglo-Saxon world and the author of the 
famous book The Great Illusion. The Great Illusion came out in 1909, and it was considered one of the most 
eloquent appeals for new constructive pacifism. (Oral History 75-76) 
 
Mr. Norman Angell’s pacifism was called a new pacifism because it was not of my earlier type which was based 
primarily upon non-resistance. (Hu, Oral History 77). 
 
89 Hu’s oral history 79 quoted from John Dewey's article “Force and Coercion.” 
 
90 This is a quote from Hu’s diary that Hu quotes in his oral history recording. The diary citation can be found on 
page 77 of oral history. 
 
91 Ibid.  
 
92 McLuhan, Understanding Media, 285. The literary reformers understood the effect of literat arts in much the same 
way as McLuhan maintains they are understood by the literat artist. “The business of the writer or the film-maker,” 
he writes, “is to transfer the reader or viewer from one world, his own, to another, the world created by typography.” 
 
93 Ibid. Literature is able to affect a culture that would otherwise ward of change because “those undergoing the 
experience,” the readers,” accept it… without critical awareness.” In other words, rather than being asked to accept a 
new belief wholesale, the reader has time to adjust to new ways of thinking. Print, McLuhan says, engenders 
imagination, imagination usurps reality, and the reader becomes a dreamer. 
 
94 Jones, 123.  
 
95 Grieder, 152. Grieder translates quote from Hu Shih, “Wo-men tui-yü Hsi-yang chin-tai wen-ming ti t’ai-tu” (Our 
attitude toward modern Western civilization), HSWT III, I, 6. The following is another quote from the same page: 
“The level at which modern Western culture is able to satisfy the spiritual demands of mankind is far away beyond 
the dreams of the old civilization of the Orient… Modern Western civilization is not at all a materialistic civilization; 
it is, rather, idealistic, it is spiritual.” 
 
96 Hu, “The Renaissance in China,” 275-276.  
 
97 Ibid., 275.  
 
 91 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
98. Jones, 13.  
 
99
 Ibid.   
 
100 Ibid.  
 
101 Dewey, Characters and Events, 294.  
 
102 McLuhan, Understanding Media, 45. McLuhan writes that reading and writing changes the individual by making 
“possible the discovery of individualism, introspection and so on.” 
 
103 Hu Shih, “The Social Message in Chinese Poetry,” The Chinese Social and Political Review, 1923-Jan. Vol. 7, 
pp. 66-79, in Vol. I of A Collection of Hu Shih’s English Writings, 138.  
 
104 Ibid. Hu notes the prevalence of this kind of poetry at the dawn of the age of logic, leading up to the nihilism of 
Lao Zi some 2600 years ago. He gives many examples from the Book of Poetry.  
 
105 Availability of print must follow literacy; (Ong 55) print includes publications of all kinds (pleasure reads and 
politics) Types of things derived from “text-formed thought” (Ong 55) Logic is a technological product, “logic itself 
emerges from the technology of writing.” (Ong 169) 
 
106 Leonid Cherkassky, Review of Hu Shi, Experiments, in A Selective Guide to Chinese Literature, 1900-1949, 
Volume 3, the Poem, edited by Lloyd Haft, European Science Foundation, (Leiden, The Netherlands: E.J. Brill), 
136-139.  
 
107 Ibid.  
 
108 Ibid. Examples of Hu’s “‘modernised’ images are generally paler and less rich than their classical models.” 
 
109 Ibid. Clearly, Cherkassky notes, “Hu Shi is a champion of poetry based on experience.” 
 
110 Ibid.  
 
111 Ibid.  
 
112 In some of Hu’s writings he uses the spelling “esthetic,” rather than aesthetic.  
 
113 Hu, “The Social Message in Chinese Poetry,” 137. Rhythm is something that extends over time. Rhythm can take 
time to mature and it can fade away. “What was once the most vivid imagism may become the sordid poetic 
convention of to-day.” 
 
114 Ibid., 169.  
 
115 Ibid.  
  
116 John Dewey, Art as Experience, (NY: Penguin Group, 2005), 168.  
 
117 Ibid.  
 
118
 Ibid., 138. On “content,” Hu writes, “poetic expressions” reveal “the true explanations of the life and institutions 
of the people.” 
 
119 Ibid., 136-137.  
 
120 Dewey, Art as Experience, 168. 
 92 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
121 Cherkassky, 136-139. 
 
122 Hu, The Chinese Renaissance, 57. 
 
123 Ibid.  
 
124 McLuhan, Understanding Media. The materials of print play a motivational role as well. The newspaper, for 
example, encourages an intelligent form of communal playfulness by recording and distributing recent local events. 
“Experience translated into a new medium literally bestows a delightful playback of earlier awareness,” McLuhan 
writes. “The press repeats the excitement we have in using our wits, and by using our wits we can translate the outer 
world into the fabric of our own being.” (211). The playfulness of translated experiences in the newspaper is similar 
in kind to the way books create “an inward world of fantasy and dreams.” (292).  
 
125 Hu, “The Social Message in Chinese Poetry,” 175. “Demand for variety is the manifestation of the fact that being 
alive we seek to live until we are cowed by fear or dulled by routine. The need of life itself pushes us out into the 
unknown.”  
 93 
 
Chapter Four  The Chinese Sophist: Hu Shi’s Model for a New Public 
Intellectual 
 
The New Sophist  
The primary contribution of this study is clear articulation of the rhetorical figure Hu Shi 
tried to shape and bring to life during the Chinese Renaissance as a social actor capable of 
changing culture in substantive ways. Hu aimed at enabling and inspiring a particular type of 
player to see China through the process of modernization and to secure a future that would be 
made stable by way of continual change. Generally, the figure he envisioned for China’s “new 
Sophist” is akin to Nathan Crick’s conception of the Sophist as a “public intellectual,” marked by 
the characteristics of reflexive thought and social productivity.
1
 The idea of the “public 
intellectual” is helpful to our understanding of Hu Shi because the work of the public intellectual 
is both situated, and able to transcend their particular situation. Crick explains that when we 
think of the public intellectual we must think in terms of the “philosophical situation”2 to which 
they respond. This means that we must think of the public intellectual in relation to their 
sociohistorical situation, theoretical work, and the potential of their work as a productive art, to 
people in their own time as well as to other people in other times.
3
 As a public actor, it is 
inevitable that the public intellectual be historically situated, and at the same time, as an 
intellectual he works in the realm of the timeless and the true.
4
 “Public intellectuals are those 
who react to the problems of their sociohistorical situation by creating enduring works that 
broadly influence cultural habits and institutional practices during their lifetimes.”5 The figure is 
equipped with the tools of the sophistic attitude such as experimentalism, a wide foundation of 
contemporary knowledge, historical perspective, and an integrated approach to logos and 
aesthetics. Engaging the Chinese public with arts and logic, the new Sophist can engender what 
we might call a Sophistic Tao, an ongoing practice in life, or way of living that experimentally 
blends knowledge and practice to produce creative solutions to handle the ongoing contingencies 
of a continually changing society.
6
 
For Hu and other liberal reformers of the Chinese Renaissance, the “ideal” state is a 
moral democracy built around a continually changing society, established on educative 
democratic institutions, and propelled by new ideas and ambitions. The notion of a moral 
democracy considers democracy “as a social and intellectual environment.”7 A continually 
changing society is one that respects “new ideas” and “new ambitions.”8  Hu believed that when 
a society thrives on new ideas it will be immune to the destructive pull of social revolutions.
9
 
Education is the gateway to new ideas, he maintained; it initiates the cycle of continual change. 
Democratic “institutions themselves perform an educative function.”10 Democratic institutions 
function in two ways: first, to allow citizens to exercise the democratic spirit in all venues of 
social life; and second, to help citizens cultivate a “civic morality,”11 Hu explains that democratic 
morality can be learned in practice. “Although political life is not so simple a thing as electricity 
and the telephone, it is in actuality only a kind of organized life,” he writes, and “this kind of 
organized life can be learned.”12 
As Hu’s rhetorical project, the Literary Revolution demonstrates how Hu’s understanding 
of rhetoric aligns with the Sophistic notion. Hu developed the Literary Revolution as the 
rhetorical means of achieving the ideal state. Already, this origin puts Hu’s project on Sophistic 
ground. For the Sophists, as John Poulakos explains, “rhetoric came about as an activity 
grounded in human experience.”13 Sophistic rhetoric is situated on a historic timeline and is 
undertaken by an association of people who desire something. A rhetorical undertaking is 
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triggered by a situation of need; the rhetorical project is a “movement originating in the sphere of 
actuality and striving to attain a place in that of potentiality.”14 In short, “Rhetoric is the art 
which seeks to capture in opportune moments that which is appropriate and attempts to suggest 
that which is possible.”15 To change the actual into the potential, rhetoric accounts for the “how, 
the when, and the what of expression and understands the why of purpose.”16 When: The Literary 
Revolution took the opportunity of the Republican Period, allowed for by the overthrow of 
dynastic rule and abolishment of the civil service examinations. How: Hu’s Literary Revolution 
used a new sort of rhetorical discourse, an aesthetic literature, to articulate imaginative 
possibilities and change Chinese society. What of Expression: The new rhetorical discourse 
would enable the spirit of mind that encourages the methods of logical inquiry to reinvigorate 
development of the Sophistic attitude, and thus, enable a new rational consciousness capable of 
seeing China transition into modern civility. Why of Purpose: To develop the ideal state, based 
on the kind of society that gives perpetual rise to public intellectuals, hence continually 
advancing a culture of logical and aesthetic rhetorical discourse in the more developed and 
sophisticated secondary forms.   
Taken in total, one can see how the other characteristics of the Sophistic attitude—
experimentalism, a wide foundation of contemporary knowledge, historical perspective, and an 
integrated approach to logos and aesthetics—are interwoven with Hu’s rhetorical project. This 
chapter will construct a clearer image of Hu’s understanding of the Sophistic character with 
regard to China’s transition to a modern, moral, and democratic civilization by describing the 
rhetorical function of the new Sophist, a public intellectual who combines logic and aesthetics 
within a rhetorical discourse that is intended to move people to action in particular circumstances, 
all the while aiming at the imagined end in view, the ideal state. This new sophistical discourse 
challenges people to think critically about situations while at the same time embedding 
judgments within a larger aesthetic possibility of a new nationhood. The responsibility for this 
type of discourse falls on a generation of new Sophists, like Hu, who use aesthetic vernacular and 
rational logic to combine classical and modern insights for experimental judgment and advocacy 
on specific contemporary controversies. 
Having studied Western philosophy under John Dewey, Hu Shi drew from his 
understanding of intellectual and cultural development in the West to gain a new perspective on 
the latent, glossed over, or altered parts of China’s own ancient intellectual development. 
Articulating the rhetorical figure of the new Sophist involves describing the type of rhetorical art 
they would use.  
 
Ancient Radicals  
Rhetoric was a radical invention that appeared in ancient Greece with the rise of 
democracy. Rhetoric functions to guide human affairs through the power of the human mind to 
craft logoi and to order appearances through the arts. Before the organizing and reasoning 
functions of rhetoric, tradition and faith in the gods ruled human affairs. The most influential 
theories in classical Western rhetoric share three major characteristics in common, Lloyd Bitzer 
notes, including the community context, often referred to in civic or political terms, normative 
goals, and view of rhetoric as an “art.”17 The “art” of rhetoric refers to a “systematic method, the 
object of which was to guide practice toward the best activity permitted by circumstances, and 
they assigned it tasks of the first order.”18 The power of the art aligns with the power of language 
to move people to act together, in the context of a community. Democracy enables the power of 
language because with democracy comes faith in the arts and faith in the power of human reason 
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and speech. Rhetoric arises in responses to particular needs (“tasks of the first order”) and is 
shaped in response to the situation, or circumstances, that are present at that particular time of 
need.  
The most key ties between ancient and contemporary western rhetoric involved in the 
present study originated with the Sophists. The Sophists are most well-known for instructing 
people in ways of oral defense, persuasion, and style. Yet, the Sophists made a far greater 
contribution to western rhetoric than what they are commonly given credit for. Social knowledge, 
for instance, the foundational democratic principle that all people can attain and employ 
knowledge to make judgments about and take action on their world and society, originated with 
the Sophists. This concept attests to the resonating effects of rhetoric that live on past their 
original conception and become integrated into cultural practice.  
The Sophists account for the democratic portion of what Poulakos calls the Greek 
trilogy.
19
 “Without the Sophists,” he says, “our picture of the rhetoric that came out of the Greek 
experience is incomplete.”20 The Sophists grounded the abstract thought of their predecessors in 
the everyday experiences of the Greek people. They “were the first to infuse rhetoric with life.”21 
Or, as Farrell says, “Formally speaking, rhetoric is the collaborative art of addressing and 
guiding decision and judgment.”22  
Hu Shi approached the Sophists in a way very similar to his teacher, John Dewey, who 
writes:  
The Sophists taught that man could largely control the fortunes of life by mastery of the 
arts… Through instrumental arts, arts of control based on study of nature, objects which 
are fulfilling and good, maybe multiplied and rendered secure. This road after almost two 
millennia of obscuration and desertion was refound and retaken; its rediscovery marks 
what we call the modern era.
23
  
Both Dewey and Hu found in this precursor to the rhetorical philosopher a tie to the practical 
world that they wanted to reclaim and use to enable social progress in their modern world. The 
Sophist had represented a new phase in the spirit of Greek democracy before being eclipsed and 
replaced by reflective discussions about a priori truths. At different times in both China and the 
West, the skills of the Sophists resurfaced to be put to work for ends to which they were not 
intended.
24
 Yet, the Sophistic attitude behind the skills was revived to pursue the constructive 
ends of the humanists and pragmatics. Both of these theoretical turns saw the Sophists as a 
beneficial lens for viewing the problems of their day because the Sophistic spirit carried the idea 
that humans could control their fates through the use of language and arts.  
The pedagogical legacy of the Sophists attests to their real radicalism. The Sophists have 
long been known according to Plato’s accusations of them as profit driven subversives, who 
were as unethical as they were nihilistic and skeptical. However, as Crick explains, the approach 
taken by the Sophists was so novel because they gave people skills they didn’t have before in a 
social context that was shaken up by this exchange.
25
 Far from complete nihilists, the Sophists 
taught people how to create things. By imparting the skills of rhetoric, the Sophists equipped 
people with tools to make sense of their experiences in life. As Farrell writes, “Rhetorical 
questions attempt to provide an appropriate caption for our ongoing experience with 
appearances.”26 Rhetoric arises out of problematic, and often confusing, situations. With rhetoric 
we make sense of events by establishing their order, causes, and meanings. We check our 
understanding against the understanding of others’ in a community. In this practice, we reaffirm 
democratic values by legitimating individual perspectives. Further, those people who share the 
same problem join together to make sense of it. Enabled by the assistance of others, people who 
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could not have remedied the problem on their own find that they have new capabilities as part of 
a group.  Thus, rhetoric provides “for the continual reinvention of human agency,”27 meaning 
one’s ability to act effectively.   
 
Rhetorical Power 
Agency is the power of rhetoric. Rhetoric responds to pressing conditions and relies on 
arguments from citizens to persuade other citizens of the most beneficial course of action for all 
who are concerned. It empowers the audience with the capacity for judgment and ethical 
responsibility. It appeals to the audience with reason as well as with emotion, by calling on the 
empathetic bonds we create in civic life with strangers who have similar life experiences as our 
own. 
The rhetorical arts were understood as so significant to the ancient philosophers precisely 
because they could affect particular social actions and ongoing cultural practices in this way. The 
philosophers understood the social currency of rhetoric, or in other words, the force it had to 
move a community to act, think, and believe.
28
 The notion of force relates to ideas about the 
movement of the natural world as well as the destructive and constructive potential of human 
communities and human desires. Force is also related to ideas about the aim of rhetoric and the 
means employed to achieve that aim. Some force is effective and some is not. Some force is 
wasteful and some is not. Different situations require different kinds of force and different tools 
for applying it. 
The experimental aspect of Sophistic rhetoric is remedy to the human inability to obtain 
permanent knowledge about the world. The Sophists acted in ways “aware of the human 
limitations and the acquisition of knowledge,” Poulakos explains.29 Every notion was born of 
experience and aimed at future experience. We can also say that Sophistic rhetoric is defined by 
the speaker’s sense of urgency. “During times of stress we feel compelled to intervene and, with 
the power of the word, to attempt to end a crisis, redistribute justice, or restore order.”30 
Sophistic rhetoric, then, involves people with one another while helping them confront and 
experimentally overcome the most trying moments of life. Social knowledge arises out of these 
experiences, shared with our neighbors, when we experimentally confront hardships. “Rhetoric 
may thus be seen as the principal art responsible for the shape and coloration of public 
character.”31 The rhetorical enterprise is thus a risky affair that needs good timing, bravery, 
camaraderie, and public memory to get along. It is then no wonder why rhetoric arises as a 
companion to democracy and perpetually strengthens communal bonds.  
 
The Sophists Spread the Power  
The Sophists spread the power of rhetoric among the members of a community. In 
ancient Greece, they were are a class of itinerant teachers who roamed about teaching a new 
class of citizens the arts of politics so that they could appear before others and have a hand in 
guiding affairs. They are also “teachers of culture,”32 as Poulakos writes. Like contemporary 
institutions that “teach culture,” the education system, government, military, and so on, the 
Sophists trained people in the ways of public decorum, public thought, and public action. They 
were the trainers of the people who sought to stake some sort of social claim.  
The Sophistic identity is built up around the idea of potential. As Poulakos explains, 
rhetoric is an “art which seeks to capture in opportune moments that which is appropriate and 
attempts to suggest that which is possible.”33 With the arrival of Sophists, people must have been 
able to feel potential on the air of Athens. Crick notes, “The Sophists marked a distinct change in 
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mood in the ancient world.”34 Individual citizens had ever increasing opportunities “to 
participate in culture and politics.”35 In practice, the Sophists saw the potential of discovering 
new theories and pedagogies, which were in turn put to work to develop new forms of practice.  
The sophists taught rhetorical competencies. It was a cyclical adventure, certainly a 
“novel approach to rhetorical invention.” The Sophistic spirit was one of experimental creation, 
Crick writes, in “which ideas and actions were allowed to interpenetrate and inform one another 
across a situated and temporal horizon.”36 The Sophists would seem radical because they were 
giving people something they didn’t have before; they gave people the ability to affect the 
operations of society by giving them the ability to create new operations for society. The 
Sophistic spirit is therefore the spirit of introduction, whereby people gain new capacities to 
shake up the old guard and feel engaged in the world. A Sophist is one who teaches an art and 
maintains a spirit of creation and endurance in the midst of challenges. Hence, a Sophist is a 
radical because a Sophist is a bearer of change who uses pedagogy to infiltrate the old structure. 
This is what sets Sophism apart from rhetoric. Whereas rhetoric is an art, Sophism is a spirit. It 
accounts for a type of person who experiments, creates, teaches, and brings change.  
 To teach rhetorical arts means to train a particular kind of person with a particular set of 
competencies. The Sophists taught “competencies crafted by the arts of practical reason,” Farrell 
writes.
37
 These competencies are things like “reading situations creatively, setting out positions 
clearly, [and] appraising alternatives with prudence and practical judgment.”38 As anyone who 
has tried to teach these skills, or learn these skills, will know, all of them require a great deal of 
practice. These are competencies of behavior, intellect, and emotion. They “are not simply 
impersonal, neutral capacities. They admit—indeed require—some qualitative differentiation.”39 
On the one hand, the practitioner of rhetoric will naturally be devoted to the cause of their 
practice, because by the very nature of rhetoric, the cause will be something connected to the 
rhetor’s life. Rhetoric, naturally hits close to home. Thus, the practice of rhetoric will necessarily 
merit the interest of the rhetor. However, I might ask my reader to consider if he or she has ever 
side-stepped a competency of behavior, intellect, or emotion in a moment of reactionary impulse, 
intellectual turmoil, or emotional exhaustion? “It is not only that the rhetorician studies what is 
the capacity of human nature—that is, the direction of human agency through discourse—but 
that the systematic study, this technique, is also a potential that must be prodded or coaxed into 
existence in order to be realized.”40 There is technique in the rhetorical art and there is technique 
in the practice of rhetorical arts. Thus, the teachers, practitioners, and “theorists of rhetoric are 
absorbed in an enterprise that is unmistakably of ethical, aesthetic, and normative 
significance.”41 Social judgments of all kinds are inlaid in the techniques of rhetoric.  
The Sophists can be said to “spread the power” because it is their experimental and 
practical orientation that keeps the rhetorical enterprise, and judgments therein, in the hands of 
all the people. The Sophists who understand the power of rhetoric and seek to pass it along aim 
at “richer human experience. Enlightened civic participation. The explicit goals may differ, but 
usually they have something to do with the advancement of civic discourse.”42 So how does the 
Sophistic attitude take shape in the context of the China’s twentieth century Renaissance? The 
remainder of this section illustrates the new Sophist, or in other words, the teacher and public 
intellectual that Hu Shi tried to develop.  
 
A New Type of Teacher: The Relevance is in the Metaphor  
Hu asserted that to change the trajectory of China’s intellectual development, the 
intellectual leaders of New China must lead the nation through a conscious reform, directed by 
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“creative intelligence.”43   Creative intelligence, he defined as the ability to use critical thought to 
break away from “enslavement to cause and effect.”44 Hu maintained that man is capable of 
consciously altering the sequence of cause and effect. By investigating history we can find 
particular “causes of historical fact.”45 If then, we implement new causes; we can create new 
historical facts.
46
 Principally, this is the culmination of Hu’s ideas on causality, genealogy and 
gradualism. Its basic premise is that laws of causality enable man “to explain the past and predict 
the future,” but they also, like chapter two attested, embolden man “to use his intelligence to 
create new causes and attain new results.”47  
If man is to put the laws of causality to work in his conscious favor, he must be 
knowledgeable about his intellectual heritage, the qualities of social life he wants to achieve, and 
what ideas and beliefs are likely contributors to the favored qualities. As mentioned earlier, Hu 
said the Chinese needed to access “with critical candor the nature of their inheritance.”48 Only 
this would allow for their rescue “from the relentless mechanism of the universe.”49 
Confucianism had proven especially “relentless” in its self-perpetuation. Like the Sung and Ming 
periods show, whatever thought systems were not ground out by Confucianism at their origin, 
were subsumed or substantially subjugated by it later on.  
Hu needed to establish a “new cause” for a critical, logical spirit. He explains a cause like 
a social prerequisite. To have knowledge of cause is to have knowledge of something 
manageable to work with, a tangible canvas for sketching out a new trajectory of cultural 
development. Hu had to look for a more appropriate cause further back in China’s intellectual 
development, before Confucianism’s overwhelming influence. Taking the American democratic 
spirit as guide to the social qualities he sought, he then took the characteristics of a Greek 
Sophist as the cause he was searching for. Hu understood the slow nature of his undertaking, and 
he believed that its gradual nature would be part and parcel to its lasting effect. As he writes, “I 
have come to hold that there is no short-cut to political decency and efficiency… Good 
government cannot be secured without certain necessary prerequisites.”50         
  The characteristics Hu found would be the makings of a “new individual” who is 
“critical, tolerant, creative, intellectually his own master, seeking to mold his natural and cultural 
surroundings to suit his own benign purposes, and thus moving ever toward richer and more 
satisfying life experiences.”51 He wanted the democratic and scientific spirit to cultivate a sense 
of agency and accountability in Chinese thought; he hoped the Chinese people would “become 
the masters of their history, not, as in the disastrous century just behind them, its slaves.”52  
 The Greek Sophistic model aided Hu’s endeavor to create new causes in two primary 
ways: first, it was a model that could prompt questions about the idea of pious models; second, it 
functioned as a tangible starting point, a precursor of critical logic. It was something upon which 
the Chinese could build the “qualities of intellectual independence that must be the mark of the 
individual’s emancipation.”53 Grieder explains the individual character Hu sought, he writes: 
He envisioned an individual strong enough in intellect and character to be able 
continuously to subject all standards of conduct and value, not excluding his own, to 
critical re-examination, and to deny any claim upon him to which he was unwilling to 
give intellectual assent. Hu was convinced that for China, as for the rest of the world, 
only the acceptance of this kind of ‘critical attitude’ could prepare men to move into a 
more promising future. ‘In examining the demands of this age of ours,’ Hu wrote in 1922, 
‘we must recognize that the greatest responsibility of mankind today, and its greatest 
need, is to apply the scientific method to the problems of human life.’54   
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In ancient Greek and Chinese intellectual history alike, the critical attitude—that responsibility 
and need of mankind described above—showed its first signs of life in the Sophistic precursor. 
At origin, the characteristics of Greek Sophistical style included: teaching, intelligence, 
reflection, action, testing, focus on history, imagination, and dialogue. 
The Sophistic character is important to this project because Hu borrowed the metaphor of 
the Western Sophist as precursor to the western democratic civilization in order to show that 
there are characteristics in China’s past that are of great significance to China’s modern future 
that have similar grounding in China’s history as they do in western history. While 
simultaneously, there are characteristics that developed from those grounds in the west and were 
unable to develop in China that are now required in this modern age. Although these 
characteristics might appear foreign, they are analogous to the sophistical age, and thus, can find 
accommodation in China’s intellectual legacy.  
The Sophistic attitude plays a radical role in society by prompting questions about the 
idea of pious models through a pedagogical philosophy that aims at giving people something 
they didn’t have before.55 In ancient Greece the Sophists gave the people perspective and social 
access. The new Sophists of the liberal Chinese reformers were no less radical. They were giving 
people the power of language, the quintessential part of the potion in the hierarchy of traditional 
China. With language, the common people could close the gap between the two strata of 
traditional society. A common and elevated vernacular language gave the Chinese people a path 
directly into the mechanisms of society. With the civil service examinations abolished and the 
Qing dynasty dismantled, a mass of people connected and empowered by a common tongue 
could affect real and radical change.     
Further, like the ancient Greek Sophists, the new Sophist of modern China would teach 
people the rhetorical arts. As Farrell notes, “rhetoric is a way of looking at things.”56 To teach 
people the rhetorical arts means to teach a particular way of looking at things. As discussed 
earlier, rhetoric is an art that deals with issues of public need and the uncertainties that people 
encounter when they are stuck in the midst of change. “Rhetoric is the only art which evokes the 
capacity for practical reason from situated audience.”57 So, in essence, we are thinking about a 
kind of thinking public made up of individuals with personal perspectives who are also 
connected to one another in situation and concern. Rhetoric helps this public join together, 
exercise their individual strengths, synthesize their judgment, and act. “Rhetoric is an acquired 
competency… that… helps us to invent public thought.”58 Hu saw developing the Sophistic 
rhetorical attitude as synonymous with developing in people the capacity to conceive of the 
world, and their individual place within the world, in a wholly new way.   
The remainder of this chapter constructs the new Sophistic attitude that Hu wanted for 
modern China for the eventual aim of a moral democratic state. I will show how Hu sought to 
strengthen and advance China’s own Sophistic foundations by merging them with western 
pragmatic rhetoric and experimentalism. Also, this section gives examples of how vernacular 
was intended to function to get people to tell stories about themselves, and in turn, see 
themselves in a new light. Here I look at the characteristics of China’s new Sophist: an 
understanding of opportunity (kairos), courage, wisdom, a critical approach, creativity, tolerance, 
self-sufficiency, and eloquence.  
 
Opportunity 
Undoubtedly, one of the most significant turning points in modern Chinese history is the 
abolishment of the civil service examinations in 1905. Wang Ke-wen writes that the 
 100 
 
examinations came under severe criticism after the mid-nineteenth century, when “reform-
minded Chinese… attacked the system for its exclusion of Western learning, which China’s self-
strengthening required.”59 Empress Dowager Cixi of the Qing dynasty abolished the examination 
system as a result of domestic and international pressure. The effects of this action were 
monumental. “The action liberated the minds of educated Chinese which, in a sense, had been 
imprisoned by this institution for nearly one thousand years. Yet, it also produced far-reaching 
repercussions in the society in the decades that followed.”60  
Doubt and discontent about China’s place in the world and traditional placement of 
individuals in Chinese society brought about a moment that shook the bedrock of Confucian 
tradition. The mechanism that had produced and protected the gentry class had been removed 
and the government had not replaced it with any clear alternative system of modern education.
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As Wang notes, “no clear pattern of advancement, therefore, was available to those who were 
ambitious or interested in pursuing a government career.”62 At this point, the young Chinese 
people of the educated-ruling class had no clear path to obtaining government positions and they 
knew of no other of making a comparable living. Further, the lack of options brought the foreign 
rule of the Qing dynasty into sharp relief. The realization could not be avoided that even the most 
well-to-do members of Chinese society could not assuredly claim that their future was their own. 
With no other options, many students left to study abroad.  
The anxiety about their own futures, combined with the shocking foreign experiences, 
created a profound sense of crisis that in the end marginalized and radicalized a 
generation of Chinese youth. The abolition of the examination system paved the way for 
the Qing dynasty’s own downfall.63   
Chinese society had reached an unmistakable moment of potential.  
Certainly the young intellectuals of China in the early twentieth century had little certain 
means of changing their situation, nor could they have clearly known what they should aim at. 
Yet, for the Sophists, Poulakos explains, such a situation was simply known as “kairos (the 
opportune moment).”64 Kairos, as it applies to the new Sophists of Hu’s vision, is related to the 
larger trajectory of China’s historical timeline.65  Crick describes this “notion of kairos” as a 
historical moment, “that includes one’s entire sociohistorical situation.”66 If we view the 
“opportunity” within the larger framework of social history, the practical meaning of the moment 
is more obvious. As Crick explains, the question of kairos “is whether intellectuals such as 
philosophers, scientists, or artists merely reflect qualities of their situations or whether they act 
as agents of change.”67 Certainly a moment would not be considered opportune if not for some 
potentiality. Further, this potential must be in the direction of some previously considered end. 
With no end in view, there would be no way to distinguish one moment’s potentiality from the 
next. The young intellectuals of the early 1900s had a revolutionary end in view. Kairos 
followed on the heels of the abolition of the civil service examinations. The revolutionaries 
sought destruction of the imperial dynasty and, in 1911, they achieved it. 
Like the ancient Greek Sophists, Hu and his cohorts arrived on the scene after the 
revolution; they were not revolutionaries. As opposed to other radicals of the same time who 
were still inspired by revolutionary fervor, Hu did not want his efforts to be reactive or 
destructive. Hu had returned to China in 1917, five years after the Republican government had 
been established and even though the Republican state had thus far proven ineffective, Hu 
maintained that to revolt against it would be a further waste of energy.   
As a historically situated opportunity, kairos, means the ability to affect change. Hu 
understood this when he said that the Republican government has failed. The failure of the 
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Republic has been the result of superficial changes, he writes, which “have hardly touched the 
fundamental issues of political transformation.” A successful Republic needs “modern 
leadership,” a “genuine admission of our real weaknesses,” and “recognition of [the] spiritual 
possibilities of the new civilization.”68 He maintained that none of this has been accomplished 
because the energy of the Renaissance has thus far only been put to destructive ends. There must 
be a constructive use of force if reformers are to take advantage of this opportunity in social-
historical time.   
Hu was looking for the attitude that could unite the reflective and practical arts “without 
collapsing them”69 This attitude was found with the Sophists, for whom Crick explains, “kairos 
extends through time and space, expanding our notion of ‘situations’ beyond our immediate 
experience.”70 Unlike their common description as subversive radicals, the Sophists were not 
revolutionaries either. They too understood the constructive properties of force. The Sophists 
shared in the critical, doubting attitude of the revolutionaries; however, they did not want to 
bring the system down. Rather, the Sophists wanted to engage doubt and criticism, along with a 
wide foundation of contemporary knowledge and historical perspective to develop novel and 
more effective ways of confronting and handling the problems of society from within site. In 
essence, they aimed at strengthening and stabilizing society; method of doubt and criticism 
exposed social weaknesses so they can be gotten rid of. It is only by regularly questioning the 
social that the social system can be known to be strong. 
For Hu, the concept of effectively applied force was at the crux of multiple topics, such 
as Sophistic doubt, nonresistance, and Tao. Even the function of social institutions like law and 
government, for Hu, represented the effective application of force to enable fulfillment of those 
opportune moments as they appear along the social-historical timeline. Perhaps Hu’s ideas on 
force are best approached via his understanding of Tao. Lao Zi, Hu explains, conceived “of a 
well-ordered universe wherein the Way of Heaven (which also means the law of nature) rules 
apparently indifferently and nonchalantly, but always effectively and absolutely.”71 “Nature” and 
“heaven” are interchangeable expressions in ancient Chinese philosophy; these terms are also 
exchanged with terms like “universe” and “cosmos.” Generally, these terms blend the ideas of a 
natural world and other-worldly fate. Rather than focus on the maker, as in a God or some power 
in the universe, they focus on the made, as in the subjects or creatures on Earth. Moreover, these 
terms relate to the forces that Earthly creatures will most definitely encounter. There is nothing 
human about the forces as Lao Zi describes them. Fate, nature, heaven, or whatever one might 
call it, does not think about things as a human would; there is no emotion and there is no 
indecision. The rules of Nature are absolute, and when left unobstructed, the Way of Nature is 
seamless and seemingly still; it is “an order which seems to do nothing yet achieves 
everything.”72  
The Way of Nature is the single most effective use of force. To watch it would be like 
looking at a gigantic fast moving river in which the water appears totally still. The riverbed is as 
smooth as polished marble and there is no rough sediment, no boulders, nor any bushes intruding 
from the banks. There is nothing at all standing in the way of the quickly flowing water, and 
hence, it does not appear to be moving quickly at all.  With no rocks to push against there is no 
foam or contrast. It is calm but it is quick, just like the Way of Nature is said to be nothing but 
everything at once.  
 The same principal applies to the creatures on the Earth; one can either disrupt the river 
like a boulder in its course or one can stay up on the bank. On the one hand this can seem to be a 
fully passive philosophy, and it has often been interpreted this way. On the other hand, it is a 
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philosophy of strength. Hu points out that this philosophy is also present in Western thought, and 
here too it is known as a philosophy that is both passive and strong.   
It is, therefore, a mistake to think that the great teachers of nonresistance have intended 
that we should condemn all use of force. Under certain circumstances, passive resistance 
may prove more effective force than physical violence. But under other circumstances 
even the great teacher of nonresistance did not hesitate to use force drive the vendors and 
money-changers out of the Temple of God.
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If the Way of Nature is this unceasing and unalterable force, than the way of living efficiently in 
the midst of it is Tao.   
All human progress in law and government, internally and internationally, is in a sense an 
imitation, however imperfect, of that supreme moral order implied in the doctrine of 
nonresistance, by creating on earth some higher power to which all interested parties in a 
dispute may resign their private and ‘natural’ rights of redressing injury and 
administering rough justice by themselves.
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As Hu explains, part of his philosophical endeavor is to “clear the way for a more positive 
conception of the nature of force and its place and function in human society.”75 This 
philosophical interest has a rich legacy in Chinese intellectualism, as we have seen. It is also an 
inheritance from his mentor, John Dewey, who in 1916 posed what Hu called “the acute question 
of social philosophy in a world like that of today.”76 Dewey asked “What is force and what are 
we going to do with it?”77 Dewey’s answer, Hu explained, is that “force figures in different 
roles.” It can play the role of “energy,” “coercion and constraint,” and “violence.”78  “Energy is 
power used with a eulogistic meaning; it is power of doing work, harnessed to accomplishment 
of ends.’”79 In short, the ability to direct energy, to make it constructive at times and destructive 
at others, is the only way to capture the opportune moment.  
 
Courage 
A person needs courage to seize an opportune moment and make appropriate decisions 
for particular situations. It is precisely what sets rhetoric apart from episteme that makes courage 
such a vital part of rhetoric. “In distinction to episteme,” Poulakos explains, “rhetoric does not 
strive for cognitive certitude, the affirmation of logic, or the articulation of universals.”80 
Rhetoric arises from contingency; it is the constructive response to a problem surrounded by 
uncertainty.  
Rhetoric can draw on similarities of previous circumstances preserved in social 
knowledge, but since the problem is unique to its own situation, time, and participants, crucial 
aspects of it will require the wise judgment of those who are involved with no idea of outcome 
more guaranteed than as a likely probability. Take for instance the situation mentioned in the 
previous chapter, when Hu was studying in America and Japan released the infamous list of the 
Twenty-One Demands. Hu’s fellow students were outraged by the demands and thought the 
Nationalist government should take a stand and assert itself, even declare war if necessary. Some 
students wanted to return to China to take up the cause. Hu urged for calmness. He said the 
students will better serve their country by completing their education and that continued 
destruction will do nothing good for the nation in its present state. His request was published as 
an open letter to Chinese students called, “A Plea for Patriotic Sanity.”81 His fellow students 
responded to him in anger and called him a traitor. Hu could not have been certain what the 
result would have been if his pleas were followed. He could also not be certain about how his 
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insistence on temperance might alter the situation itself. Nonetheless, feeling that the time called 
for him to voice his concern, he courageously did so.  
The most compelling example of the way Hu embodied the courage of the new Sophistic 
attitude was after the death of his mother. A coincidental turn of events placed his mother’s death 
just days before Hu was scheduled to speak on the reform of traditional Chinese mourning rites. 
The following excerpt is from an article translated by E.T.C. Werner’s Autumn Leaves that Hu 
wrote after tending to his mother’s funeral arrangements and reflecting on the experience.  
The date for the address was fixed for the 27
th
 day of the 11
th
 month. Unexpectedly, on 
the 24
th
 day of that month I received a telegram from my home informing me of the death 
of my mother. Thus, before I had even begun my address it had become a question of 
myself actually taking a practical part in the ‘reform of mourning rites!’ On the 25th I 
made haste to return to the South; and when I was about to set out on my journey; two 
scholars came to see me, and said: ‘We have come to-day, first, to bid you godspeed on 
your journey; secondly, you, sir, have in times past referred to the subject of introducing 
reform into the mourning ceremonial. Now that, unfortunately, this great grief has 
befallen you, we very much hope that you will change the old forms of ceremonial.’ I 
thanked them for their kind thought, and then, entering my carriage, took my departure.
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E.T.C. Werner, British diplomat who studied Chinese culture and witnessed China’s transition 
from the Qing dynasty to the Republican Period, translated this article noting the significance of 
Hu’s courage in both thought and action. “Mr. Hu has had the courage not only to publish but 
also to act up to his unorthodox beliefs.”83 Werner maintains, that Hu’s “courage and example 
cannot but do good in helping to free China from the trammels of superstition.”84  
 The primary conclusion Hu reached after dealing with his mother’s funeral, and the only 
direct advice he offered to readers, is to approach every action and decision by asking “why?” “If 
we can in every act find the ‘Why?’ we naturally shall be unwilling to follow the various mean 
customs for which we cannot assign a reason. If in everything we neglect to ask the reason for 
our conduct, then our conduct is based on meaningless custom. That is the conduct of the lower 
animals. It is shameless conduct.”85 One should not mistake Hu’s for looking down on others for 
such conduct. Rather, he writes that this was a lesson that he is ashamed to have learned the hard 
way. After he heard of his mother’s death, he set about preparing to travel home. He moved 
through the initial preparatory tasks, like preparing his chief mourning clothes, without giving 
too much thought to what he was doing. It was only after he began the trip, when he had a 
moment to sit still and think about it, that he realized the habitual path he had set out upon. 
“Careful thinking convinced me that I had not yet rid myself of the influence of the 
supernaturalism of the archaic customs; I was still afraid of what people would say!”86 Then later 
he writes, “Truly the influence of habit is terrible!”87  
As Hu handled the funeral affairs, he broke from many of the traditional mourning rites, 
such as the customary way of composing the death announcement, the gift’s he said the family 
was willing to receive, how weeping was handled, how the biography of the deceased was 
written, the conduct of the sacrificial ceremonials, the inclusion of ceremonial masters from 
outside the family, and allowing sacrificial feasts to be given by relatives.
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 He explains that 
many of these practices have become absurd and unnecessary. A couple of the most telling 
examples he gives are of the gifts customarily given to the family and the customary practice of 
wailing. With regard to the first example, the gifts, Hu explains the custom and why he limited 
the items and amounts people could give to his family.   
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Our custom at Hui Chou is, when a death occurs in a family, the related clan and one’s 
own family must all present tin-foil, white paper, and incense; and especially fastidious 
people send as well ‘winding satin,’ paper clothes and hats, paper furniture, and other 
things. The tin-foil and white paper sent by all the various families is often in 
superabundance; so much, in fact, that it cannot all be burned. Accordingly, when the 
funeral is over, the mourning family often strike a bargain with the storekeeper to sell it 
back to him at a discount! Extravagant expenditure of this sort is certainly 
unreasonable.
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To get an even better idea of the amount of items these things would amount to, Hu explains that 
spectators of town, who realized the expanse of Hu’s family relations, actually opened shop to 
cater to everyone who would need paper funeral articles specifically for this funeral. “I having 
unexpectedly excluded all these things,” Hu notes, “the new paper shop had no alternative but to 
close its doors.”90 
 Another aspect of the funeral activities that has grown especially absurd, Hu writes, is the 
practice of wailing. The customary importance of weeping is highlighted in everything from the 
death announcement, to the time of condolences, to the funeral procession. Death 
announcements traditionally follow own of a few conventional formats, such as the phrase “The 
mourning orphans So-and-So and other with tears of blood and clothed in mourning garments 
prostrate themselves, knocking their heads on the ground.”91 Similarly, in funeral processions, 
the chief mourner, in this case, Hu as the eldest son should be so bereaved as to be utterly 
exhausted and unable to walk without the support of walking stick. However, it is during the 
time of condolences that Hu explains people go to the most absurd lengths.  
The ordinary custom at the time of condolence is:—Drums are beaten outside the house, 
inside the ‘spirit-curtain’ is hung up. The master of the house and the men and women of 
the establishment wail. The condoling guests having left, the wailing ceases. What absurd 
behaviour! Men of olden times ‘wailed until they wept’; but this weeping was surely not 
done for the condoling guests! In order to use the weeping as a pretense of ‘filiality’ 
people of wealth in whose establishments the condoling guests are numerous invariably 
spend money on hiring people to come and weep for them.
92
  
Some of the old customs were, at their time of origin, attached to very practical reasons, Hu 
explains. For example, the customs that involve external literati, such as the ceremonials and 
signing of the death register, were probably begun because families without education needed the 
assistance of someone who could read and write.
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Habit should aid life by lessoning the amount of energy one needs to exert. However, the 
customs are so far removed from any of the current behaviors, needs, and in most cases, beliefs 
of the people, that the habits of mourning rites cause unnecessary trouble and exhaustion.  
All these and others of like kind are evidence that the present mourning regulations are 
fixed anyhow and are entirely dependent upon social custom. There is no principle to be 
expounded; there is no beacon to be kept in view. All is upside down and confused. Not a 
single thing is right. The pecuniary waste need not be mentioned; but besides this the 
vexations are very difficult to bear. I had thought of selecting a set of mourning rules 
which would meet people’s desires, be reasonable, and serve as a standard, but I could 
not find any.
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However, the reasonability of one’s actions is sometimes a weak comfort in the face of the 
distress that can be incurred by breaking with tradition. Hu knew the likely negative effects of 
breaking with tradition, particularly in relation to customary mourning rites, which involve the 
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entire clan system and are sure to attract a lot of attention made even more unbearable by the fact 
that the loss of a loved one already makes for such a difficult time.
95
 Hu was particularly worried 
about this when writing his mother's biography; telling the truth about his mother would involve 
memories of people who are still living that might not present them in the best light. Yet, Hu 
decided that it is a worse irreverence to misrepresent the memory of his mother for the benefit of 
the living.
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Even though Hu was not shy about breaking from custom, there were a couple customs 
that he judged better to follow in his particular circumstance, rather than attract so much 
attention to himself and his intentions as to possibly negate the meaning of the entire endeavor. 
For example even though Hu was fully qualified to make the inscription on the death register, he 
asked his friend to do it. Likewise, rather than forego the traditional mourning clothes of the 
funeral march altogether, which would have made him stand out in sharp contrast to the other 
mourners, Hu decided to wear an abridged version of the traditional outfit. In these choices we 
can see how Hu tried to inhabit courage as well as a respect for kairos. Hu’s article reflected on 
his personal experience confronting traditional mourning rites.  
My object was only to set forth my experiences and feelings arising from an examination 
of one of the most dreadfully distressing events of my whole life; to indicate the parts 
most needing reform in the present mourning ceremonial, and the trend they will most 
probably assume in the future.
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He was not trying to command people to follow his lead, but rather, he offered the article to 
people to share the perspective he gained from this experience.  
 
A Critical Approach  
The ancient Greek Sophists juxtaposed abstract otherworldly ideas and denied the 
existence of a singular truth, to place value instead, on the individual subjective experience. “The 
core spirit of the sophistical attitude,” Crick writes, “is marked by respect for the diversity and 
reality of human experience.”98 In ancient Greek intellectualism, the Sophists are the contrast to 
the Platonic conception of Truths just as the new Chinese Sophists are the contrast to what Hu 
Shi describes as the problem of “isms,” which is essentially an ideology that has become forceful 
in society. In the 1940s Hu grew increasingly concerned about the forceful thrust of “isms.” He 
said the world is in the midst of a very “real conflict among the several contradicting and 
opposing systems of ideas about life, society, economic organization, and political 
institutions.”99 Toward the end of Hu’s life, in the oral history recorded at Columbia University, 
he tried to clarify once again.  
I said the greatest dangers of these isms is to make people, particularly young people, feel 
easily satisfied that they have found the final solution for the fundamental resolution of 
all problems, ken-pen chiai-chueh (‘a fundamental or radical solution of all problems’).100 
Always, Hu had to try to make people see the value of the tempered, or gradual, course. Hu 
worried about “cure all” ideas in any form. Confucianism had engendered a culture of deductive 
habits of mind that the Chinese people were, in many ways, still struggling beneath. He did not 
want to free Chinese thought from the domination of one “ism” just to get trapped beneath 
another.   
 The threat of totalitarian ideologies also greatly troubled Hu. “Wherever there was 
confusion, disorder, and discontent, there was fertile soil for the rise and growth of 
dictatorship.”101 He calls the spread of totalitarianism a forceful despotism, but even worse, it is 
spread by propaganda, which gives it a sense of “vigor, freshness, and glamour.”102 In his 
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dissertation, “The Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China,” Hu wrote about a very 
similar concern he had much earlier regarding the philosophy of Mo Zi, doubter of all doubters, 
who worked to re-solidify the complete social authority of Confucianism. Mo Zi’s philosophy 
was compelling in a similar sort of way because he applied the reformers’ theories of logic to 
support the old hierarchy. Mo Zi had a “politico-religious doctrine” of “Agreeing Upward,” 
which aimed at universal laws to guide all action in times of inconsistency or uncertainty. Hu 
explains, “In politics, he desired to see a unitary sovereignty and a universal system of laws; in 
religion, he taught the Will of Heaven as the most universal standard of right and wrong.”103 He 
worried about the totalitarian potential of this kind of political philosophy. His concern was 
supported by the influence the Nazi Party claimed of Platonic ideals. As Guthrie notes, the aim 
of the Nazi party was “described in its official programme, was the production of ‘guardians in 
the highest Platonic sense.’”104 There is great danger in this kind of political thinking, Hu 
maintains. The appeal to isms is nothing more than “shameless politicians utilizing these labels 
and doctrines to mislead the public for their own selfish ends.”105 In short, the use of “isms” in 
politics is nothing more than “intellectual laziness.”106 
 “Isms” have a place in social thought; “I do not advocate or advise people to abandon the 
study of theories or isms,” Hu says.107 “All theories and doctrines are part of our tools for the 
study of concrete problems. They help us to get suggestions and formulate hypotheses; they help 
us in thinking out possible consequences of the particular suggestion or hypothesis.”108 
However, he maintains that the mere empty talk of “isms” is not helpful to the problems China is 
facing.  
All doctrines were originated as concrete suggestions for the solution of concrete 
problems facing the originators of such doctrines. If we do not begin by observing and 
studying our own social, political, and cultural needs, I said, I'm years lavish importation 
of abstract doctrines, without regard to their origin in concrete problems of a particular 
agent locality would be useless.
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It is also not helpful to overemphasize imported “isms” for which China has not yet developed 
the intellectual and cultural foundations. Most of all, focusing on the doctrine before the 
particular problem is putting the cart before the horse.  
 
Creativity  
Rhetorical power is embedded in the imagination of its aim. As Farrell writes, “The very 
aim of rhetorical theory has always been to define and articulate a vision of what the highest 
potential of rhetorical practice might be.”110 Creativity, as it describes the new Chinese Sophist, 
means an innovative and experimental spirit that mixes the old and new and binds art with reason 
and practice to develop, try, and test new ideas. Grieder hits directly on this characteristic as it 
was embodied by “Hu’s vision, [which]… gave expression to an ideal that had no precedent in 
the traditions of Chinese social thought.”111  
The courage required of the Sophist to face troubling situations under the ever-present 
risk of timing and uncertainty about the adequacy of available knowledge, is tempered by the 
experimentalist approach. The experimentalist approach brings some standard of reliability into 
the contingent situation by way of objectivity and methodology. As Farrell writes, “apart from 
rhetoric, there is literally no systematic way of exploring particular, probable issues of choice 
and avoidance.”112 With the experimental attitude, the Sophist blends the productive and 
reflective arts without collapsing them into one another.   
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Often, Hu argued for the benefits of historical perspective to objective thought. Hu saw 
value in studying old works in new and modern ways because of the cultural perspective that 
could be gained by understanding which forms of thought and action prevailed at different points 
on the historical timeline. The appreciation for this perspective is a primary characteristic of the 
Sophistic attitude, Crick writes, because the Sophist understands that “valuable perspectives are 
preserved in words.”113  
The character of the Sophist is best represented by experimentalism. Following from the 
Chinese intellectual legacy of the old Sinitic religion and Taoism, and even the common person's 
experience of neo-Confucianism, one can see how the idea of the Sophist, as a public intellectual 
who takes an integrated approach of practice and reflection to problems of daily experience, is 
well-suited for a China that is to possess the best characteristics of modern civilization and the 
best characteristics of the ancient Chinese civilization. Crick explains that “in Homeric times, to 
possess knowledge of any kind was to possess a practical acquaintance with how things come to 
be and pass away.”114 “In short, to possess knowledge was to know how to bring a preferred 
reality into being over time through active engagement with the things and people of the shared 
environment.”115 As we have discussed previously, this idea of knowledge is both at home and 
foreign to Chinese intellectualism. On the one hand, it is consistent with how the old Sinitic 
religion and Taoism understood people's position as an integrated part of the world in which 
insight into the movements of the world or in other words, “a practical acquaintance” with it so 
as to live in harmonious accord with it, or in other words, to achieve “a preferred reality” in “a 
shared environment.” On the other hand, this approach to knowledge is foreign to Chinese 
intellectualism because it calls for a more methodological understanding, rather than mere 
insight, that can translate into active and directing engagement with the surroundings, rather than 
purposive passiveness of the Taoist version of Tao. Rather than the purposive passive Tao, Hu 
sought a pragmatic version of Tao, a practical and theoretical Way of getting along in the modern 
civilization. 
With regard to the characteristic of experimentalism, the Sophist serves the creative role 
of an artist to reshape basic cultural attitudes. This is the aspect of reform rhetoric that integrates 
and diffuses a new epistemological rationale.
116
 This process of integration and diffusion is just 
like what Andrew Jones explains happened with the spread of ideas on evolutionary biology. 
They were absorbed into Chinese culture and spread among the people via the vernacular 
language. Jones traces the beginning of the spread of evolutionary ideas through Chinese 
vernacular to the naval officer from Fujian, Yan Fu (1854-1921), who was sent by the Qing 
dynasty “to the Naval Academy in Greenwich to learn from the British the secret of their 
superiority.”117 The Qing government was motivated by forced exposure to the imperialist 
threats of the west, which led them to view the capitalist modern world as a Hobbesian reality.
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“It is of course no accident that Chinese intellectuals first began to view their own situation in 
Darwinian terms just as the age of imperialism reached its apogee.”119 Yan Fu “became one of 
the first and most important conduits for the entry of Darwinism into the Chinese discursive 
realm.”120 
Yan Fu used “idiomatic literary Chinese” to transpose the vocabulary and assumptions of 
Victorian science, Jones explains. In Yan Fu’s rendition of On Evolution (Tianyan lun), he  
reframes national history in terms of natural history, passing China as an actor in the 
unfolding of a vast and tumultuous world-historical drama, one in which species, races, 
and nations alike were caught up in a relentless struggle for survival. He also shared with 
Spencer a sense that ‘progress consists in a change from the homogeneous to the 
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heterogeneous… [and from] the simple into the complex.’ Yan Fu offered Chinese 
readers and writers not only new terminology, but a new narrative mode, a way of telling 
stories about the growth and progress of nations and national subject in their relation to 
other nations and the natural world.
121
  
After their initial entry into China’s intellectual circles, evolutionary ideas first circled only 
among the elite educated class, but by the early 1930s there was a “nearly universal purchase of 
evolutionary ideas,”122 which resulted from their spread through vernacular popular media, such 
as the “print culture to cartoons and cinema, as well as of their penetration into a variety of 
practices and social spheres.”123 The adoption of evolutionary ideas into the vernacular language, 
subsequent development of a new national narrative based on these ideas, and the spread of this 
narrative through popular culture is a prime example of how the Sophist’s idea of social 
knowledge is constructed and altered when people share in the institution of a national 
vernacular language.   
Hu understood the creative arts as playing an extremely significant role in re-orienting 
Chinese intellectualism precisely because new thought was up against a tradition of all-
encompassing intellectual rearing. In the tradition of Confucianism, Chinese rulers did not argue 
or plead with the masses. Rather, as Garrett explains, they desired “a deep imprinting of 
particular attitudes, loyalties, and predilections in the entire population so that pleading or 
coercion on specific occasions would not be necessary, only the issuance of directives and 
occasional exhortations.”124 Even “cognitive activities were… assumed to involve physical 
movement of the heart.”125 The movements of the heart are understood much like Aristotle's idea 
of attitudes. As it was understood in ancient China, the charge of the heart was “to make sensory 
perceptions intelligible and to think, but it also remembers, is anxious, wills, intends, and 
dreams.”126 
The Sophistic Tao is wrapped up with experimentalism and the arts.
127
 It is not just about 
experimentalism, but experimentalism in the venue of the arts, where knowledge and novelty 
have a cultural home. This home essentially de-revolutionizes experimentalism in the sense that 
it counters its destructive qualities and gives consistency to novelty. The product of art passes on 
a message in the form of logos. Logos is thus the means of social change. It gives a rational to 
the novel ideas that arise based on social knowledge, the situation, and the audience.
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In ancient Greek intellectualism, the Sophists filled the same need as they were intended 
to in ancient Chinese intellectualism. The primary difference is that in Chinese the need persisted, 
unfulfilled, to haunt Hu’s undertaking in the modern day. Crick writes that before the Sophist, 
there had been two prevalent attitudes about knowledge in ancient Greece. One held art, or 
technȇ, as completely entwined with the practical sciences, where it functioned as if in the 
chokehold of practical applicability narrowly defined, the same as that which Hu lamented of 
China's Mohist thinkers. The other, “emancipated epistȇmȇ from these narrowly practical ends in 
an effort to give the speculative imagination freedom to roam.”129 This latter attitude was even 
better known in ancient Chinese thought; it originated with Taoist nihilism and continued to 
perpetuate an assumption—primarily that humans are either unable to know things about their 
world or that more damage than good will be wrought by any attempt to know—over the course 
of intellectual development.  
The similarity between the functions Crick understood the Sophistic attitude to play in 
ancient Greece and the functions Hu understood the Sophistic attitude to play in modern China, 
can be seen in the similarities between their analyses of Gorgias’ Ecomium of Helen and Li Ju-
Chen’s Flowers in a Mirror respectively. Ecomium of Helen is an example of how a work of art 
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can demonstrate creativity and novelty by presenting the audience with “methods of reasoning 
and style” to demonstrate the way logos can lead people through a contingent situation.130 Like 
Hu’s advocacy of fair consideration for all ideas, the Sophistic attitude looks for possibility and 
novelty. “The Sophistical Attitude,” Crick writes, “approaches the arts and sciences as resources 
for rhetorical invention to master contingencies and reduce uncertainty in the midst of conclaves 
and turmoil.”131 Gorgias uses his performance of Helen to demonstrate mastery of public 
knowledge (i.e. areas of public consensus on related topics) “invent[ing] radical new arguments 
out of what had become commonplace materials.”132   
The Sophistic understanding behind a work like Helen is that an artistic product, like a 
short story, poem, or speech, houses multiple things, such as a manner of thought, a summary of 
knowledge, and the artist’s reflections on the experiences he/she shares with others in the 
community. In the event that the art product reaches its full potential, it will also house a novel 
take on thought or action that will either help the community makes sense of some particular 
predicament or will help the community move beyond it. In Dewey’s terminology, same as Hu’s, 
Crick summarizes the democratic potential of the sophistical attitude understood as such. “The 
Sophists discovered a method of bridging the instrumental (or ‘logical’) and consummatory (or 
‘aesthetic’) qualities of language within a single discursive form capable of generating common 
action in response to a shared exigence.”133 Thus, a work of art is an exercise in democracy and 
every experience with a product of art is an interaction with Democratic thought and a step 
toward development of the Democratic ethos.  
 Hu likens Li’s novel to Swift’s “Gulliver's Travels,” and he explains it as serving a very 
similar rhetorical function to what Crick describes of Helen.
134
 Not only did Li Ju-Chen devise a 
phonetic system of notation, but he also worked the system into a popular novel lest it be lost to 
the general public on the pages of a “weighty philological book.”135 The novel is historically 
situated during the reign of Emperor Wu (690-705). Each chapter of the book is devoted to one 
of thirty different countries, “strange lands abroad… the imaginary inventions of the author, 
designed to serve as contrasts to the Chinese Empire.”136 Hu writes, “This novel is of interest to 
us today as a monumental work of social criticism and propaganda. Undoubtedly, Li Ju-Chen 
was profoundly dissatisfied with many social customs and institutions of his time.”137 Multiple 
times throughout the novel the author displays deep interest “in the inequality of the sexes.” The 
author’s interest on this topic is so great that Hu says “the whole book may indeed be called a 
Chinese declaration of the Rights of Women. In this novel the author has raised many disquieting 
questions concerning the treatment of women.”138 Topics about the unequal treatment of women 
include such things as the double standard of sexual morality, the practice of foot-binding, other 
aspects of “womanisation,” such as clothing, adornments, station in the family, place in the home, 
etc.
139
 Further, Hu points out, “Li Ju-Chen was no mere negative critic of the position of women. 
On the constructive side, he advocates education for all women,” which he notes, “was no less 
radical than granting the vote to women, for in China the state examinations and proper channels 
of civic advancement and political participation.”140  
 To give the readers a better idea of how Li Ju-Chen addressed social topics in a manner 
similar to Swift’s Gulliver, I will describe one chapter in particular, which focuses on the 
Country of the Black-toothed People. The country of the black-toothed people was, Hu explains, 
“apparently his utopia of universal education for women.”141 In the Country of the Black-toothed 
People, all of the people have black skin and black teeth. Hu explains that the people of this land 
were described as a very ugly race. However, this land was the utopia of universal education for 
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women, and the people were so refined by their education that there honors took precedence over 
their unseemly appearance.  
The girls spend no money on cosmetics, because powder or rouge on their dark faces 
would only enhance their native ugliness. Other savings are spent on buying books and 
stationerys, because there are no class distinctions in the country and their only 
aristocracy is that of learning and scholarship. No man would want a woman for marriage 
until she has reached the age of maturity and attained some reputation for literary ability. 
She will have to remain unmarried if she has no talent or learning, even though she may 
be born in a great family. And our author emphatically characterizes the profound 
learning of two black girls of this utopian nation in whose presence the two visiting 
scholars from the Chinese Empire felt themselves intellectual dwarfs.
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Li Ju-Chen believed in the efficacy of literary examinations and for equal rights in the education 
and examination system for women.
143
 He uses the novel to highlight different manners of 
thought and to show how common social knowledge can be re-invented in novel ways capable of 
altering the cultural attitudes of the audience.   
As the above examples demonstrate, there is an exceedingly close relationship between 
rhetoric and culture in any given society. As Farrell explains, “Social knowledge comprises 
conceptions of symbolic relationships among problems, persons, interest, and actions, which 
imply (when accepted) certain notions of preferable public behavior.”144 The symbolic 
relationships that make up the meat of social knowledge run the gamut of cultural thought from 
ideas about who has the authority over knowledge, to ideas about what kind of logic “makes 
sense,” to judgments about what kind of rhetorical aims are humane.  
Because of its dependence upon some subsequent decision and action, social knowledge 
is characterized by a state of ‘potential’ or incipience. Yet even in its incipient state, 
social knowledge is functionally a covert imperative for choice and action; and pragmatic 
parlance, it is ‘live’ knowledge.145  
Social knowledge is a vast web of information, imagination, and judgments. It cannot be formed 
from one or a few rhetorical situations, and yet all rhetorical situations feed into the body of 
social knowledge that gives future action its potentiality, energy, or rhetorical force. 
 
Tolerance, Patience, and Self-Sufficiency  
When Hu Shi made “A Plea for Patriotic Sanity” to his fellow Chinese students in 
America, he demonstrated the relationship between courage and tolerance. The other Chinese 
students were itching for a fight with the Japanese. They wanted a nationalist government that 
would demonstrate pride. Yet, with great courage and tolerance for those who disagreed and 
insulted him, Hu asked the Chinese students for something of the same. He asked them to 
distinguish between acting on behalf of the nation’s long-term good and acting on behalf of 
short-term satisfaction. Hu maintained that with effort, everything is changeable. Focus on the 
institution and change it, because people and their psychology can change. People are not the 
enemy, the institutionalized cultural beliefs are. This is why eloquence is so important, because it 
has people focus on the whole instead of the particular parts, such as the particular beliefs or 
particular group of people that one might feel intolerance toward. 
Hu’s approach to tolerance and patience is based, in large part, on his appreciation for 
historical perspective. With historical perspective, one can appreciate how short a single life is 
when considered within a span of 1,000 years. The following passage is an excerpt from Hu’s 
article, “China’s Chances of Survival,” published in The People's Tribune in 1937. In it, he 
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discusses some of the great changes that Chinese culture has undergone in just the short course 
of his own life. He shows just how rapid these changes are when considered within the context of 
history.  
Herbert Spencer once said that nature was kind, and not acquired characteristics are not 
transmissible, or, if they were, the feet of the descendants of the Chinese mother of 
bounds feet would become smaller and smaller throughout the generations. The same 
consideration applies to all the evil institutions of our ancestors, which, though great evils 
in themselves, or man-made and capable of being unrooted by human effort. Once the 
Chinese girl is freed from the fetters of blood-binding and is given the benefits of modern 
schooling and physical exercises, she bursts forth in full blossom as one of the most 
beautiful and graceful species of womanhood. And her brother, when he gives up the 
octopartite composition and submit himself to the discipline of the modern school and the 
scientific laboratory, is capable of surprising the world by his dexterity in handling the 
test to answer the microscope, and by his quick understanding and creative ingenuity and 
scientific research. Six centuries of wasteful literary gymnastics apparently have not 
disabled the Chinese mentality any more than 1,000 years of foot-binding have 
permanently crippled the feet of the Chinese girls.
146
  
With historical perspective we might resist the urge to approach change so hastily.  Further, we 
might see the problems of culture for what they are, that is, products of institutions rather than 
markers of a people. As he writes, “The sins of our fathers are merely institutional, social, and 
educational. They are not biological or racial.”147 Great psychological change can take place in a 
single lifetime.
148
  
For Hu, belief in the strength of each individual to affect his/her future is directly related 
to belief in the possibility of a modern moral democratic state. Belief is an essential part of a 
modern moral democracy; it is at the crux of the scientific spirit, imagination, and the kinds of 
social contracts necessary for founding a democratic state. Individuals with a “self-directing 
power of personality,” according to L.T. Hobhouse’s definition of “new liberalism,” should be 
the foundation that the community and society are built upon.
149
 As Jerome Grieder does well to 
point out, Hu ascribed to this conception of new liberalism.  
The ancient Greek Sophist also understood the connection between “to dynaton (the 
possible)” and “pistis (belief),” which Poulakos explains was one of the aims of rhetorical art.150 
Laws, customs, and conventions are all matters of human agreement. One can trace the 
democratic underpinnings of ancient Greece to the development of the social contract in the 
European Renaissance. Hu understood how integral the same development of belief would be to 
the success of social contracts in modern China. The new Sophist would think of possibility and 
belief in the sense of a striving and reaching individual. By finding an individual perspective in 
the present, the new Sophist is able to look ahead, and by looking ahead they become self-
sufficient. One can now piece together a more comprehensive picture of temporality for the new 
Sophist. The past provides historical perspective and social knowledge used to make intelligent 
judgments and tempered actions in the present. The human capacities exercised over the course 
of the past and present create belief in our human ability to affect different possibilit ies for the 
future.  
 
Wisdom  
Wisdom is the combined result of the previously mentioned characteristics of the new 
Sophist: courage, criticism, creativity, and tolerance. Wisdom is the characteristic that carries the 
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“essential virtue of rhetoric,” that is, “proper choices at propitious moments,” Farrell explains.151 
This is the kind of person who can make a good decision at the right time and who can maintain 
self-discipline and excitement simultaneously. “The Greek words sophos, sophia, usually 
translated ‘wise’ and ‘wisdom,’ where in common use from the earliest times,” Guthrie writes.152 
Initially wisdom meant skill, as in the quote Guthrie gives of character from the Iliad who argued 
against Agamemnon and who then got chased out of the room by Odysseus for being impudent: 
“Thersites a contemptible character but sophos with his tongue.”153 Later “this sense merges 
easily into that of generally knowing or prudent.”154 He also associates sophos with teaching; 
“the name was often applied to poets, for in Greek eyes practical instruction and moral advice 
constituted the main function of the poet.”155 
The teaching function served by the Sophists of ancient Greece is very similar to the 
function Hu understood democratic institutions, like education and government, to serve. By 
practicing the ways of these institutions, one comes to understand their underlying rationale. As 
mentioned earlier, although political life is not a simple thing, Hu maintained that “this kind of 
organized life can be learned.”156 Further, some institutions prepare people for later participation 
in other institutions. Hu offers the example of student unions that arose during the new 
educational movement in 1919.  
They are organizations of young men and women, not for athletic or gladiatorial 
exhibitions , but for a serious and noble purpose. There can be no doubt that the 
associated life and organized activities of these unions will go very far towards training 
leadership and co-operation.
157
    
Here we return to the focus on social knowledge in contemporary rhetoric. Institutions function 
to integrate principles of organization into the daily lives of their participants. Founders of the 
institutions learn about the organizing principles of the institutions by an experimenting with 
them. The insight gained in the foundation of the institutions becomes reflected in the operation 
of the institutions. In turn, participants in the institutions become accustomed to the ins and outs 
of operation. They come to expect particular events and results. Those events and results set 
standards for how participants think things should happen. Thus, when new situational stimuli 
interrupt the fulfillment of participant expectations in an unfavorable way, the participants can 
set about experimental solutions, and once again, integrate the insight they gain into the 
operation of the institution for acclamation into the body of social knowledge perpetuated by that 
institution.  
All knowledge must be put on objective ground. This is an aspect of Western rhetoric in 
its developed modern form, from origins similar to those in China but left undeveloped. Hu 
wants to merge it with the ancient foundations in China. Further, Bitzer says that rhetoric is now 
accepted as something which all people use because all people make judgments and seek 
agreement with others.
158
 This movement from restricted conceptions of knowledge, like the 
ideal Truths of Platonic rhetoric, to the acceptance of a social knowledge, which all people have 
and which all people put to work in rhetoric, is an important connection between contemporary 
rhetoric and the original democratic rhetoric of ancient Greece.  
 Like ancient rhetoric, contemporary rhetoric is normative, not only in terms of style and 
judgment, but also in terms of intellectual agreement about the constitution of knowledge. As 
Farrell notes, in order to understand rhetoric, we must give attention to the connection between 
rhetoric and its “philosophic context.”159 As he explains, in the early 20th century, western 
rhetoric was impacted by a “growth in restrictive and restricting theories of knowledge.” 160 
Increases in technology and a growing base of scientific knowledge led to more complicated and 
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toughened standards of empirical validity. Although information was growing more abundant, 
one’s ability to become involved in the production of knowledge, and further, one’s ability to 
achieve the level of professional or expert in a field of scientifically and technologically 
grounded knowledge grew more difficult. Although an abundant amount of information became 
available to the public, a less accessible form of knowledge translated into a less accessible form 
of rhetoric. Hence, western civilization experiences a “paradoxical implication:” information 
increased while public dialogue decreased.
161
 Thus, there is a common correlation between 
changes in the social conception of knowledge and changes in the social conception of 
rhetoric.
162
  
 However, the increased availability of information has also corresponded with an 
increase in ideas about what constitutes acceptable knowledge. To handle this plurality, Farrell 
notes Thomas Kuhn’s contribution of the notion of “paradigms,” or “consensual agreements on a 
structured universe of discourse,” to the field of rhetoric.163  
Writers such as Kuhn force us to turn our attention to the kinds of cooperation which are 
necessary and possible in various fields of inquiry. For this much is apparent: no criterion 
for knowledge can be polemically proclaimed; at the very least, it must require the 
cooperation of others in some form.
164
  
Once again, we see the connection between contemporary philosophy and the idea of public 
consensus from rhetoric’s ancient democratic origins. Farrell then turns to John Zimmerman 
approached the idea of public consensus with his work, Public Knowledge. “The rationale of the 
‘scientific attitude’ is not that there is a set of angelic qualities of mind possessed by individual 
scientists that guarantees the validity of their every thought… but that scientists learn… to 
further the consensible end.”165 In short, the scientific attitude encourages the progress of social 
consensus.  
By integrating thought, speech, and civic practice, the wisdom of the Sophists arises from 
the ancient Greek democratic experience, which is an experience in contingencies. Farrell notes, 
“Rhetoric has always been a practiced imperfection.”166 Rhetoric doesn’t exist in the realm of 
polished Truths. However, with the combination of historical perspective and a critical attitude, 
rhetoric is an intelligent affair. Take for example Hu’s reasoning in the following passage.  
While conservative Chinese scholars still look down upon the living spoken language as 
the degraded jargon of the vulgar and the illiterate, the student of comparative languages 
can easily convince himself that the living national tongue is the culmination of over 
twenty centuries’ linguistic revision and reform, and is consequently by far superior to 
the long dead classical language.
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Hu is looking at historical examples like the great poetry of the “Tang Dynasty (c, 620-900) [that] 
owes much to the influence of the popular songs of the pre-Tang period. It is safe to say that the 
best poems of Tang are either written in the popular tongue or in a style nearest to it.”168 He is 
also looking at the prose of literati from the Tang dynasty. “The great teachers of the Chuan or 
Zen School of Buddhism first used it in preaching and recording sayings and discourses. The 
style proved to be so effective in philosophical writings that the Neo-Confucian philosophers of 
Sung and later dynasties had to adopt it in most of their philosophical discussions.”169 With 
historical perspective and a critical willingness to spot the life of a similar kind of idea obscured 
in a completely different context, Hu can decipher the continuity of linguistic revision and 
reform, and thus, can invent novel logos.  
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Eloquence 
The culmination of the new Sophist is eloquence. Eloquence describes the kind of 
personal character that can move China beyond perceived humiliations and deficiencies, not by 
ignoring them or playing on them to inspire a reactive and exclusionary sort of nationalistic 
excitement, but to own up to cultural faults, to display courage and wisdom, and to create a 
rhetorical art to unite the people and enable them to step out of the past and move toward the 
possibility of a rhetorically imagined future. “A rhetorical culture is first and foremost an idea,” 
Farrell writes.
170
 The Chinese people, Hu would say, have not effectively apprehended the idea 
of a modern rhetorical culture.  
The Republic has failed, not because modern China has failed—there has never been a 
modern China—but because in all these processes the changes have been superficial and 
have hardly touched the fundamental issues of political transformation. There has been 
practically no modern leadership, practically no genuine admission of our real 
weaknesses, no recognition of spiritual possibilities of the new civilisation. Such reforms 
as were carried out were regarded as necessary evil and were never directed by men 
trained for such great tasks.
171
 
As Hu explains, true leaders, meaning eloquent and inspiring rhetors, are willing to make 
admissions and have the creative optimism to imagine novel future scenarios. The audience 
believes in the knowledge, honesty, and capabilities of an eloquent rhetor. “Eloquence,” is 
defined by Emerson as “the power to translate a truth into language perfectly intelligible to the 
person to whom you speak.”172 This idea of eloquence is not refer to voice intonation alone, but 
total translation, which includes pronunciation but also the characteristics of culture and thought 
that are found in the structure and the meaning of speech.  
Further, an eloquent speaker would be able to help the audience make sense of both the 
good and bad aspects of China’s history. Farrell notes two particularly important aspects of 
rhetoric for the situation Hu perceived of China’s failed Republic. First, rhetoric helps to create 
“a meaningful cultural story,”173 and second, “reason involves facing up to what we have done, 
picking up the pieces, and moving on.”174 Rather than moments of shame, the eloquent speaker 
helps the audience revision stumbling points as points of progress. “Eloquence shows the power 
and possibility of man,”175 Emerson says. The eloquent orator is found in a particular kind of 
situation. Eloquence functions as a “provocation.”176 He gives six essentials of eloquence: clear 
perceptions, memory, power of statement, logic, imagination, passion, and a grand will. 
Imagination, he says, is “the skill to clothe your thought in natural images.” The grand will refers 
to “character.”177   
In 1954 Hu spoke on the topic “An Oriental Looks at the Modern Western 
Civilization.”178 In it he exhibits many qualities of eloquence.  
In my brief life of a little over sixty years, I have gone through two critical 
periods of cultural conflict in which I had to choose a side and take a stand. In my 
younger years, I was faced with the great conflict between the old civilization of the East 
and the young, vigorous, expanding, and aggressive civilization of the Western world. In 
that struggle, I came out openly and unequivocally as a severe critic of the oriental 
civilization and a steadfast defender of the occidental civilization. 
In my more mature years, I had to face a new era of cultural conflict in the war of 
the totalitarian systems against the Democratic civilization of the free peoples of the West. 
That new conflict led me to review and rethink what I had said and published on the 
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subject, and I came out once more an unequivocal defender and supporter of the 
civilization of the democratic world.
179
 
Hu presents himself as a learner, someone who is critical, creative, and knowledgeable, and who 
continues to grow more critical, creative, and knowledgeable. This is integral to eloquence 
because it connects the speaker to the audience as a single person in a world of complexities. By 
admitting the difficulty of this position, Hu allows the audience to trust in the fruits of his labor. 
The audience can see that his conclusions are the products of his own effort. How terrible it 
would be to find out we are the third party in a string of deceptions.   
The audience of an eloquent speaker also appreciates the continuity of the development 
of thought. For example, Hu mentions a topic that originally concerned him and then continued 
to, that is, the misuse of the phrases “spiritual civilization” and “materialistic civilization.”180  
That civilization is materialistic which is limited and conquered by matter and incapable 
of transcending it, which feels itself powerless against its material environment and fails 
to make the full use of human intelligence for the conquest of nature and for the 
improvement of the conditions of man. Its sages and saints may do all they can to glorify 
contentment and hypnotize the people into a willingness to praise their gods and abide by 
their fate. But the very self-hypnotizing philosophy is more materialistic than the scanty 
food they eat and the clay and wood with which they make the images of their gods.
181
 
He says that his original praises of the modern western civilization “were written and published 
at the height of postwar prosperity.”182 He shows the audience the development of his thought in 
narrative form, with significant historical events as markers, and characteristics of the historical 
mood for the audience’s sympathetic emotional memory. Then, he says, a series of events forced 
me to rethink all of my praises. The era of the New Deal under President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
the approach of the Second World War, and “the great miracle of American war production and 
American military leadership in the great war of civilizations,” together, “forced me to take a 
renewed interest in the fate of the modern civilization of the Western democracies.”183 Both 
times Hu reflects on the differences between the new democratic civilization of the west and 
China’s old traditional civilization, he comes to the topic of materialism. In the first discussion it 
was about the misuse of the term. Second, it comes as a more developed discussion of the social 
philosophies attendant to each civilization.  
During those years of the Second World War, I could not help asking myself the 
question: does the taking of older of Western technology by Japan really make her a 
‘Western civilization’? Did not Germany, the great master of science and technology, 
become completely alienated from the Western democracies after Hitler had destroyed 
the German Republic and established totalitarian regime? And the Soviet Union has 
certainly been devoting herself to the task of taking over the technology of the West; but 
has that made her a ‘Western civilization’? 
And I would ask further: what is that third element of the modern Western 
civilization which long ago I had vaguely labeled as Democracy or ‘the religion of 
Democracy’? What is it that has enabled the Western democracies, in particular the 
Anglo-Saxon democracies to survive so many national and international crises and keep 
their democratic institutions intact? What was it that has, for instance, made it possible 
for the American nation to go through the Great Depression without a revolution, to 
affect its economic and industrial recovery without a dictatorship, and to mobilize its 
entire national economy for war production and put twelve million men into active war 
service without bringing about a military dictatorship or a militaristic system? 
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From such questioning and reasoning, I have come to the conclusion that what 
really differentiates the democracies from the undemocratic and anti-democratic 
countries is the principal and the effective machinery of democratic control of the 
authority and power of the government. A democracy is a government in which the 
authority and power of the state are ultimately and effectively controlled by the will of 
the people. 
The effective control of the governmental powers of the state has always been the 
most difficult problem that has troubled the political thinking of all times. And the 
greatest positive contribution of Anglo-Saxon liberalism to the political thinking of the 
world lies exactly in its traditional emphasis on this problem. No other people in history 
has exceeded in devising a workable system for the effective control of that great 
‘Leviathan,’ the State.184  
Hu leads us through his inquisitive process. He takes us bit by bit through the particular aspects 
of his observations that intrigued and excited him, and as I read along, I too am intrigued and 
excited. Yet, it’s the kind of excitement that has an objective quality; it is an intellectually driven 
excitement, with something to focus thought on. He is leading me somewhere and I can continue 
to pursue the train of thought once he has finished. Crick says eloquence has the ability “to 
channel passionate action by thoroughly remaking the relationship between human beings and 
their environment so as to produce the experience of being different people acting in a different 
world.”185 Hu is working to create a different conception of the people’s relationship to the 
government. It would be as difficult to explain to a western audience as it would be to a Chinese 
audience because both require conceptualizing a wholly different dynamic. Hu’s ability to 
translate that dynamism to the audience will be part of what determines his eloquence as a rhetor.  
 To be an eloquent speaker, Hu must transfer his own creative optimism to the people by 
weaving together a “meaningful cultural story” that “faces up to” the past and translates a “truth” 
into the cultural language of the audience. Hu frequently achieves this goal. Take the following 
selection from the 1933 Haskell lectures for example. The Chinese Renaissance of the 20th 
century is but the most recent installation in a series of Renaissance movements in China's 
cultural history, Hu explained. This period of Renaissance differs from the others because it is 
conscious of its goals and will go far enough to uproot and destroy the old traditions so that new 
traditions may develop and thrive in their place. Changes in China have also been complicated 
by political instability. Hu writes on this point: 
When the Republic was established it soon found itself constantly menaced by the danger 
of domination by reactionary forces backed by the military, and by the difficulty of 
reestablishing authority of the central government against the powerful centrifugal forces 
of provincialism. So 20 more years have been wasted in the long political struggles, 
which, though extremely chaotic and confusing to the casual observer, are historically 
intelligible as phases of one great movement—that of a new China seeking to build up a 
unitary modern state in the face of strong forces of reaction and disintegration.
186
 
He differentiates between the cultural responses of Japan and China to Western influence::  
Under such conditions, a study and orderly progress in the work of cultural readjustments, 
such as has taken place in Japan, is not expected in China. China's cultural readjustment 
was doomed to be slow, spasmodic, discontinuous, and wasteful. For orderly and 
continuous reformation must of necessity rely upon some stable political order as a 
nucleus, as a center of gravity, around which all separate and individual efforts may 
gravitate, accumulate, and be perpetuated into a continuous whole.
187
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There is a great history of literature written in the living language of the people, what Hu calls 
China's “living literature.” Yet, like the Renaissance movement at large, he says movements in 
the living literature have never been “conscious and articulate” enough to break the classical 
authority. 
There were a number of writers who were attracted by the irresistible power and beauty 
of the literature of lowly and untutored peasants and dancing girls and street reciters, and 
who were tempted to produce their best works in the form and the language of the 
literature of the people. But they were so ashamed of what they had done that many of the 
earlier novelists published their works anonymously or under strange noms de plume. 
There was no clear and conscious recognition that the classical language was long dead 
and must be replaced by the living tongue of the people. Without such articulate 
challenges the living language and literature of the people never dared to hope that they 
might some day usurp the high position occupied by the classical literature.
188
 
Hu does a wonderful job of connecting the present to the past and encouraging the audience to 
feel integrated into the long and historical narrative he tells from a place of passion and wisdom. 
Further, from a great breadth of historical knowledge, Hu makes conclusions with the kind of 
certitude that makes them seem obvious.  
The death knell of the classical language was sounded when it was historically 
established that it had died at least 2000 years ago... Once the table of values was turned 
upside down, once the vulgar language was consciously demonstrated to be the best 
qualified candidate for the honor of the national language of China, the success of the 
revolution was beyond doubt. The time had been ripe for the change. The common sense 
of the people, the songs and tales of numberless and nameless men and women, have 
been for centuries unconsciously but steadily preparing for this change. All unconscious 
processes of evolution are of necessity very slow and wasteful. As soon as these 
processes are made conscious and articulate, intelligent guidance and experimentation 
become possible, and the work of many centuries may be telescoped into the brief period 
of a few years.
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I believe this example demonstrates that Hu possesses great rhetorical eloquence. He excuses the 
audience from thinking about the particularities of their actual situation while taking them to an 
imagined place built from the memory of a time that left a significant impression on his thought. 
He wants us to be impressed by the great historical legacy of the vernacular language the way he 
is, so he reminds us of the legacy by describing how the most lauded writers of China found the 
vulgar tongue to be irresistible. He explains the failings of the earlier movements in literature and 
imbues the audience with the optimism of a novel alternative future by showing how they are no 
longer plagued by the conditions that caused the previous failings.  
We, the audience, are able to go to Hu’s place of excitement with him. He brings us there 
because it gives us access to the crux of his thought, the instructional aspect that allows us to see 
the bigger picture, across multiple spaces and times like he does. Yet still, within this imagined 
place, the memory focuses on a particular part of the puzzle, a major road mark on the map to a 
different social dynamic. The official announcement of the death of classical language is a 
particular appearance, Hu’s memory of our destination. Eloquence acknowledges both the 
individual and the bigger picture. It says that each person and each event plays a vital role in the 
outcome of our endeavor.  It seeks to change the audience’s relationship to their surroundings 
emotionally, personally, cognitively, and actively. Eloquence makes an audience feel as if they 
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are in the presence of the whole; and they can know it because eloquence is the sign of it. The 
effects of eloquence are transformative.  
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Conclusion  For a Rhetorical Synthesis  
A Reform for Two Audiences  
Perhaps as a testament to the human drive for self-actualization no matter what the cost, 
China’s old guard was ripped down by its newest members.  
The Manchus were driven out by a small band of intrepid revolutionists in league with 
enlightened officials. But the Chinese people took no part in the first revolution. The 
monarchist movement of Yuan Shih-k’ai was killed by Peking officialdom But the people 
of China were silent. Chang Hsun's attempted restoration of the Manchus was squelched 
by the very officials who are betraying their country today. But the people took no 
interest. Since then a great war has been fought in Europe. On the fields of France and 
Belgium the fairest sons of the great nations of the west had given their lives that 
democracy and justice might exist upon the earth. Throughout the world like the voice of 
a prophet has gone the word of Woodrow Wilson strengthening the weak and giving 
courage to the struggling. And the Chinese people have listened and they too have 
heard… They looked for the dawn of this new millenium but no sun rose for China. The 
masses of the people looked toward Peking There they found only corruption and 
treason… They found that they were inadequately prepared to offer a practical plan to 
save the country. The merchants lacked initiative they were looking for a leader. And the 
leadership came from school boys and school girls who were ready to sacrifice their 
future careers liberty and life that China might continue to exist. The students of China 
refused to study refused to participate in the usual affairs of life until China was free. 
They clogged the machinery of the nation. They brought the issue to a head.
1
 
The intellectual class and the common class account for the two primary audiences of Hu’s 
project. Intellectual institutions, like Peking University in particular, functioned as the hubs for 
radical ideas.
2
  
Hu targeted the common class with aesthetics; he appealed to be bardic elements of 
common life. The poets, painters, and novelists who spoke the vulgar tongue spoke to the 
heritage of the oral tradition. Cultural change was made possible by accessible language. New 
ideas, new products, multiple points of perspective, and a communal sense of shared experience 
prompted the common class to look up from their daily toil. With literacy and available literature, 
people who earlier had only thought of themselves as part of the family or community could now 
see themselves as an individual on a historical timeline related to others by experiences shared 
across space and time.  
Hu aimed at the educated public intellectual class, politicians, students, critics, and 
philosophers with the logical side of his project. This aspect of the reform spoke to the heritage 
of the Confucian literati. It sought to ready the elite group for that time when the common people 
would turn to look toward them. Logic would enable the intellectual class to be ready to help the 
common class with a practical plan. 
By speaking to both groups, who traditionally were severely separated, Hu hoped to 
produce “unity” between them. Only a unified society could achieve the goal of his reform. His 
goal was the reason that makes the labor of reform worth it, that is, the ability to participate in 
the constant creation of a world of your own making. 
Further, only a unified society could help China avoid falling into the technocratic 
clutches the likes of which had got ahold of Japan. As mentioned in the introduction, Up until 
this point, China had no experience with democracy as a political system. Yet, Hu maintained 
that China did have experience with some fundamental characteristics of democratic thought and 
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he sought to develop these tendencies within China. He realized the necessity of developing his 
vision from within China because of the alternatives that would be risked by doing it any other 
way. On the one hand, the risk was to import an overly operational and caricaturized version of 
western technology and science. On the other hand, the risk was to allow a partial importation to 
be subsumed by the larger homegrown and historically ruthless structure of traditional thought. 
The Historical Society  
Many aspects of Confucianism, as originally conceived, are amenable to the development 
of a modern civilization that is directed by the scientific spirit. For instance, Hu pointed to the 
Confucian doctrine of change as a positivist development as a counter to the destructive Sophism 
of Laotze. He said this aspect of Confucianism functioned similarly to the way Platonic logic 
countered the nihilism of late Sophistry.   
It has been said that the Platonic logic originated as a reaction against the Heraclitean 
doctrine of change; that, impressed by the all-pervasiveness of change, Plato sought and 
found stability in the changeless ‘ideas.’ It is significant that the book which, in my 
opinion, contains most of the basic doctrines of the Confucian logic is known as the Yi, 
or Book of Change.
3
 
Likewise, Hu understood that constructive characteristics existed alongside preservationist 
characteristics in the Confucian principle of the Five Relationships, which detailed relationships 
of duty between different peoples of higher and lower status. Wei-ming Tu notes that “the 
underlying structure of the Five Relationships suggests a strong concern for social ethics,”4 
which was a particular concern of Hu’s and guided his judgment on economic and political 
theory.  
 Hu also saw a strong presence of Humanism in the Chinese intellectual tradition, which 
was paramount to his ambition for a “transvaluation” of all values.5 Already, the importance of 
history was highly regarded in Chinese intellectualism. The kind of perseverance needed for 
gradual and lasting reform, Hu found, was also present and highly regarded in the intellectual 
tradition. Hi locates perseverance in the idea in traditional Chinese intellectual life of hsin-an li-
te. He explains it according to a discussion on the scholars of the Song and Ming dynasties who 
studied li-hsüeh, the study of Reason who were often persecuted and died under the staff at court, 
in prison, or in special prison camps. Vincent Y. C. Shih, writes of Hu using this explanation to 
show how “in the ancient Chinese culture, there was little that may be called submissive.”6 
Chinese scholars are driven to persevere by the traditional idea of hsin-an li-te. Often mistaken 
for a negative attitude, it is actually a positive and progressive attitude of protest. “One will keep 
silent only when one's mind is at ease and when the principle prevails. Should a person feel ill at 
ease as a result of one's conviction that the moral principle was lacking, he should not remain 
silent; he should protest.”7 Hu Shi saw that there are many progressive attitudes in China's 
intellectual tradition that were masked by the conservative ends to which they were employed.  
The Contemporary Society  
Issues of “citizenship” and protest, like Hu was concerned with, are wrapped up in some 
of the most pressing problems of China today, many of which have to do with property interests. 
Chinese scholars have taken a renewed interest in Hu Shi. In particular, this is because of the 
prevalence of ideas like these, on citizenry and public intellectualism, in present-day China. For 
example, David Kelly’s study, “Citizen Movements and China's Public Intellectuals in the Hu 
Wen Era,” focuses on concepts of neoliberalism, citizenship formation, and citizen movements. 
He explains, These are especially salient questions in the rapidly evolving new style of 
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government ushered in by the transfer of power between 2003 and 2005 from Party Secretary 
Jiang Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji, to the new guard of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao.”8 
“Citizenship” is an especially important term in today’s heavily censored Chinese media, 
because it can be used where other more risky terms, like democracy and freedom cannot.
9
 The 
term citizenship, on the other hand, is attached to “abstract norms” that provide “a protected 
discursive space.”10  
David Kelly's article looks at three specific segments of property interests, all of which 
have increasingly taken up space in the headlines of international news: “migrant workers, urban 
homeowners, and groups with closely related property interests.”11 There is overlap between 
today’s discussions of citizenship and the discussions taking place in twentieth century China, 
however, “this citizenship discourse it analytically distinct from earlier discussions of civil 
society in China.”12  
The relevance of Hu Shi to Chinese intellectuals of today can be seen in one piece of 
overlap in particular, that is, “the stratum of public intellectuals,” which Kelly identifies as 
“another shaping force in contemporary China.”13 Today’s public intellectuals are increasingly 
found among the ranks of lawyers and journalists and citizen activists. This is because the issues 
of citizenship/property rights that tend to boil over into a public rhetorical space are related to 
“the ‘opportunity structures’ created when the state fall short in the delivery of promised rights 
and protections. Citizenship, as the ‘right to hold rights,’ is in itself an opportunity structure of 
special intensity and volatility.”14 This category of public controversy has been termed the 
category of “rightful resistance,” and it is for issues of rightful resistance that lawyers, journalists, 
and citizen activists are most likely to get involved.
15
  
 Another category of contemporary controversy in China for which Hu becomes 
particularly relevant is the category of political identity dilemmas, which Kelly notes, takes up 
significant space in discussions of citizenship and intellectualism.
16
 While the description of a 
political identity is constructed out of “a range of attributes,” it is specifically “the recognition of 
this identity, by oneself or by others, that puts it into play politically.”17 Hu considered self-
identity and national identity as vital to the rhetorically imagined democratic state, and in turn, 
all specifically situated democratic practices.  
In China the nation-state is strongly fused with anxieties concerning unity, territorial 
integrity and sovereignty. Xenophobia and suspicion of hybrids coexist with secular, 
cosmopolitan and outward-looking sources of identity. The future of political civilization 
and social harmony is bound up with the balance of power between these forces, because 
while Chinese political civilization is destined to remain Chinese, this does not preclude 
it from being a hybrid—a Chinese citizen society.18 
The “value commitments,” “anxieties about unity,” and other nervous topics Kelly mentions, 
such as “historical destiny, political culture, and national interest,” are all consistent with the 
anxieties that Hu was responding to in the 1900s.
19
 
Studies on Hu Shi stand to make increasingly significant contributions to China’s 
contemporary rhetorical landscape. Furthermore, scholarship between China and the U.S. is 
growing evermore ready to be bridged in meaningful ways. As an American scholar of Chinese 
communication studies, I have experienced the need for comparative and expositional studies 
across the humanities firsthand. I hope that the present study has fulfilled my intended 
contribution to the body of scholarship that provides the vital means of intelligent access to other 
cultures. 
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State of the Field  
Guo-Ming Chen, in his survey of Asian Communication Studies, says that by always 
contrasting the Asian culture with European cultural characteristics and then amplifying this 
contrast, Asian and Western scholars tend to devalue or excuse the other cultural view. “On the 
behavioral level, this contrasting view inevitably leads to the dichotomy of Eastern collectivism 
versus Western individualism.”20 This kind of overgeneralization stands in the way of critical 
investigation and obscures the meaning of actual foundational values.  
Another superficial distinction too often exaggerated is between communication styles. 
Chen describes the tendency of communication scholars to rely on characterized descriptions of 
the western communication style as direct and confrontational and the eastern communication 
style as indirect and harmonious. “The convenience of the harmony vs. confrontation distinction 
is not without its pitfall when real interactions on both sides are observed. For instance, no 
human society can be conflict-free, and a conflict can be resolved by adopting either a 
harmonious style or a confrontational style in any society.”21 A culture might tend toward one 
style or the other, but a tendency is only a leaning, or predilection. It is not guaranteed; and any 
researcher who always expects this tendency or relies on it to explain communication situations 
without due investigation will necessarily undermine the potential value of their work.   
Superficial dichotomies and the domination of the Eurocentric paradigm have strained efforts to 
advance Chinese communication studies in the United States. However, “the oppressive situation 
is the stage for change,” Chen maintains.22 He urges scholars of Asian communication studies 
from the United States and Asia to pursue the goal of the Tao, which is to find “unity in 
multiplicity, a wholeness of parts… a realm of grand interfusion (da tong) that is free from all 
determinations and contradictions.”23 To reach this state, “it is critical for scholars of Asian 
communication studies to foster their ability to know the nature and relationship of difference 
and similarity and to cultivate their ability to negotiate the differences.”24 Chen is looking for 
communication scholarship of “multicultural co-equality” that can lift scholars out of 
“dichotomized struggle[s]” of empty meaning and allow them to achieve the reliable results they 
are after.
25
  
The kind of research, characterized by “unity in multiplicity, a wholeness of parts…,” to 
which Chen refers is precisely the kind of rhetorical synthesis Hu was working toward with the 
theories on comparative scholarship and reform culminating that he increasingly dedicated 
himself to in the latter part of his life. From early on, Hu frequently referred to the reform in 
terms of a revival, rebirth, and renaissance. Likewise, he always maintained that matters of logic 
and aesthetics are of utmost significance to the development of a modern culture. The 1923 plan 
for modern learning stands out as one intellectual strain from among many that Hu grew 
increasingly committed to. This strain, in particular, is important because it indicates the 
culmination of Hu’s rhetorical thought. Whereas the revival sought to dig logic out of obscurity 
and the rebirth was expressed as an aesthetic awakening of the scientific spirit, Hu’s idea of 
Renaissance, a fusion of revival and rebirth, becomes more clearly defined with his plan for 
modern learning.   
He highly valued historical studies and advanced his own genealogical approach to study 
China’s intellectual and cultural legacies. In 1958, four years before his death, Hu Shi recorded 
his oral history, Reminiscences of Shih Hu, at Columbia University. In his oral history, he 
recounts the plan he outlined for a “new revival of learning” in the first article of the journal 
Kuo-ksueh chi-k’an (the Journal of Sinological Studies) in 1923.26 The plan consisted of three 
methods of modern Chinese scholarship that were intended to remedy the defects of traditional 
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scholarship—primarily that its scope of investigation was too narrow. Generally, the plan aimed 
at a systematic approach to comparative studies.
27
 It culminated with Hu’s suggestion for 
Chinese intellectuals to form “specialized histories,” meaning the history of language, history of 
literature, history of economics, political history, history of the international communication of 
ideas, and so on, to open scholarship up to reference materials of all kinds.
28
 With specialized 
histories and ample sources for comparison, Hu reasoned that China’s intellectuals could develop 
a method of evidential analysis capable of specifying the era’s most acute problems and 
developing plans suitable for attending to them.  
The concept that relief from present-day dilemmas could be found in the light shed by 
genealogical investigation and comparative analysis is the foundation of Hu Shi’s pragmatic 
philosophy of reform. At different times in his life, perhaps for reasons of age, academic 
maturity, and historical situation, Hu expressed this platform in different ways. While studying in 
America, he tried to direct his classmates down a path of enlightenment by contrasting and 
exposing the distinction between patriotism and nationalism. During the pinnacle of his reform 
involvement he tried to show his associates a third option for China’s reform, beyond wholesale 
westernization and traditionalism, by comparing an originating point of the scientific civilization 
of the West, the spirit of sophistic doubt in ancient Greece, to the seedlings of that same tradition 
of doubt in ancient Chinese philosophy. He hoped this comparison would show his associates an 
alternative model of development for China, in which “modern” and “Chinese” are not mutually 
exclusive. He also tried to contrast American democracy with European democracies to show 
how different economic models lead to different social structures. He hoped such a comparison 
would teach his Chinese associates that they had choice and could play a directing role in the 
development of a modern China.  
Hu Shi understood causality as connected to hope. The ability to understand the pattern 
of cause and effect frees a person from the trappings of the present, and makes history a tool for 
shaping the future. But he also knew that it is only through communication that this 
understanding is made possible. Therefore, Hu Shi’s Literary Revolution aimed at promoting a 
rhetorical culture where publics with common interests could come together in rhetorical 
dialogue regarding some problem shared in a particular situation. Hu Shi’s goal will always be 
relevant. 
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